* KurdishMedia.com - By Dr Rebwar Fatah, 25/05/2005
A king is just like a chess king today in the world.
From a poem by Shukri Fazli, Kurdish intellect, journalist and poet
There are countless Kurdish figures that have been denied due credit for contributing to the cause of their people. Mustafa Pasha Yamolki is but one. Attempting to name the others would risk missing some and history already excels at this.
Therefore, this article seeks to reveal some unknown details of Yamolki’s life and to reintroduce him after an absence that is unjustified for a human of such stature. It was a significant, but worthwhile, challenge to discover information about Yamolki. I depended heavily upon his immediate family, whose acquaintance I treasure a great deal.
Contents
- Family background
- Education
- Profession and military life
- Sense of humour
- Role in the Kingdom of Kurdistan - Sulemani
Prior to his death on May 25, 1936 in the Alwazyrya area of Baghdad, Mustafa Pasha Yamolki asked to have this verse of poetry etched into his grave:
Etirsm ey weten bimrim, nebînim bextiyarî to
Binwsin ba leser qebrim, weten xemgîn u min xemgîn.
Which can be translated to:
My homeland, I am scared that I may die without seeing your happiness
Etch into my grave that my homeland and I are both sad.
He was buried in the Gurdi Saywan [Saywan Heights] graveyard in Sulemani, along with many other well-known Kurds. Until his death, Yamolki remained proud of his Kurdish nationality.
Family background
Yamolki was born in Sulemani, South Kurdistan, on 25 January 1866, to an intellectual family. They lived in one of the traditional areas of Sulemani, Sabonkaran, opposite to the well-known public bath, Hamami Mufti. At 170 cm tall, Yamolki was renowned for his patriotism, bravery and brightness.
Yamolki belongs to the powerful Bilbaz, one of the Kurdish tribes.
On 3 May 1888, Yamolki married Safya Khanim Khandan Zada, the daughter of Hussain Pasha and the sister of Saeed Pash, in Istanbul. Hers was a well-known Kurdish family and lived in Uskidar area in Istanbul.
Yamolki and his wife had one son and three daughters:
- Colonel Aziz Yamolky deceased on August 1982 in Baghdad
- Zahra Yamolky (married to Ezzet Bagy Jaff) deceased 1972 in Baghdad
- Dr. Anjom Yamolky deceased 1968 in Paris, France
- Ms Maliha Yamolky
Education
In Yamolki’s era, the majority of Middle Easterners were illiterate. Yet Yamolki was a highly educated person with high qualifications and experiences as a military personnel. He spoke Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish and Persian fluently.
He attended primary school in Sulemani and studied in mosques, which was customary during his time. Two religious teachers, Mala Fatah and Mala Erfan, taught him in Said Hussan Mosque, at an early age. Yamolki entered a military school called Rusdia Alaskarya [Al-Rushdia Military School] in Baghdad. He then transferred to a military school, known as Harb Medrasasi (literally means War School) in Istanbul. In the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Yamolki had access to higher education institutions and intellectual communities.
Professional and military life
- 1888 graduated with distinction from the General Staff Academy in Istanbul as an officer (Naqib). After one year, he transferred to Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) to lead the Hijaz Division of the Ottoman Empire as a high-ranking officer.
- 1893 appointed as a councillor in Slimas and Khuey, Urmiah Province East [Iranian] Kurdistan and also a commercial councillor in Sanandaje Province East Kurdistan.
- 1899 appointed as the deputy chief of military staff of the entire Ottoman sixth army in Baghdad.
- 1904 appointed as a commissioner to define the border between Iraq and Iran.
- 1908 appointed as the head of the military division in Ankara.
- 1909 promoted as a brigadier and appointed head of the 21st army in Baghdad and transferred to a similar rank in Azerbaijan a year later.
- 1911 appointed as the commander of the fifth army during the Turkish-Italian War.
- 1917 appointed to lead the Ottoman Empire army in Baghdad.
- December 3, 1918, appointed to lead the Ottoman Army in Syvas region (North East of Turkey).
- Yamolki also wrote poetry. His book of poetry was published in Baghdad in 1956 after his death.
Sense of humour
Yamolki was well-known for his sense of humour as the following story illustrates.
The time is 1912, the place is Istanbul. One day when Mustafa Pasha was in his Saray (official office in the Turkish language), he sent a soldier to find him a shoe polisher for his military boots. A young person came in and began to polish Yamolki’s boots. The young shoe polisher, a Kurd, didn’t know that the man whose boots he was polishing was also a Kurd. So the story began.
As the young shoe polisher worked on the boots, he was swearing in Kurdish at the boots’ owner. Yamolki kept quiet until the shoe polisher finished his job. Then Yamolki approached him kindly, paid ten Ghroosh (a local currency of the time) and told the shoe polisher in very clear Kurdish, "This 10 Ghroosha is for the boots and this 10 Lira is for the swearing.
Yamolki’s Role in the Kingdom of Kurdistan – Sulemani
The Ottoman Empire had asked for an Armistice on Oct. 30th 1918. The Arabian provinces were lost, which was partitioned between Britain and France by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1917; France proceeded not only to occupy Syria and Lebanon, but also Cilicia. The Italians claimed the coast opposite the already Italian Dodekanese islands; the Greeks desired the Smyrna region and Eastern Thrace.
Entente troops occupied the Straits area including Istanbul, which they demanded be demilitarized. The powers contemplated the establishment of an Armenian State in north-eastern Anatolia (under British protection) and a Kurdish State in south-eastern Anatolia (under French protection); there was little room left for a Turkish state.
Sultan Mehmed VI Vahiheddin, who had ascended to the throne only in July 1918, soon found himself unable to lead the affairs of his Empire, his own capital being occupied by Entente forces.
An officer, the hero of Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Ataturk) organized Turkish troops in the Ankara region, establishing a provisorical administration and reorganising the Ottoman forces into a Turkish army. Ataturk also gained the Kurdish support by promising the establishment of a Turkish-Kurdish republic.
In 1920 the Entente offered harsh conditions in the Treaty of Sevres, a treaty Turkey’s parliament never ratified.
In 1921, France withdrew from Cilicia; the united front of the Entente disintegrated. Ataturk’s forces defeated the Greeks in the Battle of Sakalya in 1922; in 1923 the Greeks were expelled from Smyrna. The Italians withdrew. The war had been decided militarily. The hitherto provisorical Turkish Republic gained international recognition in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
After the end of the First World War, Yamolki was appointed to the Iraqi legal court. Then Vali of Prussia, Farid Pasha commissioned Yamolki to head a military court as a military judge to try the Kemel Ataturk’s group.
The group was charged with declaring a mutiny against the Istanbul Caliphdom which had been established after the dethroning of Sultan Abdul-Hamid. The group comprised of Mustafa Kemel (later known as Ataturk 1881-1938– i.e. the father of Turks), Foud Pasha, Dury Pasha Ciqmaq and Husyain Rauf Bag.
The group was to be sentenced in absentia and, on April 20, 1920, Yamolki ordered their death by hanging.
In 1922 in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal finally defeated the Turkish Government of Constantinople which, as heir to the Ottomans, had signed the Treaty of Sevres. Born in Erzurum province and helped to victory by the Kurdish people, the Kemalist Movement originally proclaimed its intention to create a modern Republic of Turkey in which the Kurdish and Turkish people would live as equals with full ’ethnic rights’. Kemalism rejected the Treaty of Sevres, which may have been a just treaty in that it guaranteed rights of independence and self-determination to the Kurds.
The genocide of every aspect of Kurds and Kurdistan by the Turks under the pretext of national unity continued, i.e. Turkification of the Kurdistan. The bloodshed has not stopped since.
On June 17, 1921, after Ataturk’s victory, Yamolki returned to his homeland where he took part in the newly established Kurdish State of Sulemani, headed by Shekh Mahmud Barzinji.
When Yamulki arrived back in Kurdistan, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji was leading the Kurdish people to establish a Kurdish state in South Kurdistan.
On October 10, 1921, a statement was issued in Sulemani, the capital of Kurdistan, to establish a Kurdish government. Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji declared himself as the King of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The cabinet members included
- Abdulkarim Alaka - Finance Minister
- Ahmed Bagy Fatah Bag - Customs Minister
- Hajy Mala Saeed Karkukli - Justice Minister
- Hema Abdullah Agha - Labour Minister
- Mustafa Pasha Yamolki- Education Minister
- Sheikh Qadir Hafeed, a brother of Sheikh Mahmud - Prime Minister
- Sheikh Mohammed Gharib - Interior Minister
- Zaky Sahibqran - Defence Minister (The Kurdish army at that time was called The Kurdish National Army)
Sheikh Mufeed Sheikh Qadir appointed as the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, and the Brigadier General, Saddik Qadiry (Yamolki’s brother) as the Army’s General Inspector. Despite his strong religious affiliation, Sheikh Barzinji appointed a Christian to the post of finance minister, which shows the diversity of the Kurdish society and his own open-mindedness.
Jemiyeti Kurdistan (Kurdistan Association)
On July 21, 1922, a group of Kurdish intellectuals and social figures, led by Yamoki, established Jemiyeti Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Association). The founding members were:
- Ahmad Behjat Afendi
- Ali Afendi Bapir Agha
- Faiq Arif Beg
- Haji Agha Fethulla
- Idham Yuzybashi
- Rafiq Hilmi Ahmed Beg
- Salih Qeftan
- Sheikh Muhemed Gulan
- Sukry Aleke (Christian Kurd)
- Tofiq Beg
Jemiyeti Kurdistan had, amongst other objectives, the goal of establishing and supporting a Kurdish state headed by Sheikh Mehmud Barzinji in Sulemani Province. On August 2, 1922, the group published the first issue of its paper, ‘Bangi Kurdistan’ (The Call of Kurdistan), in Kurdish, Turkish and Persian.
As the Kurdistan Kingdom of Sheikh Barzinji was not destroyed by the British, the Kurdish King of Kurdistan was replaced by an imposed Arab King, Faysial I, Yamolki left for Baghdad where he began publishing the paper on January 28, 1926.
On October 1, 1924, Jemiyeti Kurdistan sent a letter to the League of Nations protesting Turkish demand of Wilayet Musel and Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish people in North [Turkey’s] Kurdistan.
The historical footprint of this organisation is important as it demanded an independent Kurdistan and legitimised its demands at the Treaty of Sevres.
British role in the destruction of the Kurdistan Kingdom
The Kingdom of Kurdistan did not last long, thanks to the British Royal Air Force acting on behalf of a puppet government in Baghdad. The British were not much kinder to the Kurds. It is wrongly preserved that the first regime that used poison gases against Kurds was Saddam Hussein’s government. This is wrong. British were the first regime to gas Kurds in South Kurdistan.
In this book, ’Deterring Democracy’, Noam Chomsky describes British rule in South Kurdistan as follows: [1]
As Secretary of State at the War Office in 1919, Churchill was approached by the RAF Middle East Command for permission to use chemical weapons ’against recalcitrant Arabs as experiment.’ Churchill authorized the experiment, dismissing objections:
I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gases; gases can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.
Churchill added: ’we cannot in any circumstances acquiesce in the non utilization of any weapons which are available to procure a speedy termination of the disorder which prevails on the frontier.’ Chemical weapons were merely ’the application of Western science to modern warfare.’
Churchill was in favour of using air power and poison gas against ’uncivilized tribes’ and ’recalcitrant Arabs’ i.e. Kurds and Afghans [2]. Not surprisingly, in the 1990s, William Waldegrave, who was in charge of Prime Minister John Major’s ’open government’ initiative, ordered the removal from the Public Record Office of ’files detailing how British troops had used poison gas against Iraqi dissidents including Kurds in 1919 [2].
In this way, a people who wished to run their own affairs were oppressed to the limit of genocide. Their King was undermined by the mighty British forces and an ’imported’ King from totally different culture was forced upon them.
The history has been written with the blood of the oppressed by the oppressing people. When the writings are still wet, the concept of ‘civilised and uncivilised’ people emerges. The more oppressed people bleed, the larger the history books get. The history fails to report commensurately the suffering of the oppressed. In this way, we build, what we term, ’civilisation’.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the information and pictures provided by the family of the late Mustafa Pasha Yamolki, in particular Mr. Kamal Yamolki.
Further reading on Yamolki
- Dr. Abdul-Sattar Sherif (Arabic), "History of Kurdish Societies and Political Parties"
- Rafiq Hilmi, Yadashtekani Refiq Hilmi (Kurdish)
- Dr. Kamal Mazhar, Safahatun min tarikh al-Iraq (Arabic)
- Dr. Fadhil Hussein, Mushkilat Musil (Arabic)
Further sources on the role of British Empire in oppressing Kurds
- Winston Churchill, Iraq: From Sumer to Sudan, by Geoff Simons:
http://www.informationwar.org/state%20terrorism/Britain_using_chemical_weapons.htm
- A Wall to Wall Production for Channel 4 - MLMXCII
- War is Business, Business is War, Dave Whyte, University of Leeds: http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/newsletter/issue11/isue11_part4.htm
- Britain’s role in shaping Iraq, BBC NEWS, 3 February, 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2719939.stm
- Stink Of Hypocrisy, Sunday Herald - 09 February 2003: http://www.sundayherald.com/print31247
- Prospects for Peace in the Middle East, Noam Chomsky, The University of Toledo, 4 March 2001: http://www.countercurrents.org/chomsky1.htm. Here Noam Chomsky states:
"The importance of control over oil-that was understood by about the time of the First World War. At that time, Britain was the major world power and controlled a lot of that region. Britain however did not have the military strength after the First World War to control the region by direct military occupation. It had declined to the point where it couldn’t do that. So it turned to other means. One was the use of air power and also poison gas; this was considered the ultimate atrocity at that time. The most enthusiastic supporter was Winston Churchill, who called for the use of poison gas against Kurds and Afghans.
The British use of poison gas had been suppressed for many years. Records were released, including Churchill’s enthusiasm, around 1980. Every time I went to England and gave a talk on any topic I made sure to bring that up, and discovered that everybody’s ears were closed. By the time of the Gulf War, information was beginning to seep through, but the details on how the military followed Churchill’s directives were still sealed. In 1992 the British government under popular pressure instituted an "open government" policy - meaning that in a free and democratic society people should have access to information about their own government. The first act taken under the open information policy was to remove from the Public Records office all documents having to do with England’s use of poison gas against the Kurds and Afghans and Churchill’s role in it. So that’s one that we’re not going to know a lot about thanks to the dedication to freedom and democracy for which we praise ourselves effusively."
- Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (1874-1965), http://quote.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill, about using gas said:
"I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."
"I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effects should be good, and it would spread a lively terror."
References
1. Chomsky, Noam, (1992), Deterring Democracy. New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 19 Union Square West, NY 10003, pages 181-2.
2. Chomsky, Noam, (1999), The New Military Humanism - Lessons from Kosova. London: Pluto Press. ISBN: 0 7453 1634 4. 345 Archway Road, N6 5AA, page 62
'Kürdistan' 100 yıl önce battı!
Bundan 100 yıl önce, henüz Türkiye diye bir devlet yokken, Manchester’dan Basra’ya doğru giden bir gemi Scilly Adaları güneyinde battı. Geminin adı Kürdistan’dı.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Thursday, September 9, 2010
What is Russia’s Place in the Middle East?
by Thierry Meyssan*
http://www.voltairenet.org/article166818.html
Caught up in a smoldering feud between its President and Prime Minister, Russia is not making the most of the historic opportunity to deploy in the Middle East. Russian elites were unable to draw up a strategy for that region when they had the chance and, now, they are no longer capable of it. In Thierry Meyssan’s view, Moscow is paralyzed, having failed both to take full advantage of the botched US “remodeling” of the Middle East and to fulfill the hopes raised by Vladimir Putin.
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President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. The understanding between the “30-year” friends has abruptly turned into an open war. Under these conditions, how could Moscow nurture any major ambition in the Middle East?
The Israeli defeat in the Summer of 2006 against the Lebanese resistance spelled the end of US supremacy in the Middle East. In only four years, the military, economic and diplomatic situation in that region underwent a complete change.
At present, the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle has emerged as the leading pole while Russia and China expand their influence as that of the United States is fading. However, Moscow is reluctant to seize the opportunities it has at hand. First of all, its priority is not the Middle East; secondly because no project related to this region has the consensus of the Russian elites, finally because Middle East conflicts have sensitive implications for Russia’s own domestic problems. Let’s take stock of the situation.
2001-2006 and the myth of the remodeling of the “Great Middle East”
The Bush administration was able to rally the oil lobby, the military industrial complex and the Zionist movement around a huge project: securing control of the oil fields running from the Caspian Sea to the Horn of Africa by redesigning the political map based on small ethnic states. The zone, demarcated not according to its population but to the riches under its soil, was first called “Crescent Crisis” by University professor Bernard Lewis and later “Greater Middle East” by George W. Bush.
Washington did not skimp on its Middle East “remodeling” project. Huge sums of money were invested in buying local elites so that their personal interests would come before national interests in the context of a globalized economy. Most important was the deployment of a strong military force to Afghanistan and Iraq to hem in Iran, the main actor in the region that stands up to the empire. Maps of the new region were drawn up and circulated by the Chiefs of Staff. All countries in the region, including Washington’s allies, would be broken up into various emirates incapable of defending themselves, while vanquished Iraq would be divided into three federate states (a Kurdish, a Sunni and a Shiite).
When it seemed that nothing could prevent that domination process from going ahead, the Pentagon handed Israel the task of destroying all secondary fronts before attacking Iran. The aim was to wipe out the Lebanese Hezbollah and to overthrow the Syrian government. However, after submitting one third of the Lebanese territory to a bombing campaign the likes of which hadn’t seen since the Vietnam War, Israel was forced to retreat without having attained any of its goals. That defeat marked a strategic shift in the balance of forces.
Over the next months, US generals rebelled against the White House. They had lost control of the situation in Iraq and anticipated with apprehension the difficulties of a war against a well-armed and organized state—Iran—potentially setting the entire region ablaze. The generals, gathered around Admiral William Fallon and senior general Brent Scowcroft, forged an alliance with several realistic politicians who opposed the danger inherent in the excessive military deployment.
They used the Baker-Hamilton Commission to influence American voters until obtaining the dismissal of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his replacement with one of their allies: Robert Gates. Subsequently, these same individuals hoisted Obama to the White House, on condition that Robert Gates would remain the Pentagon.
In fact, the US General Staff has lacked an alternative strategy ever since the “remodeling” failed. Its only concern is to stabilize its positions. US soldiers withdrew from large Iraqi cities and retreated to their bases. They left the management of Iraq’s Kurdish areas in the hands of the Israelis while the Arab zones were left to the Iranians. The US State Department has stopped handing out sumptuous gifts to regional leaders and has become increasingly avaricious in these times of economic crisis. Yesterday’s beholden are looking for new masters to feed them.
Tel Aviv is the only one to still believe that the US withdrawal is but an eclipse and that the “remodelling” will resume once the economic crisis is over.
Formation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran Triangle
Washington thought that the dismantlement of Iraq would be contagious. The Sunni-Shiite civil war (the Fitna, in Arabic) was supposed to pit Iran against Saudi Arabia and split the whole Arab-Muslim world. The virtual independence of Iraqi Kurdistan was expected to cause a Kurdish secession in Turkey, Syria and Iran.
But the opposite happened. The easing of US pressure on Iraq sealed the alliance among the enemy brothers of Turkey, Syria and Iran. All three realized that in order to survive they had to unite and that once united they could exert regional leadership. In fact, Turkey, Syria and Iran, together, cover all crucial aspects of the regional political spectrum. As the heir to the Ottoman empire, Turkey incarnates political Sunni Islam. As the only remaining Baathist state after the destruction of Iraq, Syria embodies secularism. And, finally, since the Khomeiny Revolution, Iran represents political Shi’ism.
In just a few months, Ankara, Damascus and Teheran opened their common borders, lowered customs tariffs and paved the way for a common market. This opening provided them with a breath of fresh air and a sudden economic growth which, despite the memories of prior disputes, has also garnered genuine grassroots support.
However, each of these three states has its own Achilles’ heel which the United States and Israel, as well as some of their neighbors, will attempt to exploit.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
For years, Tel Aviv and Washington have accused Iran of violating its obligations as signatory of the [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty and of developing a secret military nuclear program. In the times of Shah Reza Pahlevi, both capitals - plus Paris - had set up a large program designed to provide Iran with the atomic bomb. In view of its history, it was generally accepted that Iran had no expansionit ambitions and that the great powers could safely provide it with such technology. A propaganda campaign based on deliberately fabricated information was later organized, painting current Iranian leaders as fanatic and capable of using the atomic bomb - if they had it - in an irrational manner, therefore posing a great threat to world peace.
Nevertheless, Iranian leaders affirm they have renounced to building, storing or using the atomic bomb, precisely due to ideological reasons. And their assertion to totally reliable. Let us simply recall what happened during the war led by the Iraq of Sadam Husein against the Iran of Imam Khomeiny.
When Baghdad unleashed a stream of missiles against Iranian cities, Teheran retaliated in the same way. But they were unguided missiles that were launched in any given direction and fell indicriminately. Imam Khomeiny intervened to denounce the use of such weapons by his own armed forces. Khomeiny stressed that good Muslims should refrain from shooting at the military if it entailed the risk of killing a large number of civilians. Khomeiny then prohibited the use of missiles against cities, which had an impact on the balance of forces, prolonged the war and brought new suffering to the Iranian people. At present, the successor of Khomeiny, Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Revolution, defends the same ethics in respect of nuclear weapons and it is unthinkable that any faction of the Iranian state would dare to violate the authority of the Supreme Leader and secretly build the atomic bomb.
The fact is that after the Iraqi offensive, Iran anticipated the eventual depletion of its hydrocarbon reserves and wanted to have a civil nuclear industry to guarantee its own long-term development and that of the rest of Third World nations. To this end, the Revolutionary Guards set up a special team of officials dedicated to scientific and technical research, which was organized in secret cities, according to the soviet model. These researchers are also working on other programs, such as those linked to conventional weapons. Iran has opened all its nuclear facilities for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it refuses to give them access to research facilities dedicated to conventional weapons. We therefore find ourselves in a déjà vu situation : IAEA inspectors assure there is nothing to accuse Iran of, while the CIA and the Mossad insist—without any evidence—that Iran hides its illegal activities within its vast scientific research sector.This situation is reminiscent of the intoxication campaign previously carried out by the Bush administration, accusing the UN inspectors of not doing their job properly and of overlooking the WMD programs supposedly developed by Sadam Husein.
No country in the world has been the object of so many IAEA inspections and it is not serious to keep accusing Iran, but it hasn’t made a dent in the bad faith displayed by Washington and Tel Aviv. The fallacy about the alleged threat is crucial for the military industrial complex, which has for years implemented the Israeli program known as “antimissile shield” with US taxperyers’ money. Without the Iranian threat, there is no budget!
Teheran has undertaken two operations to get out of the trap which was set against it. First, it organized an international conference for a nuclear-free world, during which Iran finally expounded its position to its principal partners (on April 17). Iran also accepted the mediation by Brazil, a country whose president Lula da Silva aspires to become the Secretary General of the United Nations. President Lula had asked his US counterpart Barack Obama what kind of measures would be likely to reestablish confidence. Obama replied in writing that the compromise concluded in November 2009, but never ratified, would suffice. President Lula travelled to Moscow to make sure Russian President Dimitri Medvedev had the same opinion. President Medvedev publicly confirmed his view that the November 2009 compromise would be enough to solve the crisis. The next day, May 18, President Lula co-signed with Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a document that, from all perspectives, met the demands made by the United States and Russia. But the White House and the Kremlin did an about-face, going back on their position, and denounced the guarantees offered by the new document as insufficient.
However, there is no significant difference between the document negotiated in November 2009 and the one ratified [by Iran, Brazil and Turkey] in May 2010.
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Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) is striving to restore his country’s independence in the face of US tutelage. By opening his country to Russian trade, the Turkish PM intends to balance international relations. His foreing minister Ahmet Davutoglu (right) is trying to solve, one by one, the conflicts inherited from the past, which hinder Ankara’s scope of action.
Turkey’s liabilities
Turkey inherited from its past a large number of problems with its minorities and neighbors; the United States has been fueling these problems for decades to keep Turkey under its thumb. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, a theorist of neo-ottomanism and new Turkish foreign minister, has drawn up a foreign policy aimed, in the first place, at freeing Turkey from the endless conflicts bogging it down, as well as at multiplying its alliances with various intergovernmental institutions.
The dispute with Syria was the first to be solved. Damascus stopped using the Kurds and abandoned its claim over the Hatay province. In return, Ankara yielded on the division of river waters and helped Damascus to come out of its diplomatic isolation; it even organized direct negotiations with Tel Aviv, which occupies the Syrian Golan. Syrian President Bachar el-Assad was received in Turkey (in 2004) and the Turkish President Abdullah Gull was welcomed in Syria (in 2009). A Strategic Cooperation Council was set up by the two countries.
As for Iraq, Ankara had opposed an invasion of this country by the Anglo-Americans (in 2003). It banned the United States from using the NATO bases on Turkish territory to attack Bagdad, thus upsetting Washington and delaying the start of the war. When the Anglo-Americans formally transferred power to the Iraqis, Ankara favored the electoral process and encouraged the Turkmen minority to take part in the vote. Later, Turkey relaxed border controls and boosted bilateral trade. There is only one aspect marring this panorama: relations between Ankara and the Bagdad national government are excellent, but they are chaotic with the Kurdish regional government of Erbil. The Turkish army even took the liberty of persecuting the PKK separatists inside Iraqi territory—needless to say, with the support of the Pentagon and under its control. Be that as it may, an accord was signed to guarantee the export of Iraqi oil through the Turkish harbor of Ceyhan.
Ankara took a series of initiatives to put an end to the secular conflict with the Armenians. Resorting to “football diplomacy”, Ankara acknowledged the 1915 massacre (but refused the term ‘genocide’), and managed to establish diplomatic relations with Erevan, while it seeks a solution to the High Karabaj conflict. Nevertheless, Armenia suspended the ratification of the Zurich bi-party accord.
Turkey’s liability in relation to Greece and Cyprus is also very significant. The division of the Aegean Sea has not yet been clarified and the Turkish army is still occupying Northern Cyprus. Ankara has proposed different measures to reestablish confidence, particularly the mutual reopening of harbors and airports. But relations are far from being normalized and, for the time being, Ankara does not appear willing to abandon the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Syria’s diplomatic isolation
Washington has accused Syria of continuing its war against Israel through various intermediaries: Iran’s secret services, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas. The United States thus falsely blamed Syrian President Bachar el Assad of having ordered the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and had a Special Penal Court set up to judge the Syrian President.
With astonishing ability, Bachar el-Assad, who had been depicted as a conceited and totally incompetent "daddy’s boy”, managed to wiggle out of that corner without making concessions or firing a single shot. The testimonies of his accusers wilted one after the other, and Saad Hariri, the son of the late Hariri, stopped demanding his arrest and even paid him a friendly visit in Damascus. Nobody wants to finance the Special Court any more and it is possible that the UN might decide to dismantle it even before it convenes, unless it will be used as a forum to accuse Hezbollah.
Finally, in response to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s injunctions to break relations with Iran and with Hezbollah, Bachar el-Assad organized a surprise Summit meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and with the top Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
What about Russia?
The consolidation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle is a consequence of US and Israeli military power decline. The vacuum created is being filled by others.
China has become Iran’s first commercial partner and draws on the expertise of the Revolutionary Guards to overcome the hurdles set up by the CIA in Africa. It also gives military back-up, as discreet as it is effective, to Hezbollah (which it probably equipped with land-to-air missiles and guiding systems to counter interference) and to Hamas (which opened a representation office in Pekin). However, China is advancing very slowly and cautiously on the Middle East stage where it has no intention of playing a decisive role.
All expectations point in Moscow’s direction, which has been absent from the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia wants to recover its former position of world power, but is reluctant to make a move before having solved the problems it currently faces in the former Warsaw Pact zone. The main drawback is that the Russian elites have no alternative policy to replace the US “remodeling” project and are stuck on precisely the same problem as the United Sates: in view of the shift in the regional power correlation, it is no longer possible to implement a balanced policy between Israel and the Arab countries. Any involvement in the region implies, sooner or later, a rupture with the Zionist regime.
Moscow’s clock stopped in 1991, at the moment when the Madrid Conference took place. Moscow has not yet registered the failure of the Oslo (signed in 1993) and the Wabi Araba (1994) accords in terms of implementing the so-called “Two-State Solution”, which is no longer viable. The only peaceful option is the one implemented by South Africa: the abandonment of Apartheid and the recognition of a single nationality for all citizens, Jews and non-Jews alike; and the reinstatement of a real democracy based on the principle of “one man, one vote.” That is already the official position adopted by Syria and Iran, which will soon be embraced also by Turkey.
The great diplomatic conference on the Middle East that the Kremlin wanted to organize in Moscow in 2009, and which was both announced at the Annapolis Summit and confirmed by several UN resolutions, never took place. Russia passed up its opportunity to act.
Those Russian elites which still enjoy great prestige in the Middle East, no longer frequent the region; they fantasize about it more than they understand it. In the 1990s, they were enthusiastic over the romantic theories of anthropologist Lev Gumilev and were in tune with Turkey, the only nation which, similar to Russia, is both European and Asian. Then, they fell for the geo-political charisma of Alexander Dugin, who detested western materialism, thought that Turkey was contaminated by western values, and was mesmerized by the asceticism of the Iranian Revolution.
However, that momentum evaporated in Chechnya before it began to materialize. Russia was brutally confronted with a form of religious extremism that received undercover support from the United States and was fueled by the Turkish and Saudi secret services. As a consequence, any alliance with a Muslim state seemed risky and dangerous. And when peace was reestablished in Grozny, Russia was unable, or did not want, to play on its colonial heritage. According to the President of the Islamic Committee of Russia, Gaidar Zhemal, Russia cannot aspire to become an euro-Asian nation and at the same time pretend that nothing happened nor can it continue to view itself as an orthodox state which is protecting its turbulent Muslim brothers. Russia had—and still has—to define itself by considering orthodox and Muslims as equals.
Rather than leaving for tomorrow the solution to the problems concerning minorities, and postponing for the day after tomorrow its involvement in the Middle East, Russia could consider interacting with Muslim partners abroad, as reliable third-party players, with a view to establishing an internal dialogue. The Syria of Bachar el-Assad constitutes a model of a post-socialist state on its way to democratization that has been able to preserve its lay institutions, has allowed the flourishing of major religions and their various ramifications, including hardcore Wahhabism, while also managing to preserve social peace.
The economic attraction
For the time being, the Russian elites are ignoring the warning issued by former Chief of Staff of the Russian armed forces, General Leonid Ivashov, about the need to establish alliances in Asia and in the Middle East, in the face of US imperialism. As noted by political analyst Gleb Pavlovski, they prefer to think that geo-political antagonism will dissipate thanks to economic globalization. They also regard the Middle East primarily as a market.
President Dimitri Medvedev has recently concluded a tour that took him to Damascus and Ankara. He lifted visa requirements and opened the doors of the burgeoning common market (Turkey, Syria, Iran + Lebanon) for Russian companies. He also favored the sale of a large arsenal to all these countries. In particular, he negotiated the ten-year construction of nuclear power plants. Finally, he took advantage of Turkey’s strategic evolution to obtain support for the transit of Russia’s hydrocarbons. A Russian land oil pipeline would connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Ankara might be attracted to the transnational South Stream gas pipeline project.
The limits of Russia’s involvement
Outside of the economic sphere, it is hard for Moscow to consolidate its position. Former Soviet naval bases in Syria have been reactivated and opened to the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, all the more since naval deployment in the Black Sea is expected to be reduced. It is all happening as if Moscow were trying to gain time and postpone the Israeli issue.
The fact is that any condemnation [by Russia] of Jewish colonialism may revive internal problems. In the first place because, to express it in a caricatural and unflattering manner, Israeli apartheid is reminiscent of Russia’s treatment of the Chechnyans; and also because Russia is acting under the burden of a historical complex: that of anti-Semitism. Vladimir Putin has tried on several occasions to turn the page through symbolic gestures such as appointing a rabbi to the army, but Russia keeps feeling uncomfortable with this issue.
However, Russia ought to stop playing the waiting game; the dice have been tossed and Russia must face the consequences once and for all. Israel played a crucial role in arming and training the Georgian troops that attacked and killed Russian citizens in Southern Ossetia. In response, Georgia’s Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, a double Israeli-Georgian national, rented two military air bases to the Israeli Tsahal enabling it to attack Iran from a closer distance. Moscow stood stoically by without lifting a finger against Israel.
The Middle East looked upon this lack of reaction with surprise. It is true that Tel Aviv has numerous relations with the Russian elites, networking with them by offering to some of the most influential people material privileges in Israel. But, Moscow has comparatively many more contacts in Israel, considering the presence of some one million Soviets immigrants. Conceivably, Moscow could bring to the fore some personality capable of playing in occupied Palestine the role played by Frederik de Klerk in South Africa: to abolish Apartheid and establish democracy in the heart of one single state. With this scenario in mind, Dimitri Medvedev anticipates a possible exodus of Israeli Jews who would not tolerate the new situation. Therefore, he blocked the formerly announced merger between the Krai of Jabarovsk with the autonomous Jewish Oblast of Birobidyan. The Russian president, who comes from a Jewish family and converted to the Russian Orthodox religion, plans to reactivate that administrative entity founded by Stalin in 1934 as an alternative to the creation of the State of Israel. What used to be a Jewish republic within the former Soviet Union could become the future home to refugees, who would certainly be welcomed since Russia is experiencing a plummeting demographic decline.
Ultimately, it is Russia’s procrastinations with respect to Iran’s nuclear program that surprise the most. It is a fact that Iranian businessmen have constantly questioned the bills submitted for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. It is also true that the Persians have become sensitive after years of Anglo-American interference. But the Kremlim hasn’t stopped blowing hot and cold. President Medvedev speaks with the West and pledges Russia’s support in favor of the UN sanctions voted by the Security Council. Meanwhile, Putin assures the Iranians that Russia will not leave them unshielded if they accept to play the game of transparency. On the ground, officials are wondering whether the two leaders have split their roles according to the interlocutors in order to jack up the bids. Or, whether Russia has been paralysed by a conflict brewing at the apex of power? In reality, this is what appears to be happening: the Medvedev-Putin duo has gradually deteriorated and their relationship has abruptly turned into a fratricidal war.
Russian diplomacy had led the Non-Aligned countries to believe that a fourth resolution adopted by the UN Security Council condemning Iran would be preferable to the adoption of unilateral measures by the United States or the European Union. It was wrong since Washington and Brussels would automatically use the UN resolution to justify their own unilateral and additional sanctions.
During a joint press Conference, held on May 14, with his Brazilian counterpart, President Medvedev indicated that he had reached a common position with President Obama during a phone conversation: If Iran accepted the proposal made [in November 2009] to enrich uranium abroad, there would be no reason to adopt sanctions at the Security Council. But when Iran unexpectedly signed the Teheran Protocol with Brazil and Turkey, Washington withdrew and Moscow hurriedly followed suit, breaching its commitment.
On 14 May 2010, Russian president Medvedev publicly vowed his support for the initiative by his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva to solve the Iranian crisis. Some days later, Medvedev aligned with the United States and ordered his ambassador at the UN to vote in favor of Resolution 1929, thus reneging on his previous promise.
© Kremlin Press Service
It is a fact that Russia’s permanent representative at the Security Council, Vitaly Churkin, drained resolution 1929 of much of its substance by preventing a total energy embargo … but he nevertheless voted in favor. Short of being effective, the resolution is altogether an outrage for Iran, for Brazil, for Turkey as well as for all the Non-Aligned states that support Teheran’s position. The resolution is all the more shocking since it violates the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which guarantee to all signatory countries the right to enrich uranium. Resolution 1929 of the UN Security Council denies Iran that right. Up to now Russia seemed to be the defender of international law. But it is not any longer. The Non-Aligned countries in general, and Iran in particular, have interpreted the Russian vote as the will on the part of a great power to prevent emerging powers from attaining the energy independence they need for their economic development. And it will be difficult to make them forget this Russian faux pas.
http://www.voltairenet.org/article166818.html
Caught up in a smoldering feud between its President and Prime Minister, Russia is not making the most of the historic opportunity to deploy in the Middle East. Russian elites were unable to draw up a strategy for that region when they had the chance and, now, they are no longer capable of it. In Thierry Meyssan’s view, Moscow is paralyzed, having failed both to take full advantage of the botched US “remodeling” of the Middle East and to fulfill the hopes raised by Vladimir Putin.
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President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. The understanding between the “30-year” friends has abruptly turned into an open war. Under these conditions, how could Moscow nurture any major ambition in the Middle East?
The Israeli defeat in the Summer of 2006 against the Lebanese resistance spelled the end of US supremacy in the Middle East. In only four years, the military, economic and diplomatic situation in that region underwent a complete change.
At present, the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle has emerged as the leading pole while Russia and China expand their influence as that of the United States is fading. However, Moscow is reluctant to seize the opportunities it has at hand. First of all, its priority is not the Middle East; secondly because no project related to this region has the consensus of the Russian elites, finally because Middle East conflicts have sensitive implications for Russia’s own domestic problems. Let’s take stock of the situation.
2001-2006 and the myth of the remodeling of the “Great Middle East”
The Bush administration was able to rally the oil lobby, the military industrial complex and the Zionist movement around a huge project: securing control of the oil fields running from the Caspian Sea to the Horn of Africa by redesigning the political map based on small ethnic states. The zone, demarcated not according to its population but to the riches under its soil, was first called “Crescent Crisis” by University professor Bernard Lewis and later “Greater Middle East” by George W. Bush.
Washington did not skimp on its Middle East “remodeling” project. Huge sums of money were invested in buying local elites so that their personal interests would come before national interests in the context of a globalized economy. Most important was the deployment of a strong military force to Afghanistan and Iraq to hem in Iran, the main actor in the region that stands up to the empire. Maps of the new region were drawn up and circulated by the Chiefs of Staff. All countries in the region, including Washington’s allies, would be broken up into various emirates incapable of defending themselves, while vanquished Iraq would be divided into three federate states (a Kurdish, a Sunni and a Shiite).
When it seemed that nothing could prevent that domination process from going ahead, the Pentagon handed Israel the task of destroying all secondary fronts before attacking Iran. The aim was to wipe out the Lebanese Hezbollah and to overthrow the Syrian government. However, after submitting one third of the Lebanese territory to a bombing campaign the likes of which hadn’t seen since the Vietnam War, Israel was forced to retreat without having attained any of its goals. That defeat marked a strategic shift in the balance of forces.
Over the next months, US generals rebelled against the White House. They had lost control of the situation in Iraq and anticipated with apprehension the difficulties of a war against a well-armed and organized state—Iran—potentially setting the entire region ablaze. The generals, gathered around Admiral William Fallon and senior general Brent Scowcroft, forged an alliance with several realistic politicians who opposed the danger inherent in the excessive military deployment.
They used the Baker-Hamilton Commission to influence American voters until obtaining the dismissal of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his replacement with one of their allies: Robert Gates. Subsequently, these same individuals hoisted Obama to the White House, on condition that Robert Gates would remain the Pentagon.
In fact, the US General Staff has lacked an alternative strategy ever since the “remodeling” failed. Its only concern is to stabilize its positions. US soldiers withdrew from large Iraqi cities and retreated to their bases. They left the management of Iraq’s Kurdish areas in the hands of the Israelis while the Arab zones were left to the Iranians. The US State Department has stopped handing out sumptuous gifts to regional leaders and has become increasingly avaricious in these times of economic crisis. Yesterday’s beholden are looking for new masters to feed them.
Tel Aviv is the only one to still believe that the US withdrawal is but an eclipse and that the “remodelling” will resume once the economic crisis is over.
Formation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran Triangle
Washington thought that the dismantlement of Iraq would be contagious. The Sunni-Shiite civil war (the Fitna, in Arabic) was supposed to pit Iran against Saudi Arabia and split the whole Arab-Muslim world. The virtual independence of Iraqi Kurdistan was expected to cause a Kurdish secession in Turkey, Syria and Iran.
But the opposite happened. The easing of US pressure on Iraq sealed the alliance among the enemy brothers of Turkey, Syria and Iran. All three realized that in order to survive they had to unite and that once united they could exert regional leadership. In fact, Turkey, Syria and Iran, together, cover all crucial aspects of the regional political spectrum. As the heir to the Ottoman empire, Turkey incarnates political Sunni Islam. As the only remaining Baathist state after the destruction of Iraq, Syria embodies secularism. And, finally, since the Khomeiny Revolution, Iran represents political Shi’ism.
In just a few months, Ankara, Damascus and Teheran opened their common borders, lowered customs tariffs and paved the way for a common market. This opening provided them with a breath of fresh air and a sudden economic growth which, despite the memories of prior disputes, has also garnered genuine grassroots support.
However, each of these three states has its own Achilles’ heel which the United States and Israel, as well as some of their neighbors, will attempt to exploit.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
For years, Tel Aviv and Washington have accused Iran of violating its obligations as signatory of the [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty and of developing a secret military nuclear program. In the times of Shah Reza Pahlevi, both capitals - plus Paris - had set up a large program designed to provide Iran with the atomic bomb. In view of its history, it was generally accepted that Iran had no expansionit ambitions and that the great powers could safely provide it with such technology. A propaganda campaign based on deliberately fabricated information was later organized, painting current Iranian leaders as fanatic and capable of using the atomic bomb - if they had it - in an irrational manner, therefore posing a great threat to world peace.
Nevertheless, Iranian leaders affirm they have renounced to building, storing or using the atomic bomb, precisely due to ideological reasons. And their assertion to totally reliable. Let us simply recall what happened during the war led by the Iraq of Sadam Husein against the Iran of Imam Khomeiny.
When Baghdad unleashed a stream of missiles against Iranian cities, Teheran retaliated in the same way. But they were unguided missiles that were launched in any given direction and fell indicriminately. Imam Khomeiny intervened to denounce the use of such weapons by his own armed forces. Khomeiny stressed that good Muslims should refrain from shooting at the military if it entailed the risk of killing a large number of civilians. Khomeiny then prohibited the use of missiles against cities, which had an impact on the balance of forces, prolonged the war and brought new suffering to the Iranian people. At present, the successor of Khomeiny, Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Revolution, defends the same ethics in respect of nuclear weapons and it is unthinkable that any faction of the Iranian state would dare to violate the authority of the Supreme Leader and secretly build the atomic bomb.
The fact is that after the Iraqi offensive, Iran anticipated the eventual depletion of its hydrocarbon reserves and wanted to have a civil nuclear industry to guarantee its own long-term development and that of the rest of Third World nations. To this end, the Revolutionary Guards set up a special team of officials dedicated to scientific and technical research, which was organized in secret cities, according to the soviet model. These researchers are also working on other programs, such as those linked to conventional weapons. Iran has opened all its nuclear facilities for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it refuses to give them access to research facilities dedicated to conventional weapons. We therefore find ourselves in a déjà vu situation : IAEA inspectors assure there is nothing to accuse Iran of, while the CIA and the Mossad insist—without any evidence—that Iran hides its illegal activities within its vast scientific research sector.This situation is reminiscent of the intoxication campaign previously carried out by the Bush administration, accusing the UN inspectors of not doing their job properly and of overlooking the WMD programs supposedly developed by Sadam Husein.
No country in the world has been the object of so many IAEA inspections and it is not serious to keep accusing Iran, but it hasn’t made a dent in the bad faith displayed by Washington and Tel Aviv. The fallacy about the alleged threat is crucial for the military industrial complex, which has for years implemented the Israeli program known as “antimissile shield” with US taxperyers’ money. Without the Iranian threat, there is no budget!
Teheran has undertaken two operations to get out of the trap which was set against it. First, it organized an international conference for a nuclear-free world, during which Iran finally expounded its position to its principal partners (on April 17). Iran also accepted the mediation by Brazil, a country whose president Lula da Silva aspires to become the Secretary General of the United Nations. President Lula had asked his US counterpart Barack Obama what kind of measures would be likely to reestablish confidence. Obama replied in writing that the compromise concluded in November 2009, but never ratified, would suffice. President Lula travelled to Moscow to make sure Russian President Dimitri Medvedev had the same opinion. President Medvedev publicly confirmed his view that the November 2009 compromise would be enough to solve the crisis. The next day, May 18, President Lula co-signed with Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a document that, from all perspectives, met the demands made by the United States and Russia. But the White House and the Kremlin did an about-face, going back on their position, and denounced the guarantees offered by the new document as insufficient.
However, there is no significant difference between the document negotiated in November 2009 and the one ratified [by Iran, Brazil and Turkey] in May 2010.
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Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) is striving to restore his country’s independence in the face of US tutelage. By opening his country to Russian trade, the Turkish PM intends to balance international relations. His foreing minister Ahmet Davutoglu (right) is trying to solve, one by one, the conflicts inherited from the past, which hinder Ankara’s scope of action.
Turkey’s liabilities
Turkey inherited from its past a large number of problems with its minorities and neighbors; the United States has been fueling these problems for decades to keep Turkey under its thumb. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, a theorist of neo-ottomanism and new Turkish foreign minister, has drawn up a foreign policy aimed, in the first place, at freeing Turkey from the endless conflicts bogging it down, as well as at multiplying its alliances with various intergovernmental institutions.
The dispute with Syria was the first to be solved. Damascus stopped using the Kurds and abandoned its claim over the Hatay province. In return, Ankara yielded on the division of river waters and helped Damascus to come out of its diplomatic isolation; it even organized direct negotiations with Tel Aviv, which occupies the Syrian Golan. Syrian President Bachar el-Assad was received in Turkey (in 2004) and the Turkish President Abdullah Gull was welcomed in Syria (in 2009). A Strategic Cooperation Council was set up by the two countries.
As for Iraq, Ankara had opposed an invasion of this country by the Anglo-Americans (in 2003). It banned the United States from using the NATO bases on Turkish territory to attack Bagdad, thus upsetting Washington and delaying the start of the war. When the Anglo-Americans formally transferred power to the Iraqis, Ankara favored the electoral process and encouraged the Turkmen minority to take part in the vote. Later, Turkey relaxed border controls and boosted bilateral trade. There is only one aspect marring this panorama: relations between Ankara and the Bagdad national government are excellent, but they are chaotic with the Kurdish regional government of Erbil. The Turkish army even took the liberty of persecuting the PKK separatists inside Iraqi territory—needless to say, with the support of the Pentagon and under its control. Be that as it may, an accord was signed to guarantee the export of Iraqi oil through the Turkish harbor of Ceyhan.
Ankara took a series of initiatives to put an end to the secular conflict with the Armenians. Resorting to “football diplomacy”, Ankara acknowledged the 1915 massacre (but refused the term ‘genocide’), and managed to establish diplomatic relations with Erevan, while it seeks a solution to the High Karabaj conflict. Nevertheless, Armenia suspended the ratification of the Zurich bi-party accord.
Turkey’s liability in relation to Greece and Cyprus is also very significant. The division of the Aegean Sea has not yet been clarified and the Turkish army is still occupying Northern Cyprus. Ankara has proposed different measures to reestablish confidence, particularly the mutual reopening of harbors and airports. But relations are far from being normalized and, for the time being, Ankara does not appear willing to abandon the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Syria’s diplomatic isolation
Washington has accused Syria of continuing its war against Israel through various intermediaries: Iran’s secret services, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas. The United States thus falsely blamed Syrian President Bachar el Assad of having ordered the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and had a Special Penal Court set up to judge the Syrian President.
With astonishing ability, Bachar el-Assad, who had been depicted as a conceited and totally incompetent "daddy’s boy”, managed to wiggle out of that corner without making concessions or firing a single shot. The testimonies of his accusers wilted one after the other, and Saad Hariri, the son of the late Hariri, stopped demanding his arrest and even paid him a friendly visit in Damascus. Nobody wants to finance the Special Court any more and it is possible that the UN might decide to dismantle it even before it convenes, unless it will be used as a forum to accuse Hezbollah.
Finally, in response to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s injunctions to break relations with Iran and with Hezbollah, Bachar el-Assad organized a surprise Summit meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and with the top Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
What about Russia?
The consolidation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle is a consequence of US and Israeli military power decline. The vacuum created is being filled by others.
China has become Iran’s first commercial partner and draws on the expertise of the Revolutionary Guards to overcome the hurdles set up by the CIA in Africa. It also gives military back-up, as discreet as it is effective, to Hezbollah (which it probably equipped with land-to-air missiles and guiding systems to counter interference) and to Hamas (which opened a representation office in Pekin). However, China is advancing very slowly and cautiously on the Middle East stage where it has no intention of playing a decisive role.
All expectations point in Moscow’s direction, which has been absent from the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia wants to recover its former position of world power, but is reluctant to make a move before having solved the problems it currently faces in the former Warsaw Pact zone. The main drawback is that the Russian elites have no alternative policy to replace the US “remodeling” project and are stuck on precisely the same problem as the United Sates: in view of the shift in the regional power correlation, it is no longer possible to implement a balanced policy between Israel and the Arab countries. Any involvement in the region implies, sooner or later, a rupture with the Zionist regime.
Moscow’s clock stopped in 1991, at the moment when the Madrid Conference took place. Moscow has not yet registered the failure of the Oslo (signed in 1993) and the Wabi Araba (1994) accords in terms of implementing the so-called “Two-State Solution”, which is no longer viable. The only peaceful option is the one implemented by South Africa: the abandonment of Apartheid and the recognition of a single nationality for all citizens, Jews and non-Jews alike; and the reinstatement of a real democracy based on the principle of “one man, one vote.” That is already the official position adopted by Syria and Iran, which will soon be embraced also by Turkey.
The great diplomatic conference on the Middle East that the Kremlin wanted to organize in Moscow in 2009, and which was both announced at the Annapolis Summit and confirmed by several UN resolutions, never took place. Russia passed up its opportunity to act.
Those Russian elites which still enjoy great prestige in the Middle East, no longer frequent the region; they fantasize about it more than they understand it. In the 1990s, they were enthusiastic over the romantic theories of anthropologist Lev Gumilev and were in tune with Turkey, the only nation which, similar to Russia, is both European and Asian. Then, they fell for the geo-political charisma of Alexander Dugin, who detested western materialism, thought that Turkey was contaminated by western values, and was mesmerized by the asceticism of the Iranian Revolution.
However, that momentum evaporated in Chechnya before it began to materialize. Russia was brutally confronted with a form of religious extremism that received undercover support from the United States and was fueled by the Turkish and Saudi secret services. As a consequence, any alliance with a Muslim state seemed risky and dangerous. And when peace was reestablished in Grozny, Russia was unable, or did not want, to play on its colonial heritage. According to the President of the Islamic Committee of Russia, Gaidar Zhemal, Russia cannot aspire to become an euro-Asian nation and at the same time pretend that nothing happened nor can it continue to view itself as an orthodox state which is protecting its turbulent Muslim brothers. Russia had—and still has—to define itself by considering orthodox and Muslims as equals.
Rather than leaving for tomorrow the solution to the problems concerning minorities, and postponing for the day after tomorrow its involvement in the Middle East, Russia could consider interacting with Muslim partners abroad, as reliable third-party players, with a view to establishing an internal dialogue. The Syria of Bachar el-Assad constitutes a model of a post-socialist state on its way to democratization that has been able to preserve its lay institutions, has allowed the flourishing of major religions and their various ramifications, including hardcore Wahhabism, while also managing to preserve social peace.
The economic attraction
For the time being, the Russian elites are ignoring the warning issued by former Chief of Staff of the Russian armed forces, General Leonid Ivashov, about the need to establish alliances in Asia and in the Middle East, in the face of US imperialism. As noted by political analyst Gleb Pavlovski, they prefer to think that geo-political antagonism will dissipate thanks to economic globalization. They also regard the Middle East primarily as a market.
President Dimitri Medvedev has recently concluded a tour that took him to Damascus and Ankara. He lifted visa requirements and opened the doors of the burgeoning common market (Turkey, Syria, Iran + Lebanon) for Russian companies. He also favored the sale of a large arsenal to all these countries. In particular, he negotiated the ten-year construction of nuclear power plants. Finally, he took advantage of Turkey’s strategic evolution to obtain support for the transit of Russia’s hydrocarbons. A Russian land oil pipeline would connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Ankara might be attracted to the transnational South Stream gas pipeline project.
The limits of Russia’s involvement
Outside of the economic sphere, it is hard for Moscow to consolidate its position. Former Soviet naval bases in Syria have been reactivated and opened to the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, all the more since naval deployment in the Black Sea is expected to be reduced. It is all happening as if Moscow were trying to gain time and postpone the Israeli issue.
The fact is that any condemnation [by Russia] of Jewish colonialism may revive internal problems. In the first place because, to express it in a caricatural and unflattering manner, Israeli apartheid is reminiscent of Russia’s treatment of the Chechnyans; and also because Russia is acting under the burden of a historical complex: that of anti-Semitism. Vladimir Putin has tried on several occasions to turn the page through symbolic gestures such as appointing a rabbi to the army, but Russia keeps feeling uncomfortable with this issue.
However, Russia ought to stop playing the waiting game; the dice have been tossed and Russia must face the consequences once and for all. Israel played a crucial role in arming and training the Georgian troops that attacked and killed Russian citizens in Southern Ossetia. In response, Georgia’s Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, a double Israeli-Georgian national, rented two military air bases to the Israeli Tsahal enabling it to attack Iran from a closer distance. Moscow stood stoically by without lifting a finger against Israel.
The Middle East looked upon this lack of reaction with surprise. It is true that Tel Aviv has numerous relations with the Russian elites, networking with them by offering to some of the most influential people material privileges in Israel. But, Moscow has comparatively many more contacts in Israel, considering the presence of some one million Soviets immigrants. Conceivably, Moscow could bring to the fore some personality capable of playing in occupied Palestine the role played by Frederik de Klerk in South Africa: to abolish Apartheid and establish democracy in the heart of one single state. With this scenario in mind, Dimitri Medvedev anticipates a possible exodus of Israeli Jews who would not tolerate the new situation. Therefore, he blocked the formerly announced merger between the Krai of Jabarovsk with the autonomous Jewish Oblast of Birobidyan. The Russian president, who comes from a Jewish family and converted to the Russian Orthodox religion, plans to reactivate that administrative entity founded by Stalin in 1934 as an alternative to the creation of the State of Israel. What used to be a Jewish republic within the former Soviet Union could become the future home to refugees, who would certainly be welcomed since Russia is experiencing a plummeting demographic decline.
Ultimately, it is Russia’s procrastinations with respect to Iran’s nuclear program that surprise the most. It is a fact that Iranian businessmen have constantly questioned the bills submitted for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. It is also true that the Persians have become sensitive after years of Anglo-American interference. But the Kremlim hasn’t stopped blowing hot and cold. President Medvedev speaks with the West and pledges Russia’s support in favor of the UN sanctions voted by the Security Council. Meanwhile, Putin assures the Iranians that Russia will not leave them unshielded if they accept to play the game of transparency. On the ground, officials are wondering whether the two leaders have split their roles according to the interlocutors in order to jack up the bids. Or, whether Russia has been paralysed by a conflict brewing at the apex of power? In reality, this is what appears to be happening: the Medvedev-Putin duo has gradually deteriorated and their relationship has abruptly turned into a fratricidal war.
Russian diplomacy had led the Non-Aligned countries to believe that a fourth resolution adopted by the UN Security Council condemning Iran would be preferable to the adoption of unilateral measures by the United States or the European Union. It was wrong since Washington and Brussels would automatically use the UN resolution to justify their own unilateral and additional sanctions.
During a joint press Conference, held on May 14, with his Brazilian counterpart, President Medvedev indicated that he had reached a common position with President Obama during a phone conversation: If Iran accepted the proposal made [in November 2009] to enrich uranium abroad, there would be no reason to adopt sanctions at the Security Council. But when Iran unexpectedly signed the Teheran Protocol with Brazil and Turkey, Washington withdrew and Moscow hurriedly followed suit, breaching its commitment.
On 14 May 2010, Russian president Medvedev publicly vowed his support for the initiative by his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva to solve the Iranian crisis. Some days later, Medvedev aligned with the United States and ordered his ambassador at the UN to vote in favor of Resolution 1929, thus reneging on his previous promise.
© Kremlin Press Service
It is a fact that Russia’s permanent representative at the Security Council, Vitaly Churkin, drained resolution 1929 of much of its substance by preventing a total energy embargo … but he nevertheless voted in favor. Short of being effective, the resolution is altogether an outrage for Iran, for Brazil, for Turkey as well as for all the Non-Aligned states that support Teheran’s position. The resolution is all the more shocking since it violates the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which guarantee to all signatory countries the right to enrich uranium. Resolution 1929 of the UN Security Council denies Iran that right. Up to now Russia seemed to be the defender of international law. But it is not any longer. The Non-Aligned countries in general, and Iran in particular, have interpreted the Russian vote as the will on the part of a great power to prevent emerging powers from attaining the energy independence they need for their economic development. And it will be difficult to make them forget this Russian faux pas.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
BOOKLIST RELATING TO KURDS AND KUDISTAN
Below list was provided by Deniz SERHEDÎ from Kurdish Studies Network Group...
Ahmad, Kamal Madhar, Kurdistan During the First World War, London, Saqi Books, 1994.
Anonymous, The Kurds: Search for Identity: An International Conference - April 17-18 2000, Washington, DC, American University, 2000, On line
Bruinessen, Martin van, Kurds and Identity Politics, London, I.B. Tauris, 2001, ISBN: 1-86064-571-2, Buy/Reviews
Entessar, Nader, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
Fuad, Jamal, The Kurdish question: Missed opportunities and future challenges, Tallahassee, FL, Badlisy Center for Kurdish Studies, 1993
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, NYC, St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Hassanpour, Amir, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, San Francisco, Mellen Research University Press, 1992.
izady Mehrdad R., The Kurds, Washington, DC, Taylor&Francis, 1992.
Ali, Othman, British policy and the Kurdish question in 'Iraq 1918-1932, Ottawa, National Library of Canada, 1995.
Andrews, Peter Alford, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Wiesbaden, Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989.
Anonymous, The Kurdish problem in Iraq, London, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1992.
Arfa, Hassan, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, London, Oxford University Press, 1966.
Barkey, H.J.,and Graham E Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
Brauer, Erich, The Jews of Kurdistan, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1993.
.
Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992.
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Sluglett, Peter, Iraq Since 1958, London, I.B. Tauris, 1990.
Fuad, Jamal, The Kurdish question: Missed opportunities and future challenges, Tallahassee, FL, Badlisy Center for Kurdish Studies, 1993.
Ghareeb, Edmund, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1981.
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, N.Y, St. Martin's Press, 1997.
Gunter, Michael M., The Changing Kurdish problem in Turkey, London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994.
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990.
Hoiris, Ole and Sefa Martin Yurokel (ed.), Contrasts and solutions in the Middle East, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 1997.
Hourani, Albert Habib, Minorities In The Arab World, London, Oxford University Press, 1947.
Hussein, Fuad Mohammad, The legal concept of self-determination and the Kurdish question, Amsterdam, Luna, 1985.
Jawad, Saad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958-1970, London, Ithaca Press, 1981.
Kasaba, Resat and Sibel Bozdogan (ed.), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997.
Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G.W, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, London, Frank Cass, 1997.
Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Allison C., Kurdish Culture and Identity, London, Zed Books, 1996.
Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Sperl Stefan (ed.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, London/New York, Routledge, 1992.
Laizer, Sheri, Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots, London, Zed Books, 1996.
Layard, Henry Austin, Ninveh And Its Remains, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1970.
Lytle, Elizabeth Edith, A bibliography of the Kurds, Kurdistan, and the Kurdish question, Monticello, Ill, Council of Planning Librarians, 1977.
McDowall, D., A Modern History of the Kurds, London and New York, I.B. Tauris, 1996.
McDowall, David, The Kurds, London, Minority Rights Report, 1991.
Mojab, Shahrzad, Women of a non-state nation: The Kurds, Costa Mesa, Calif, Mazda Publishers, 2001.
O'Ballance, Edgar, The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1973, ISBN: 0-208-01395-4, Buy/Reviews.
Ocalan Abdullah, Declaration on the democratic solution of the Kurdish question, London, Mesopotamian Publishers, 1999.
Olson Robert, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheik Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, Austin, The University of Texas Press, 1989.
Olson Robert, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998 (Kurdish Studies Series, No. 1, California, Mazda Publishers, 1998.
Olson, Robert (ed.), The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990's: It's Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1996.
Ostergaard-Nielsen Eva, Trans-State Loyalties and Policies: Turks and Kurds in Germany (Transnationalism, London, Routledge, 2002.
Pelletiere, Stephen C., The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.
Randal, Jonathan C., After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? : My Encounters With Kurdistan, Denver, Westview Pr, 1999.
Sabar, Yona, The Folk Literature of the Kurdistani Jews: An Anthology, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982.
Vali,Abbas, Modernity and the Stateless: The Kurdish Question in Iran, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, ISBN: 1-86064-050-8, Buy/Reviews.
44 entries. Updated: 31.07.03
• Adamson, David. The Kurdish War . London, 1964.
• Ahmad, Kamal Madhar. Kurdistan During the First World War. Saqi Books. London. 1994.
• Amnesty International. Getting Away with Murder: Political Killings and "Disappearances" in the 1990s . London, 1990.
• Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan Since 1991 . London, 1995.
• Iraq: Human Rights Violations Since the Uprising . London, 1991.
• Iraq: The Need for Further United Nations Action to Protect Human Rights . London, 1991.
• Turkey: Brutal and Systematic Abuse of Human Rights . London, 1989.
• Turkey: A Policy of Denial. EUR 44/01/95. London: February, 1995.
• Turkey: Dissident Voices Jailed Again . New York: June, 1994.
• Turkey: Mothers of "Disappeared" Take Action . New York: May, 1995.
• Article 19, et al. Censorship and the Rule of Law in Turkey: Violations of Press Freedom and Attacks on Ozgur Gundem . London, 1994.
• Aydin, Zulkuf. Underdevelopment ad Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey: The Household Economy in Gisgis and Kalhana . London: Ithica Press, The Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1986.
• Barkey, Henri J., and Fuller, Graham E. Turkey's Kurdish Question . Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Lanham, Maryland, 1997.
• Bozarslan, H. (ed.). Les Kurdes et Les Etats (Peuples Mediterranees) : nos. 68-9. Paris, 1994.
• Brauer, Erich. The Jews of Kurdistan . Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993.
• Bruinessen, Martin van. Agha, Sheikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan. London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992.
• " Kurdish Tribes and the State in Iran: The Case of Simko's revolt ", in: Richard Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. London: Croom Helm, 1983, 364-400.
• " The Kurds in Turkey ", MERIP Reports no. 121 (February 1984), 6-12.
• " Popular Islam, Kurdish nationalism and rural revolt: The rebellion of Shaikh Said in Turkey (1925) ", in: Janos M. Bak and Gerhard Benecke (eds.), Religion and Rural Revolt. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, 281-295.
• " The Kurds between Iran and Iraq ", MERIP Middle East Report no. 141 (July-August 1986), 14-27.
• " Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: The Workers' Party of Kurdistan ", MERIP Middle East Report no. 153 (July-August 1988), 40-46.
• [-- and Hendrik Boeschoten] Evliya Gelebi in Diyarbekir. The relevant section of the Seyahatname edited with translation, commentary and introduction [= Evliya Gelebi's Book of Travels: Land and people of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century. A corpus of partial editions, vol. I]. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988.
• " Les Kurdes et leur langue au XVII ieme siecle: Notes d'Evliya Gelebi sur les dialectes kurdes ", Studia Kurdica (Paris) No. 1-5, 1988, 13-34. "The ethnic identity of the Kurds", in: Ethnic groups in the Republic of Turkey, compiled and edited by Peter Alford Andrews with R|diger Benninghaus [=Beihefte zum T|binger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, Reihe B, Nr.60]. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwich Reichert, 1989, 613-21.
• " The Naqshbandi order in 17th-century Kurdistan ", in: Marc Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic et Thierry Zarcone (ed), Naqshbandis: cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique musulman. Istanbul-Paris: Editions Isis, 1990, 337-360.
• " La sociiti traditionnelle kurde et l'itat ", in: Les Kurdes: Droits de l'homme et identiti culturelle. Confirence internationale de Paris, 14-15 octobre 1989. Paris: Institut Kurde de Paris, 1991, 35-43.
• " Kurdish Society and the Modern State: Ethnic Nationalism Versus Nation-building ", in: Turaj Atabaki and Margreet Dorleijn (eds), Kurdistan in search of ethnic identity. Papers presented to the First Conference on Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity in the Middle East and Central Asia. Utrecht: Department of Oriental Studies, 1991, 24-51.
• " Religion in Kurdistan ", Kurdish Times (New York) vol. 4 nos. 1-2, 1991, 5-27. "Haji Bektash, Sultan Sahak, Shah Mina Sahib and various avatars of a running wall", Turcica XXI-XXIII, 1991, 55-69.
• " Kurdish `ulama and their Indonesian students ", in: De Turcicis aliisque rebus commentarii Henry Hofman dedicati [= Utrecht Turcological Series, vol 3]. Utrecht: Instituut voor Oosterse Talen en Culturen, 1992, 205-227.
• " Matriarchy in Kurdistan? Women rulers in Kurdish history ", The International Journal of Kurdish Studies (Brooklyn NY) vol. 6 no. 1-2, 1993, 25-39.
• " Kurdistan ", in: Joel Krieger (ed), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 518-519.
• " Genocide in Kurdistan? The suppression of the Dersim rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the chemical war against the Iraqi Kurds (1988) ", in: George J. Andreopoulos (ed), Conceptual and historical dimensions of genocide. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, 141-170.
• " Genocide of Kurds ", in: Israel W. Charny (ed), The widening circle of genocide [= Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review, vol 3]. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Books, 1994, 165-191.
• " Nationalisme kurde et ethnicitis intra-kurdes ", Peuples Miditerraniens no. 68-69, 1994, 11-37.
• " When Haji Bektash still bore the name of Sultan Sahak. Notes on the Ahl-i Haqq of the Guran district ", in: Alexandre Popovic & Gilles Veinstein (eds), Bektachiyya: itudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach, pp. 117-138. Istanbul: Iditions Isis, 1995, 117-138.
• " Turkey's death squads ", Middle East Report #199 (April-June 1996), 20-23.
• " Kurds, Turks, and the Alevi revival in Turkey ", Middle East Report 200 (Summer 1996), 7-10.
• " Diversity and division among the Kurds ", Warreport, bulletin of the institute for war and peace reporting, number 47, november/december 1996, 29-32.
• " Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems, " in P.G. Kreyenbruek and S. Sperl (eds.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview. London: Routledge, 1992. pp. 33-67.
• The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevis. Center for Study of Asia and the Middle East, Deakin University. Malvern, Australia, 1996.
• Bullock, J., and Morris, H. No Friends but the Mountains, The Tragic History of the Kurds . London: Penguin Books, 1992.
• Capoglu, Gokhan. Overcoming the Political Stalemate in Turkey . Strategic Research Foundation. Ankara, 1995.
• Cengiz, Seyfi. Dynamics of the Kurdish & Kirmanc-Zaza Problems in Anatolia. ed. by Paul White, Center for Study of Asia and the Middle East, Deakin University. Malvern, Australia, 1996.
• Chaliand, Gerard (ed.). People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan . Translated by Michael Pallis. Zed Press. London, 1982.
• Ciment, Ciment. The Kurds, State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran . New York : Facts on File, 1996.
• Cook, Helena. The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi Kurdistan. Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. London, 1995
• Driver, G.R. Kurds and Kurdistan . Mount Carmel, 1919.
• Eagleton, William. The Kurdish Republic of 1946 . London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
• Edmunds, C.J. Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in Northern Iraq, 1919-1925 . London, 1957.
• Entessar, Nader, Kurdish Ethnonationalism , Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
• "Kurdish Identity in the Middle East," in: Current World Leaders International Issues, vol. 34, no. 2, April 1991, pp. 270-282.
• "The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord," in: Third World Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4, October 1989, pp. 83-100.
• "The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iran and Iraq," in: Thrid World Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4, October 1984, pp. 911-933.
• Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Sluglett, Peter. Iraq Since 1958, 2nd Edition. London: I. B. Tauris, 1990.
• Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East . New York, 1989.
• Fuccaro, Nelida. The Lost Kurds: The Yazidis of Modern Iraq. I.B. Tauris. London & New York, 1997.
• Gemalmaz, Mehmet Semih. The Institutionalization Process of the "Turkish Type of Democracy": A Politico-Juridical Analysis of Human Rights . Amac Yayincilik. Istanbul, 1989.
• Ghafor, Abdulla. Geography of Kurdistan (in Kurdish) Apec. Sweden, 1996.
• Ghareeb, Edmund. The Kurdish Question in Iraq . Syracuse, 1981.
• Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman. Kurdistan and the Kurds . London, 1980.
• Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds and the Future of Turkey . St. Martin's Press. New York, 1997.
• The Kurds in Turkey . Boulder, Colorado, 1990.
• The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope . New York, 1992.
• Hassanpour, Amir. Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-85 . San Fransisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992.
• Heller, Mark A. "Iraq's Resentful Shi'a and Kurdish Communities," in Iraq's Road to War, Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds). St. Martin's Press. New York, 1996.
• Hitchins, Christopher. The Struggle of the Kurds. National Geopgraphic Magazine. Washington, D.C., August 1992. pp 32-61.
• Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. 1995 Turkey Human Rights Report . Ankara, 1995.
• 1994 Turkey Human Rights Report . Ankara, 1994.
• 1993 Turkey Human Rights Report . Ankara, 1993.
• 1992 Turkey Human Rights Report . Ankara, 1992.
• Human Rights Watch/Arms Project. Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey . New York, 1995.
• Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. Broken Promises: Torture and Killings Continue in Turkey . New York, December 1992.
• The Kurds of Turkey: Killings, Disappearances and Torture . New York, March 1993.
• Turkey: Censorship by Assassination: Eleven Journalists and One Newspaper Distributor Murdered Since February . New York, December 1992.
• Turkey: Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey . New York, October 1994.
• Turkey: Turkey's Failed Policy to Aid the Forcibly Displaced in the Southeast . New York, June 1996.
• Turkey: Violations of the Right of Petition to the European Commission of Human Rights . New York, April 1996.
• Kurds Massacred: Turkish Forces Kill Scores of Peaceful Demonstrators. New York, 1992.
• Human Rights Watch/Middle East. Syria: The Silenced Kurds . New York: October, 1996.
• Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words . New York, 1994.
• Imset, Ismet G. The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey, 1973-92 . Turkish Daily News Publications. Ankara, 1992.
• Initiative for Human Rights in Kurdistan. Documentation of the International Conference on Human Rights in Kurdistan: 14-16 April 1989 . Bremen, Germany, 1989.
• Ismail, Yashar. Anthology of Contemporary Kurdish Poetry. Kurdistan Solidarity Committee. London, 1994.
• Izady, Mehrdad R. The Kurds: A Concise Handbook . Washington and London, 1992.
• Kendal. " The Kurds Under the Ottoman Empire " in A People Without a Country. Olive Branch Press: New York, 1993.
• Kinnane, Derk. The Kurds and Kurdistan . London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
• Kreyenbroek, P. and Sperl, S. The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview . Routledge. London and New York, 1992.
• Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Allison C. Kurdish Culture and Identity . London: Zed Books, 1996.
• Kurdish Human Rights Project. A Fearful land: Report on a KHRP Fact-Finding Mission to Southeast Turkey: 5-10 February 1996 . London, March 1996.
• The Internal Conflict and Human Rights in Iraqi Kurdistan: Report of KHRP Delegations to Iraqi Kurdistan: June and December 1995. London: March 1996.
• The European Convention under Attack: The Threat to Lawyers in Turkey and the Challenge to Strasbourg . London, August 1995.
• The Law: Freedom of Expression and Human Rights Advocacy in Turkey . London, (no date).
• Kurdish Institute of Paris. International Interparliamentary Consultation on the Kurds. Washington, DC: 27 February, 1991 . Paris, 1992.
• International Paris Conference. The Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity. 14-15 Oct. 1989 . Paris: February, 1989.
• Kutschera, Chris. Le Mouvement national kurde . Paris, 1979.
• Laizer, S. Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War . Zed Books: London and New Jersey, 1996.
• The Law Society. Lawyers in Fear; Law in Jeopardy: Report of a Delegation to Istanbul and Diyarbakir in the Southeastern Region of Turkey to Investigate the Situation of Lawyers Defending People in Political Trials and Involved in Human Rights Work . New York, 1993.
• Lovat, Francois-Xavier. Kurdistan Irak. (Photograhps) 3C Comunic-Aline Bernard. Paris, 1997.
• Makiya, Kanan (Samir al-Khalil). Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World . New York, 1993.
• Mayall, Simon V. Turkey: Thwarted Ambition . National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 1997.
• McDowall, David. The Kurds, A Nation Denied . Miinority Rights Publications, London, 1992.
• A Modern History of the Kurds. I.B. Tauris, London & New York, 1997.
• Medico International. Cultural and Language Rights of the Kurds: A Study of the Treatment of Minorities under National Law in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria in Light of International Human Rights Standards . London, February 1997.
• A Democratic Future for the Kurds of Turkey: Proceedings of the International Conference on Northwest Kurdistan: Brussels, 12-13 March 1994. London, 1995.
• The Destruction of Villages in South-east Turkey . London, June 1996
• Meho, Lokman. The Kurds and Kurdistan: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. 1997.
• Meiselas, Susan. Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History. New York, Random House. 1997
• Middle East Watch. The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Destruction of Koreme . New York, 1993.
• Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and its Aftermath . New York, 1992.
• Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds . New York, 1993.
• Human Rights in Iraq . New York, 1990.
• Unquiet Graves: The Search for the Disappeared in Iraqi Kurdistan . New York, 1992.
• Mofty, Soraya. Easy Way to Kurdish: A Mini Course (Sorani) Jeffrey Norton Publishers (Audio Forum) New Haven. 1997.
• O'Ballance, Edgar. The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
• O'Connor, Karen. A Kurdish Family. Lerner Communications. Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1997.
• Olson, Robert. "The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990s?" Journal of South Asian & Middle Eastern Studies. Summer 1992, Vol. 15, No. 4.
• The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989.
• Olson, Robert (ed.). The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East . Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996.
• Pelletiere, Stephen C. The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf . Boulder and London, 1984.
• Randal, Jonathon C. A fter Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan . Farrar, Straus and Grioux. New York:, 1997.
• Rizgar, Baran. Learn Kurdish - Dersen Kurdi. (language text) Lithosphere Print. London, 1996.
• Rugman, J., and Hutchings, R. Ataturk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds. Cassell. London and New York, 1996.
• Sabar, Yona. The Folk Literature of the Kurdistani Jews: An Anthology . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
• Safrastian, Arshak. Kurds and Kurdistan . London, 1948.
• Sauar, Erik. Turkey's Struggle with Democracy and Kurds - An Authority, Information and Terrorism Perspective. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Social Anthropology. Norway, 1996.
• Stitchting Nederland-Koerdistan. F orced Evictions and Destructions of Villages in Dersim (Tunceli) and the Western Part of Bingol, Turkish Kurdistan, September-November 1994 . Amsterdam, 1995.
• Tirman, John. Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade. New York : The Free Press, 1997,
• Wahby, Taufiq and Edmonds, C.J., A Kurdish-English Dictionary. Oxford University Press. UK, 1996.
• White, Paul (ed.). The Kurds in World Politics: Papers and Resources for Studying the Kurds . Malvern, Victoria, Australia: CSAME Special Issues Series, Deakin University, 1995.
• Yassin, Borhanadin A. Vision or Reality? The Kurds in the Policy of Great Powers. Chartwell-Bratt. Bromley, England, 1995.
• Yilmaz, Bahri. Challenges to Turkey: The New Role of Turkey in International Politics since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
• Zana, Mehdi. Prison No. 5: 11 Years in a Turkish Prison. Blue Crane Books. Boston 1997. .
Ahmad, Kamal Madhar, Kurdistan During the First World War, London, Saqi Books, 1994.
Anonymous, The Kurds: Search for Identity: An International Conference - April 17-18 2000, Washington, DC, American University, 2000, On line
Bruinessen, Martin van, Kurds and Identity Politics, London, I.B. Tauris, 2001, ISBN: 1-86064-571-2, Buy/Reviews
Entessar, Nader, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
Fuad, Jamal, The Kurdish question: Missed opportunities and future challenges, Tallahassee, FL, Badlisy Center for Kurdish Studies, 1993
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, NYC, St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Hassanpour, Amir, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, San Francisco, Mellen Research University Press, 1992.
izady Mehrdad R., The Kurds, Washington, DC, Taylor&Francis, 1992.
Ali, Othman, British policy and the Kurdish question in 'Iraq 1918-1932, Ottawa, National Library of Canada, 1995.
Andrews, Peter Alford, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Wiesbaden, Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989.
Anonymous, The Kurdish problem in Iraq, London, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1992.
Arfa, Hassan, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, London, Oxford University Press, 1966.
Barkey, H.J.,and Graham E Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
Brauer, Erich, The Jews of Kurdistan, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1993.
.
Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992.
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Sluglett, Peter, Iraq Since 1958, London, I.B. Tauris, 1990.
Fuad, Jamal, The Kurdish question: Missed opportunities and future challenges, Tallahassee, FL, Badlisy Center for Kurdish Studies, 1993.
Ghareeb, Edmund, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1981.
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, N.Y, St. Martin's Press, 1997.
Gunter, Michael M., The Changing Kurdish problem in Turkey, London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994.
Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990.
Hoiris, Ole and Sefa Martin Yurokel (ed.), Contrasts and solutions in the Middle East, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 1997.
Hourani, Albert Habib, Minorities In The Arab World, London, Oxford University Press, 1947.
Hussein, Fuad Mohammad, The legal concept of self-determination and the Kurdish question, Amsterdam, Luna, 1985.
Jawad, Saad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958-1970, London, Ithaca Press, 1981.
Kasaba, Resat and Sibel Bozdogan (ed.), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1997.
Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G.W, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, London, Frank Cass, 1997.
Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Allison C., Kurdish Culture and Identity, London, Zed Books, 1996.
Kreyenbroek, Philip G. and Sperl Stefan (ed.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, London/New York, Routledge, 1992.
Laizer, Sheri, Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots, London, Zed Books, 1996.
Layard, Henry Austin, Ninveh And Its Remains, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1970.
Lytle, Elizabeth Edith, A bibliography of the Kurds, Kurdistan, and the Kurdish question, Monticello, Ill, Council of Planning Librarians, 1977.
McDowall, D., A Modern History of the Kurds, London and New York, I.B. Tauris, 1996.
McDowall, David, The Kurds, London, Minority Rights Report, 1991.
Mojab, Shahrzad, Women of a non-state nation: The Kurds, Costa Mesa, Calif, Mazda Publishers, 2001.
O'Ballance, Edgar, The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1973, ISBN: 0-208-01395-4, Buy/Reviews.
Ocalan Abdullah, Declaration on the democratic solution of the Kurdish question, London, Mesopotamian Publishers, 1999.
Olson Robert, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheik Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, Austin, The University of Texas Press, 1989.
Olson Robert, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998 (Kurdish Studies Series, No. 1, California, Mazda Publishers, 1998.
Olson, Robert (ed.), The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990's: It's Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1996.
Ostergaard-Nielsen Eva, Trans-State Loyalties and Policies: Turks and Kurds in Germany (Transnationalism, London, Routledge, 2002.
Pelletiere, Stephen C., The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.
Randal, Jonathan C., After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? : My Encounters With Kurdistan, Denver, Westview Pr, 1999.
Sabar, Yona, The Folk Literature of the Kurdistani Jews: An Anthology, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982.
Vali,Abbas, Modernity and the Stateless: The Kurdish Question in Iran, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, ISBN: 1-86064-050-8, Buy/Reviews.
44 entries. Updated: 31.07.03
• Adamson, David. The Kurdish War . London, 1964.
• Ahmad, Kamal Madhar. Kurdistan During the First World War. Saqi Books. London. 1994.
• Amnesty International. Getting Away with Murder: Political Killings and "Disappearances" in the 1990s . London, 1990.
• Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan Since 1991 . London, 1995.
• Iraq: Human Rights Violations Since the Uprising . London, 1991.
• Iraq: The Need for Further United Nations Action to Protect Human Rights . London, 1991.
• Turkey: Brutal and Systematic Abuse of Human Rights . London, 1989.
• Turkey: A Policy of Denial. EUR 44/01/95. London: February, 1995.
• Turkey: Dissident Voices Jailed Again . New York: June, 1994.
• Turkey: Mothers of "Disappeared" Take Action . New York: May, 1995.
• Article 19, et al. Censorship and the Rule of Law in Turkey: Violations of Press Freedom and Attacks on Ozgur Gundem . London, 1994.
• Aydin, Zulkuf. Underdevelopment ad Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey: The Household Economy in Gisgis and Kalhana . London: Ithica Press, The Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1986.
• Barkey, Henri J., and Fuller, Graham E. Turkey's Kurdish Question . Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Lanham, Maryland, 1997.
• Bozarslan, H. (ed.). Les Kurdes et Les Etats (Peuples Mediterranees) : nos. 68-9. Paris, 1994.
• Brauer, Erich. The Jews of Kurdistan . Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993.
• Bruinessen, Martin van. Agha, Sheikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan. London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992.
• " Kurdish Tribes and the State in Iran: The Case of Simko's revolt ", in: Richard Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. London: Croom Helm, 1983, 364-400.
• " The Kurds in Turkey ", MERIP Reports no. 121 (February 1984), 6-12.
• " Popular Islam, Kurdish nationalism and rural revolt: The rebellion of Shaikh Said in Turkey (1925) ", in: Janos M. Bak and Gerhard Benecke (eds.), Religion and Rural Revolt. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, 281-295.
• " The Kurds between Iran and Iraq ", MERIP Middle East Report no. 141 (July-August 1986), 14-27.
• " Between Guerrilla War and Political Murder: The Workers' Party of Kurdistan ", MERIP Middle East Report no. 153 (July-August 1988), 40-46.
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Sunday, August 15, 2010
Kurdish rebels announce ceasefire to September 20
QANDIL MOUNTAINS, Iraq (Reuters) - Kurdish militants from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced a ceasefire against Turkish forces until September 20, a PKK official said on Friday.
A lasting ceasefire was possible if Turkey stopped military operations, released some 1,700 political detainees and started a peace process, PKK official Bozan Tekin told reporters in the mountains near the Turkish border.
"The PKK announces a conditional ceasefire," Tekin said, citing the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as a reason for the move.
The announcement came days after Turkey said suspected PKK rebels had blown up a pipeline in southeastern Turkey carrying Iraqi oil.
Asked if the rebels were targeting pipelines, Tekin said: "Yes, our troops have done that. It's part of our self defense. Oil is not just related to the economy but has been turned into a weapon against us," he said, without elaborating.
Tekin also said: "We believe that a ceasefire at this time might have positive results toward developing a political and peaceful solution."
The Turkish government has in the past rejected the PKK's unilateral ceasefire declarations saying a ceasefire assumes two legal parties in conflict.
The PKK has scrapped previous ceasefires due to continued military operations by the Turkish army against the guerrillas.
The militants called off a unilateral, 14-month ceasefire in June. More than 100 military personnel have been killed since March, exceeding the death toll throughout all of 2009.
The violence has undermined an attempt by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's government to boost Kurdish minority rights and end a 26-year separatist conflict.
His government is under pressure to contain violence that threatens to hit his popularity in an election set by July 2011.
More than 40,000 people, mostly Kurds, have been killed since the PKK took up arms against Turkey in 1984 for an independent homeland. The rebels say they now want greater rights and autonomy for Turkey's estimated 15 million Kurds.
Turkish special forces captured the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999 after forcing him to abandon his refuge in Syria.
(Writing by Ulf Laessing; additional reporting by Selcuk Gokoluk; editing by Janet Lawrence)
Terra/Reuters
A lasting ceasefire was possible if Turkey stopped military operations, released some 1,700 political detainees and started a peace process, PKK official Bozan Tekin told reporters in the mountains near the Turkish border.
"The PKK announces a conditional ceasefire," Tekin said, citing the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as a reason for the move.
The announcement came days after Turkey said suspected PKK rebels had blown up a pipeline in southeastern Turkey carrying Iraqi oil.
Asked if the rebels were targeting pipelines, Tekin said: "Yes, our troops have done that. It's part of our self defense. Oil is not just related to the economy but has been turned into a weapon against us," he said, without elaborating.
Tekin also said: "We believe that a ceasefire at this time might have positive results toward developing a political and peaceful solution."
The Turkish government has in the past rejected the PKK's unilateral ceasefire declarations saying a ceasefire assumes two legal parties in conflict.
The PKK has scrapped previous ceasefires due to continued military operations by the Turkish army against the guerrillas.
The militants called off a unilateral, 14-month ceasefire in June. More than 100 military personnel have been killed since March, exceeding the death toll throughout all of 2009.
The violence has undermined an attempt by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's government to boost Kurdish minority rights and end a 26-year separatist conflict.
His government is under pressure to contain violence that threatens to hit his popularity in an election set by July 2011.
More than 40,000 people, mostly Kurds, have been killed since the PKK took up arms against Turkey in 1984 for an independent homeland. The rebels say they now want greater rights and autonomy for Turkey's estimated 15 million Kurds.
Turkish special forces captured the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999 after forcing him to abandon his refuge in Syria.
(Writing by Ulf Laessing; additional reporting by Selcuk Gokoluk; editing by Janet Lawrence)
Terra/Reuters
Saturday, July 10, 2010
TC’nin PKK ile görüşmeleri
Taraf - Istanbul - 10.07.2010
GÜNAY ASLAN * / TC ile PKK arasındaki ilk görüşmeler PKK’nin 1984’teki Eruh ve Şemdinli baskınlarından sonra başladı. Görevli albaylar hapisteki PKK’lilerle görüştü.
Türkiye kritik bir eşikten geçiyor. 25 yılı ‘düşük yoğunluklu çatışmayla’ geçen Kürt sorunu günümüzde ‘Türk-Kürt boğazlaşmasının’ işaretlerini veriyor. Süreç, bu ülkenin kaderinde söz sahibi olan herkesi Kürt meselesinde yeni bir karar almanın eşiğine getirmiş bulunuyor.
Ne ki tablo hiç de iç açıcı görünmüyor. Türkiye’nin Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ, ‘sözün bittiği yerde’ olduklarını söylüyor. Kuzeyi güneyiyle; parlamenteri bölge yöneticisiyle Kürtleri tehdit ediyor. AKP Hükümeti hem generalden yana hem değilmiş gibi bir tutum izliyor. İktidar her zamanki gibi ‘ortayolculuk’ yapıyor. Ana muhalefet partisi CHP sistemin kendisine vurduğu prangaları çözemiyor. Devletin partisi olmaktan çıkıp halkın partisi haline gelemiyor. MHP ise ‘olağanüstü hâl ilan edilmesi’ ve ‘Kandil’e kara harekâtı yapılması’ için bastırıyor. BDP bunlara karşı ‘barış ve demokrasi’ mücadelesi veriyor.
Sivil toplum örgütleri, yazarlar, aydınlar ve sıradan insanlarsa akan kanın durmasını, herkesi tüketen kirli savaşın sonlanmasını istiyor. Kamuoyunun dikkatleri bu amaçla yeniden Öcalan’a ve PKK’ye çevrilmiş bulunuyor. Türkiye toplumunun ezici çoğunluğu PKK’den yeni bir ‘ateşkes’ bekliyor. Öcalan ve PKK’yse bunun ‘çift taraflı’ olmasında ısrar ediyor. Kürt tarafı ordunun operasyonlarına son vermesi gerektiğini söylüyor. Aksi durumda zaten ateşkesin pek bir anlamı olmuyor.
Bu kritik süreçte en çok da ‘PKK’yle görüşme’ meselesi tartışılıyor. Kimileri bunu destekliyor, kimileriyse karşı çıkıyor. Karşı çıkanlar böyle bir şeyin ‘asla mümkün olamayacağını, devletin PKK’yle pazarlığa oturamayacağını’ söylüyor.
Bu yazımda, düşük yoğunluklu çatışmayla’ geçmiş son 25-26 yılda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti (TC) ile Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK) arasındaki açık-gizli görüşmeleri yazacağım. Tarihlerini, aktörlerini ve içeriklerini vererek -özeleyazacağım. Ayrıca her görüşme veya ateşkes sonrası gündeme gelen bazı olayları dikkatinize sunacağım.
Taraf gazetesinden Yıldıray Oğur bu konuda iki yazı kaleme aldı. (6 ve 8 Temmuz). Oğur yazılarında PKK’nin 1 Eylül 1998 tarihinde ilân ettiği ateşkes sürecini yazdı. Bunu da 28 Şubat süreciyle irtibatlandırdı. İlk yazısı için ‘Genelkurmay- PKK dayanışması’ başlığını kullandı. Ancak ikinci yazısında ‘dayanışmanın’ yerini ‘görüşme’ aldı.
Objektif olanın ‘görüşme’ olduğuna inanıyorum. Genelkurmay ile PKK arasında ‘dayanışma’ olduğunu söylemek doğru değildir. Kaldı ki Kürtlerin haklı insani; ulusal ve demokratik mücadelelerine ‘Ergenekon gölgesi’ düşürmek, Ergenekon mağduru Kürtleri son derece üzmektedir. Ayrıca bu sorunun barışçıl çözümüne zarar vermektedir.
Elbette varsa bir belge veya bilgi açıklanmalıdır. PKK ve Öcalan’ın bu konudaki tutumları açıktır. PKK birçok kez ‘varsa bildiğiniz, açıklayın’ demiştir. Öcalan, Ergenekon savcılarına birçok dilekçe göndermiştir. Ancak bunlar görmezden gelinmiştir.
TC ile PKK arasında neredeyse 25 yıl öncesinden başlayan ve günümüze kadar devam eden bir dizi görüşme yapılmıştır. Bunların çoğunun içeriği ve sonuçları PKK tarafından yayınlanmıştır.
Türk devleti Türkiye toplumunun balık hafızalı yapısından yararlanıyor. Bu yüzden ‘görüşmem’ ve ‘muhatap almam’ diyor. Fakat, arşivler farklı şeyler söylüyor. Arşivler neredeyse bu savaş başladığından bu yana TC ile PKK arasında ‘görüşmeler’ yapıldığına işaret ediyor. Doğrusu TC ile PKK arasında bu kadar çok görüşmenin yapılmış olması beni şaşırtmıyor.
Çünkü bu, devletin soruna verdiğini önemi ve ‘çok boyutlu’ çalıştığını gösteriyor. Fakat bu görüşmelere rağmen sorunu neden çöz(e)mediği sorusunu da yanıtlamak gerekiyor. Kanımca bunun yanıtını Türkiye’nin ‘irade parçalanması’ ve ‘sorunun uluslararasılaşmasında’ aramak gerekiyor.
Görüşmelerin tarihleri ve aktörleri
TC ile PKK arasındaki ilk görüşmeler PKK’nin 15 Ağustos 1984’teki Eruh ve Şemdinli baskınlarından sonra başladı! Genelkurmay’ın görevlendirdiği birçok subay cezaevinde bulunan PKK yöneticileriyle görüştü. Çoğu albay rütbesindeki bu subaylar periyodik olarak PKK’lilerle ‘Kürt sorununun nasıl çözüleceğine ilişkin’ tartışmalar yürüttüler. Bunlar elbette ‘resmî’ görüşmeler değildi. Bu yüzden tutanak düzenlenmedi.
1988-1991 arasında ise devlet, Öcalan’a ‘aracılar’ gönderdi. Bunların hiçbiri resmî devlet görevlisi değildi. Öcalan bu yüzden basına ‘devlet çekinmesin, bir subayını göndersin, görüşelim’ demecini verdi.
Devlet subay yerine Talabani’yi gönderdi. 1993 yılı başında Cumhurbaşkanı Özal, şimdi Irak’ın Cumhurbaşkanı olan Celal Talabani’yi Öcalan’a gönderdi. Öcalan, Özal’ın önerisiyle 17 Mart 1993’te 25 günlük ateşkes ilan etti. 16 Nisan’da ise yine Özal’ın önerisiyle ateşkesi süresiz olarak uzattı.
Ne var ki 17 Nisan günü Özal şüpheli bir ölümle hayata veda etti. Ateşkes de PKK’nin 33 askeri öldürdüğü ‘Bingöl eylemiyle’ sona erdi. Başbuğ, geçenlerde, o dönem Bakü- Ceyhan boru hattı gündemdeydi, bu eylem o projeyi sabote etmeye yönelikti’ dedi.
Ancak, PKK’nin tek taraflı ateşkesine rağmen gerillaya dönük operasyonların neden devam ettirildiğine ve PKK’nin ‘misilleme’ kararına rağmen, 33 askeri silahsız ve korumasız neden gönderdiklerine değinmedi. Askerleri neredeyse zoraki yola çıkaran komutanın Ergenekon sanığı olarak Silivri’de yattığını da söylemedi!
İkinci öneri Çiller’den geldi
1995 yılında bu kez Çiller devreye girdi. Başbakan Tansu Çiller savunma eski bakanlarından Ercan Vurulhan’ı danışmanlık görevine getirmişti. Vuralhan, 1995 Mart’ının ilk haftasında Avrupa’da gizlice görüştüğü Talabani’ye Çiller’den bir mesaj getirdi. Çiller mesajında, Öcalan’dan ‘ateşkes’ talep ediyordu. Vuralhan’ı Ankara’ya yolculayan Talabani 14 Mart 1995 tarihinde yazdığı bir mektupla bunu Öcalan’a iletti. ‘Tansu Çiller, siyasi bir çözümün peşindedir ‘ diye de ekledi.
Talabani mektubunda Çiller’in taleplerine de yer vermişti. Buna göre, ‘ PKK önce bir yıl sürecek bir ateşkes ilan etmeli, bu süre içinde şiddet eylemlerine girişmemeli ve terörden vazgeçtiğini ilan etmeli’ydi!
PKK lideri Öcalan, Çiller’e -Talabani üzerinden- bir mektup gönderdi. Önce ‘diyalog’ istedi. ‘Halka yönelik saldırılardan uzak durulması, PKK’ye dönük operasyonlardan kaçınılması halinde ateşkes ilan etmeye hazırım’ dedi.
Çiller’in koalisyon ortağı SHP’nin eski Dışileri Bakanı Hikmet Çetin de işin içindeydi. Çetin, Londra’da yaşayan gazeteci Kamuran Karadağ’ı kendine ‘aracı’ seçmişti. O da ‘devleti adına’ üstelik, ‘siyasal çözüm için PKK’nin savaşı sonlandırmasını’ istemişti.
Öcalan, 11 Mayıs 1995 tarihinde Çetin’e de bir mektup gönderdi. Yine ‘karşılıklı diyalog’ istedi. ‘Çözüme ilişkin girişimlerinize anlamlı karşılık vereceğim’ de dedi. Bu karşılık yıl sonunda geldi.
PKK lideri, 15 Aralık 1995 tarihinde MED TV’den canlı olarak yayınlanan, moderatörlüğünü yaptığım programda ateşkes ilan etti.
Ne var ki az kalsın uydumuz düşecekti. Zira, canlı yayın boyunca Türkiye’deki askerî bir üsten (Çanakkale) televizyonumuzun yayın yaptığı uyduya korsan sinyaller gönderilmekteydi. Buna rağmen karar ilan edildi. PKK ikinci kez ateşkes ilan etmiş, çatışmalara tek yanlı son vermişti.
Fakat bunun hemen arkasından Güçlükonak katliamı geldi. 16 Ocak 1996’da Güçlükonak’ta bir minibüs önce tarandı, sonra da yakıldı. Olayda 11 Kürt köylüsü hayatını kaybetti. Genelkurmay hemen bir açıklama yaparak ‘eylemi PKK yaptı’ dedi. Ancak gerçek kısa sürede ortaya çıktı; fail Jitem’di!
Arkasından ‘Öcalan’a suikast’ haberi geldi. Çiller bunun için, dönemin Emniyet Genel Müdürü Mehmet Ağar ile Ergenekon sanığı, emniyet eski Özel Harekât Başkan Vekili İbrahim Şahin’i görevlendirmişti.
Çiller gitti, Yılmaz geldi, ‘aracı’ değişti
Çiller ‘ateşkes’ istemiş, Öcalan ‘karşılıklı diyalog’ demiş,ardından önce ateşkes, sonra suikast girişimi gelmişti. 1995 seçimlerinden sonra DYP-SHP Hükümeti’nin yerini ANAP-DYP Hükümeti aldı. Şimdi Mesut Yılmaz başbakandı.
Yılmaz da diğer liderler gibi Kürt sorununun yarattığı sorunların altında eziliyordu. Soluk almak, aldırmak istiyordu. Görevi devralır almaz o da PKK’nin kapısını çaldı. Başbakan Yılmaz’ın ‘özel danışmanı’ yazar Alev Alatlı bu amaçla Avrupa’ya çıkarma yaptı.
Alatlı 16 Nisan 1996 günü Brüksel’de PKK’nin Avrupa sorumlusu Abdurrahman Çadırcı’yla buluştu. Alev Hanım, sorunun siyasal çözümü için ‘yapılması gerekenleri konuşmaya’ gelmişti. Alatlı, Çadırcı’nın sorusu üzerine bu görüşmeden Genelkurmay’ın haberdar olduğunu söyledi.
Görüşmelerin ilk turu ‘başarılı’ geçti. Alatlı ikinci gelişinde Öcalan’a gidecekti. Taraflar belli aralıklarla görüşmelere davam edeceklerdi. Fakat bu kez yeni bir suikast girişimi gerçekleşti! 6 Mayıs 1996 günü Şam’daki PKK okulunun yakınlarında C-4 patlayıcılarla dolu bir minibüs infilak ettirildi. Eylemi Yeşil örgütlemişti. Minibüsün bırakıldığı yer Öcalan’ın geçiş güzergâhıydı. Öcalan o esnada okulda değildi ama mesaj verilmişti.
Öcalan o gece yaptığı televizyon konuşmasında ‘biz barış, kardeşlik diyoruz, bu savaşı bitirelim diyoruz, karşılığında bomba alıyoruz’ dedi. Öcalan’ın suikast girişiminden Yılmaz’ı sorumlu tutması üzerine Alatlı bir daha PKK’ye gel(e)medi.
Netanyahu-Karadayı görüşmesi ve Erbakan’ın mektubu
Türkiye’de siyasi istikrar sağlanamıyor, hükümetin biri gidiyor, diğeri geliyordu. ANAP-DYP Hükümeti yürümeyince Refahyol hükümeti kuruldu. Erbakan Başbakan, Çiller yardımcısı oldu. Erbakan hükümeti kurar kurmaz karşısında askeri buldu. - Genelkurmay Başkanlığı hükümetin önüne ‘İsrail’le ikili askerî anlaşmalar’ dosyasını koydu.
Genelkurmay Başkanı Karadayı İsrail’e gitmişti. İsrail’de başbakanlık koltuğunda şimdiki Başbakan Netanyahu oturuyordu. Karadayı o ziyarette (25 Şubat 1997) birçok askerî anlaşmaya imza atmıştı. Hükümete bu anlaşmaların içeriği dahi açıklanmamıştı. Hükümet yine de önüne konan bütün dosyaları onayladı.
Ordu, yeni bir Milli Askerî Stratejik Konsept (MASK) hazırladı. Buna göre ‘dış tehditin’ adresi Suriye ve İran’dı. Ardından (Kasım,1997) Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi (MGSB) değiştirildi. Belgede ‘siyasal İslam baş düşman’ gösterildi.
Ordunun bunları yaptığı günlerde Erbakan Öcalan’a mektup gönderdi. ‘Şiddet dursun, Kürt kardeşlerimizle sorunları konuşarak çözelim’ dedi. Öcalan, Erbakan’a olumlu yanıt verdi. Bunun ardından Erbakan bir yazarı ve bir milletvekilini ‘aracı’ olarak gönderdi.
Erbakan mektubunu ‘resmî’ yollardan, Suriye yönetimi üzerinden göndermişti. Ve Genelkurmay’ın bilgisi dahilindeydi. Oysa Erbakan Öcalan’a mektup yazdığı tarihte Genelkurmay ile PKK zaten görüşüyordu. Başbakan’ın bundan haberi olmadığı anlaşılıyordu.
Genelkurmay doğrudan devreye giriyor
Evet, askerî kanaldan görüşme devam etmekteydi. Bu kez PKK’nin kapısını asker çalmıştı. Bir Kürt işadamının referansıyla Avrupa’ya gelen Genelkurmay Toplumsal İlişkiler Dairesi’nden Kurmay Albay H. D, PKK ‘nin Avrupa sorumlusu Şahin Çilo’yla biraraya gelmişti. Genelkurmay geçen yıl da nabız yoklamıştı. Şimdi iki cepheden birden görüşme halindeydi. Bir albay Avrupa’ya, bir albay da PKK’nin cezaevi sorumlusu Sabri Ok’a gönderilmişti. Bu görüşmelere avukat Selim Okçuoğlu aracılık etmişti.
Genelkurmay, ‘yeni komuta kademesine fırsat verilmesini’ istemekte ve ‘kapsamlı bir dönüşümden’ söz etmektedir. ‘Devlet değişecek, her şey düzelecek ve işler yoluna girecek’ demektedir. PKK de bu tarihsel süreçte ‘devleti dönüştürmek için üzerine düşeni yerine getirmelidir.’
Buna göre ilk aşamada ateşkes ilan etmelidir. İkinci aşamada siyasi taleplerini gözden geçirmeli, bölünmeye yol açacak taleplerini geri çekmeli ve birlikte çözümü benimsemelidir. PKK; Türk-Kürt kardeşliğini esas alan 1920 ruhunun yenilenmesi için gayret göstermelidir. Genelkurmay’dan gelen mesaja göre üçüncü aşama ise geçmiş muhasebesidir. Karşılık olarak yapılan hatalarla yüzleşilecektir!
PKK, buna karşılık ; operasyonlar durmalı, koruculuk sistemi ve Jitem dağıtılmalı, medya üzerindeki ambargo kaldırılmalı, barışçıl çözümün koşulları sağlanmalı ve genel af için hazırlık yapılmalıdır’ demiştir. Genelkurmay bunlara ‘evet’ demiş ve süreç içinde yerine getireceğini söylemiştir. TSK-PKK görüşmeleri bu zeminde devam etmiştir.
MED TV’de her pazar akşamı hazırlayıp sunduğum ve Öcalan’ın telefonla katıldığı programda bu süreç yoğun olarak işlenmiştir. Öcalan bu görüşmelerden çok ciddi sonuçlar çıkacağından emin değildi. Aksine temkinliydi. Zira, 1993’ten bu yanan yaşananlar gözler önündeydi. Yine de kestirip atmak istemiyordu.
O günlerde MED TV’de programlara da katılan Yalçın Küçük, ‘Genelkurmay’dan bugünlerde PKK için önemli bir açıklama gelecek’ bilgisini verdi. Çok geçmeden de açıklama geldi. Dönemin Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanı Oramiral Güven Erkaya, 5 Şubat 1998 günü, ‘irticanın PKK’den daha tehlikeli olduğunu’ söyledi!
Belli ki Türkiye yeni bir döneme girmişti. Şimdi ‘irticayla mücadele’ öne çıkmıştı. Öcalan’a söylenen ordunun ‘yeni bir Türkiye kuracağı’ydı. Gelen mesajlar bu yöndeydi. Kaldı ki siyasal olaylar da buna işaret etmekteydi.
Öcalan o süreçte, Türk-Kürt kardeşliği temelinde Cumhuriyet’in kuruluş sürecini işledi. Kemalist devrimin önemine dikkat çekti ve her fırsatta, ‘yeni Türkiye’yi birlikte kurmaya hazırız’ dedi.
28 Şubat sürecinde yaşananlar
1998’le birlikte Kürt sorunu gündemden düşmüş, ‘irtica’ meselesi öne çıkmıştı. 28 Şubat’ta MGK toplanmış, ‘laiklik’ vurgusu yapmıştı. 21 Mayıs’ta Refah Partisi’nin kapatılması için dava açılmış, 17 Haziran’da Erbakan istifa ederek, başbakanlıktan ayrılmıştı.
Bütün bu gelişmeleri yakından izlemiş, tartışmıştık. Ordu bir adım atınca Öcalan da bir adım atıyordu. Ordu, ‘PKK asıl tehdit değil derken, Öcalan, Kemalist devrimin tamamlanması gerektiğini söylüyordu. Bu tür paslaşmalar oluyordu ancak pratikte bunun tersi yaşanıyordu.
Savaş devam ediyor, can kayıpları yaşanıyordu. Ayrıca Şemdin Sakık’ın yakalanmasından sonra (13 Nisan 98) Türkiye, Suriye üzerindeki baskılarını arttırmaya başlamıştı.
30 Haziran’da Mesut Yılmaz’ın başbakanlığında yeni bir hükümet kuruldu. Temmuz’un ilk haftası Yıldız Şimşir arkadaşımla birlikte MED TV’de ‘özel ‘bir program yaptık. Öcalan yine telefonla katıldı. Ancak bir telefon konuğumuz daha olacaktı. Ankara’dan katılacaktı. Ankara’dan katılacak olan görüşmeleri yönlendiren kişi olacaktı.
Programı açtık, PKK liderini aldık ve süreci tartıştık ancak Ankara’dan kimse bağlanmadı. Beklediğimiz kişi faks göndermişti. Faksı alıp, okudum. Faks adı sanı duyulmamış bir haber ajansının antetli kağıdıyla gönderilmişti.Yanılmıyorsam Ankara Ay Ajans’tı. Faks mesajında sorunun çözümü konusunda bilinen öneriler tekrarlandıktan sonra, ‘bu sorunun çözülmesi için Öcalan’ın bulunduğu yerden çıkması gerektiği’ söyleniyordu.
Faksı okuduktan sonra sözü Öcalan’a verdim. Öcalan, ‘eğer Ankara çözüm konusunda yeterli irade gösterirse biz burayı ikna ederiz. Bulunduğumuz alan diplomatik sorun edilmemeli, bu alana baskı yapılmamalı ‘ yanıtını verdi. Bir faks daha geldi. İkinci faksta, ‘Öcalan Suriye’de oldukça çözüm olmayacaktır’ yazıyordu.
Gidişatta bir terslik olduğu belliydi. O fakslar MED TV’nin arşivinde olmalı. Faks numaralarını araştırdık ancak sonuç alamadık. Öyle bir hat sanki hiç açılmamıştı! Ancak o ajansın adıyla birkaç hafta sonra bu kez Kıbrıs Türkleriyle ilgili bir haberde karşılaşmıştım.
1 Eylül 1998 ateşkesi
Öcalan karşı tarafın ikili oynadığından kuşkulanıyordu. Bu kuşkusunu yakın çevresiyle paylaşıyor ve tartışıyordu. Acele bir ateşkes kararı vermek istemiyordu. Bu arada mesajlar gelmeye devam ediyordu. Temmuz sonunda bu kez Yalçın Küçük Hoca’yla birlikte ‘özel’ bir program yaptık. Hoca, önceden bana , ‘bu programa iyi hazırlanalım Genelkurmay Karargâhı’ndan izleyecekler’ dedi. Aynı bilgi Öcalan’a da gitmişti.
Programı açtıktan sonra ilk sözü sözü stüdyodaki Yalçın Hoca’ya verdim. Yalçın Küçük,’biliyorum, bu gece paşalarımız bizi izliyor’ dedi ve uzun bir değerlendirme yaptı. Hoca’ya göre Ankara’da, özellikle ordu içinde ‘farklı düşünenler’ vardı. Bu programda söyledikleri onların kaygılarını gidermek amaçlıydı!
Tabii, Yalçın Hoca konusunda Öcalan’ın ve bizim düşüncelerimiz netti. Hoca’nın ordu içinde ilişkileri olabilirdi. Ayrıca, Kürt hareketini ‘siyaseten yönlendirmek’ niyetindeydi. Küçük, Kürt meselesinde kendi deyimiyle ‘devletin zihnini açıyordu’! Sık sık,’bizim devletimiz bana gelinceye kadar Kürt ve PKK cahiliydi’ diyordu.
Bunlar bilinen şeylerdi. Herkesin bir hesabı vardı ve olacaktı. Kürt tarafı bunun farkındaydı ve o da kendi hesabını yapmıştı.
21 Ağustos 1998 günü Genelkurmay’dan yeni bir mesaj geldi. Mesajda , ‘basın üzerindeki ambargonun kaldırıldığı belirtiliyor, ateşkesin ilan edilmesinin beklendiği ‘söyleniyordu.
28 Ağustos’ta programı yaptık. Programa NTV, ATV, Hüriyet, Milliyet gibi gazetelerin temsilcileri katıldı. Yeni Özgür Politika gazetesine bu programın ayrıntılarını yazdım. Yıldıray Oğur’un yazısında da var. Sonuçta Öcalan, Genelkurmay’ın talep ettiği ateşkesi ilan etti.
Ancak 6 Eylül’de yaşanan beklenenin tam tersi bir gelişmeydi. Başbakan Mesut Yılmaz İsrail’e gitmişti. Netanyahu ve Yılmaz görüşmesinden sonrası yapılan basın toplantısında Yılmaz, ‘bölücü teröre verdiği destek’ sebebiyle Suriye’nin ‘düşman ülke’ olduğunu söylemişti.
Bu açıklamanın ardından Öcalan, ‘bu bir oyundur’ dedi. Ancak ateşkes ilan edilmişti. 14 Eylül günü Genelkurmay’dan bir mesaj daha geldi. Genelkurmay görüşmelere , ‘ikinci bir gelişmeye kadar’ son verdiğini söylüyordu.
1999-2002 dönemi
Sonrası biliniyor. Amerika’nın baskısı sonucu Öcalan Suriye’den çıkarıldı. Uluslararası düzeyde aylar süren baskı ve takipten sonra da Kenya’da yakalandı ve Türk devletine verildi. Bu sürede Karadayı emekli olmuş, yerine Kıvrıkoğlu gelmişti.
TSK-PKK görüşmeleri için emri Karadayı-Kıvrıkoğlu ekibi vermişti. Görüşmeler onların bilgisi dahilinde gerçekleşmişti. Öcalan İmralı’da avukatlarıyla yaptığı görüşmelerde orada da birçok kez kendisiyle Kıvrıkoğlu adına görüşüldüğünü söyledi. Kıvrıkoğlu-Ecevit ikilisinin çözüm konusunda samimi davrandıklarını da belirtti. Öcalan’a göre ‘Rahşan affı’ da başta bu amaçla gündeme gelmişti. Ancak daha sonra değiştirilmişti. Ayrıca Ecevit Hükümeti’nin tasfiyesi de bu meseleyle yakından ilgiliydi.
Öyle miydi, değil miydi bilemeyiz. Bildiğimiz; Türkiye’nin PKK’yle görüşmeye başladığı her dönem ciddi sarsıntılar geçirdiğidir. Bazı gözlemciler bu görüşmelerin ‘oyun’ olduğunu söylüyor. Bu kadar ‘oyun’ bana fazla geliyor. Ne de olsa bugün de geçmişten farklı bir şey yaşanmıyor.
Gazeteci
gunayaslan@hotmail.de
GÜNAY ASLAN * / TC ile PKK arasındaki ilk görüşmeler PKK’nin 1984’teki Eruh ve Şemdinli baskınlarından sonra başladı. Görevli albaylar hapisteki PKK’lilerle görüştü.
Türkiye kritik bir eşikten geçiyor. 25 yılı ‘düşük yoğunluklu çatışmayla’ geçen Kürt sorunu günümüzde ‘Türk-Kürt boğazlaşmasının’ işaretlerini veriyor. Süreç, bu ülkenin kaderinde söz sahibi olan herkesi Kürt meselesinde yeni bir karar almanın eşiğine getirmiş bulunuyor.
Ne ki tablo hiç de iç açıcı görünmüyor. Türkiye’nin Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ, ‘sözün bittiği yerde’ olduklarını söylüyor. Kuzeyi güneyiyle; parlamenteri bölge yöneticisiyle Kürtleri tehdit ediyor. AKP Hükümeti hem generalden yana hem değilmiş gibi bir tutum izliyor. İktidar her zamanki gibi ‘ortayolculuk’ yapıyor. Ana muhalefet partisi CHP sistemin kendisine vurduğu prangaları çözemiyor. Devletin partisi olmaktan çıkıp halkın partisi haline gelemiyor. MHP ise ‘olağanüstü hâl ilan edilmesi’ ve ‘Kandil’e kara harekâtı yapılması’ için bastırıyor. BDP bunlara karşı ‘barış ve demokrasi’ mücadelesi veriyor.
Sivil toplum örgütleri, yazarlar, aydınlar ve sıradan insanlarsa akan kanın durmasını, herkesi tüketen kirli savaşın sonlanmasını istiyor. Kamuoyunun dikkatleri bu amaçla yeniden Öcalan’a ve PKK’ye çevrilmiş bulunuyor. Türkiye toplumunun ezici çoğunluğu PKK’den yeni bir ‘ateşkes’ bekliyor. Öcalan ve PKK’yse bunun ‘çift taraflı’ olmasında ısrar ediyor. Kürt tarafı ordunun operasyonlarına son vermesi gerektiğini söylüyor. Aksi durumda zaten ateşkesin pek bir anlamı olmuyor.
Bu kritik süreçte en çok da ‘PKK’yle görüşme’ meselesi tartışılıyor. Kimileri bunu destekliyor, kimileriyse karşı çıkıyor. Karşı çıkanlar böyle bir şeyin ‘asla mümkün olamayacağını, devletin PKK’yle pazarlığa oturamayacağını’ söylüyor.
Bu yazımda, düşük yoğunluklu çatışmayla’ geçmiş son 25-26 yılda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti (TC) ile Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK) arasındaki açık-gizli görüşmeleri yazacağım. Tarihlerini, aktörlerini ve içeriklerini vererek -özeleyazacağım. Ayrıca her görüşme veya ateşkes sonrası gündeme gelen bazı olayları dikkatinize sunacağım.
Taraf gazetesinden Yıldıray Oğur bu konuda iki yazı kaleme aldı. (6 ve 8 Temmuz). Oğur yazılarında PKK’nin 1 Eylül 1998 tarihinde ilân ettiği ateşkes sürecini yazdı. Bunu da 28 Şubat süreciyle irtibatlandırdı. İlk yazısı için ‘Genelkurmay- PKK dayanışması’ başlığını kullandı. Ancak ikinci yazısında ‘dayanışmanın’ yerini ‘görüşme’ aldı.
Objektif olanın ‘görüşme’ olduğuna inanıyorum. Genelkurmay ile PKK arasında ‘dayanışma’ olduğunu söylemek doğru değildir. Kaldı ki Kürtlerin haklı insani; ulusal ve demokratik mücadelelerine ‘Ergenekon gölgesi’ düşürmek, Ergenekon mağduru Kürtleri son derece üzmektedir. Ayrıca bu sorunun barışçıl çözümüne zarar vermektedir.
Elbette varsa bir belge veya bilgi açıklanmalıdır. PKK ve Öcalan’ın bu konudaki tutumları açıktır. PKK birçok kez ‘varsa bildiğiniz, açıklayın’ demiştir. Öcalan, Ergenekon savcılarına birçok dilekçe göndermiştir. Ancak bunlar görmezden gelinmiştir.
TC ile PKK arasında neredeyse 25 yıl öncesinden başlayan ve günümüze kadar devam eden bir dizi görüşme yapılmıştır. Bunların çoğunun içeriği ve sonuçları PKK tarafından yayınlanmıştır.
Türk devleti Türkiye toplumunun balık hafızalı yapısından yararlanıyor. Bu yüzden ‘görüşmem’ ve ‘muhatap almam’ diyor. Fakat, arşivler farklı şeyler söylüyor. Arşivler neredeyse bu savaş başladığından bu yana TC ile PKK arasında ‘görüşmeler’ yapıldığına işaret ediyor. Doğrusu TC ile PKK arasında bu kadar çok görüşmenin yapılmış olması beni şaşırtmıyor.
Çünkü bu, devletin soruna verdiğini önemi ve ‘çok boyutlu’ çalıştığını gösteriyor. Fakat bu görüşmelere rağmen sorunu neden çöz(e)mediği sorusunu da yanıtlamak gerekiyor. Kanımca bunun yanıtını Türkiye’nin ‘irade parçalanması’ ve ‘sorunun uluslararasılaşmasında’ aramak gerekiyor.
Görüşmelerin tarihleri ve aktörleri
TC ile PKK arasındaki ilk görüşmeler PKK’nin 15 Ağustos 1984’teki Eruh ve Şemdinli baskınlarından sonra başladı! Genelkurmay’ın görevlendirdiği birçok subay cezaevinde bulunan PKK yöneticileriyle görüştü. Çoğu albay rütbesindeki bu subaylar periyodik olarak PKK’lilerle ‘Kürt sorununun nasıl çözüleceğine ilişkin’ tartışmalar yürüttüler. Bunlar elbette ‘resmî’ görüşmeler değildi. Bu yüzden tutanak düzenlenmedi.
1988-1991 arasında ise devlet, Öcalan’a ‘aracılar’ gönderdi. Bunların hiçbiri resmî devlet görevlisi değildi. Öcalan bu yüzden basına ‘devlet çekinmesin, bir subayını göndersin, görüşelim’ demecini verdi.
Devlet subay yerine Talabani’yi gönderdi. 1993 yılı başında Cumhurbaşkanı Özal, şimdi Irak’ın Cumhurbaşkanı olan Celal Talabani’yi Öcalan’a gönderdi. Öcalan, Özal’ın önerisiyle 17 Mart 1993’te 25 günlük ateşkes ilan etti. 16 Nisan’da ise yine Özal’ın önerisiyle ateşkesi süresiz olarak uzattı.
Ne var ki 17 Nisan günü Özal şüpheli bir ölümle hayata veda etti. Ateşkes de PKK’nin 33 askeri öldürdüğü ‘Bingöl eylemiyle’ sona erdi. Başbuğ, geçenlerde, o dönem Bakü- Ceyhan boru hattı gündemdeydi, bu eylem o projeyi sabote etmeye yönelikti’ dedi.
Ancak, PKK’nin tek taraflı ateşkesine rağmen gerillaya dönük operasyonların neden devam ettirildiğine ve PKK’nin ‘misilleme’ kararına rağmen, 33 askeri silahsız ve korumasız neden gönderdiklerine değinmedi. Askerleri neredeyse zoraki yola çıkaran komutanın Ergenekon sanığı olarak Silivri’de yattığını da söylemedi!
İkinci öneri Çiller’den geldi
1995 yılında bu kez Çiller devreye girdi. Başbakan Tansu Çiller savunma eski bakanlarından Ercan Vurulhan’ı danışmanlık görevine getirmişti. Vuralhan, 1995 Mart’ının ilk haftasında Avrupa’da gizlice görüştüğü Talabani’ye Çiller’den bir mesaj getirdi. Çiller mesajında, Öcalan’dan ‘ateşkes’ talep ediyordu. Vuralhan’ı Ankara’ya yolculayan Talabani 14 Mart 1995 tarihinde yazdığı bir mektupla bunu Öcalan’a iletti. ‘Tansu Çiller, siyasi bir çözümün peşindedir ‘ diye de ekledi.
Talabani mektubunda Çiller’in taleplerine de yer vermişti. Buna göre, ‘ PKK önce bir yıl sürecek bir ateşkes ilan etmeli, bu süre içinde şiddet eylemlerine girişmemeli ve terörden vazgeçtiğini ilan etmeli’ydi!
PKK lideri Öcalan, Çiller’e -Talabani üzerinden- bir mektup gönderdi. Önce ‘diyalog’ istedi. ‘Halka yönelik saldırılardan uzak durulması, PKK’ye dönük operasyonlardan kaçınılması halinde ateşkes ilan etmeye hazırım’ dedi.
Çiller’in koalisyon ortağı SHP’nin eski Dışileri Bakanı Hikmet Çetin de işin içindeydi. Çetin, Londra’da yaşayan gazeteci Kamuran Karadağ’ı kendine ‘aracı’ seçmişti. O da ‘devleti adına’ üstelik, ‘siyasal çözüm için PKK’nin savaşı sonlandırmasını’ istemişti.
Öcalan, 11 Mayıs 1995 tarihinde Çetin’e de bir mektup gönderdi. Yine ‘karşılıklı diyalog’ istedi. ‘Çözüme ilişkin girişimlerinize anlamlı karşılık vereceğim’ de dedi. Bu karşılık yıl sonunda geldi.
PKK lideri, 15 Aralık 1995 tarihinde MED TV’den canlı olarak yayınlanan, moderatörlüğünü yaptığım programda ateşkes ilan etti.
Ne var ki az kalsın uydumuz düşecekti. Zira, canlı yayın boyunca Türkiye’deki askerî bir üsten (Çanakkale) televizyonumuzun yayın yaptığı uyduya korsan sinyaller gönderilmekteydi. Buna rağmen karar ilan edildi. PKK ikinci kez ateşkes ilan etmiş, çatışmalara tek yanlı son vermişti.
Fakat bunun hemen arkasından Güçlükonak katliamı geldi. 16 Ocak 1996’da Güçlükonak’ta bir minibüs önce tarandı, sonra da yakıldı. Olayda 11 Kürt köylüsü hayatını kaybetti. Genelkurmay hemen bir açıklama yaparak ‘eylemi PKK yaptı’ dedi. Ancak gerçek kısa sürede ortaya çıktı; fail Jitem’di!
Arkasından ‘Öcalan’a suikast’ haberi geldi. Çiller bunun için, dönemin Emniyet Genel Müdürü Mehmet Ağar ile Ergenekon sanığı, emniyet eski Özel Harekât Başkan Vekili İbrahim Şahin’i görevlendirmişti.
Çiller gitti, Yılmaz geldi, ‘aracı’ değişti
Çiller ‘ateşkes’ istemiş, Öcalan ‘karşılıklı diyalog’ demiş,ardından önce ateşkes, sonra suikast girişimi gelmişti. 1995 seçimlerinden sonra DYP-SHP Hükümeti’nin yerini ANAP-DYP Hükümeti aldı. Şimdi Mesut Yılmaz başbakandı.
Yılmaz da diğer liderler gibi Kürt sorununun yarattığı sorunların altında eziliyordu. Soluk almak, aldırmak istiyordu. Görevi devralır almaz o da PKK’nin kapısını çaldı. Başbakan Yılmaz’ın ‘özel danışmanı’ yazar Alev Alatlı bu amaçla Avrupa’ya çıkarma yaptı.
Alatlı 16 Nisan 1996 günü Brüksel’de PKK’nin Avrupa sorumlusu Abdurrahman Çadırcı’yla buluştu. Alev Hanım, sorunun siyasal çözümü için ‘yapılması gerekenleri konuşmaya’ gelmişti. Alatlı, Çadırcı’nın sorusu üzerine bu görüşmeden Genelkurmay’ın haberdar olduğunu söyledi.
Görüşmelerin ilk turu ‘başarılı’ geçti. Alatlı ikinci gelişinde Öcalan’a gidecekti. Taraflar belli aralıklarla görüşmelere davam edeceklerdi. Fakat bu kez yeni bir suikast girişimi gerçekleşti! 6 Mayıs 1996 günü Şam’daki PKK okulunun yakınlarında C-4 patlayıcılarla dolu bir minibüs infilak ettirildi. Eylemi Yeşil örgütlemişti. Minibüsün bırakıldığı yer Öcalan’ın geçiş güzergâhıydı. Öcalan o esnada okulda değildi ama mesaj verilmişti.
Öcalan o gece yaptığı televizyon konuşmasında ‘biz barış, kardeşlik diyoruz, bu savaşı bitirelim diyoruz, karşılığında bomba alıyoruz’ dedi. Öcalan’ın suikast girişiminden Yılmaz’ı sorumlu tutması üzerine Alatlı bir daha PKK’ye gel(e)medi.
Netanyahu-Karadayı görüşmesi ve Erbakan’ın mektubu
Türkiye’de siyasi istikrar sağlanamıyor, hükümetin biri gidiyor, diğeri geliyordu. ANAP-DYP Hükümeti yürümeyince Refahyol hükümeti kuruldu. Erbakan Başbakan, Çiller yardımcısı oldu. Erbakan hükümeti kurar kurmaz karşısında askeri buldu. - Genelkurmay Başkanlığı hükümetin önüne ‘İsrail’le ikili askerî anlaşmalar’ dosyasını koydu.
Genelkurmay Başkanı Karadayı İsrail’e gitmişti. İsrail’de başbakanlık koltuğunda şimdiki Başbakan Netanyahu oturuyordu. Karadayı o ziyarette (25 Şubat 1997) birçok askerî anlaşmaya imza atmıştı. Hükümete bu anlaşmaların içeriği dahi açıklanmamıştı. Hükümet yine de önüne konan bütün dosyaları onayladı.
Ordu, yeni bir Milli Askerî Stratejik Konsept (MASK) hazırladı. Buna göre ‘dış tehditin’ adresi Suriye ve İran’dı. Ardından (Kasım,1997) Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi (MGSB) değiştirildi. Belgede ‘siyasal İslam baş düşman’ gösterildi.
Ordunun bunları yaptığı günlerde Erbakan Öcalan’a mektup gönderdi. ‘Şiddet dursun, Kürt kardeşlerimizle sorunları konuşarak çözelim’ dedi. Öcalan, Erbakan’a olumlu yanıt verdi. Bunun ardından Erbakan bir yazarı ve bir milletvekilini ‘aracı’ olarak gönderdi.
Erbakan mektubunu ‘resmî’ yollardan, Suriye yönetimi üzerinden göndermişti. Ve Genelkurmay’ın bilgisi dahilindeydi. Oysa Erbakan Öcalan’a mektup yazdığı tarihte Genelkurmay ile PKK zaten görüşüyordu. Başbakan’ın bundan haberi olmadığı anlaşılıyordu.
Genelkurmay doğrudan devreye giriyor
Evet, askerî kanaldan görüşme devam etmekteydi. Bu kez PKK’nin kapısını asker çalmıştı. Bir Kürt işadamının referansıyla Avrupa’ya gelen Genelkurmay Toplumsal İlişkiler Dairesi’nden Kurmay Albay H. D, PKK ‘nin Avrupa sorumlusu Şahin Çilo’yla biraraya gelmişti. Genelkurmay geçen yıl da nabız yoklamıştı. Şimdi iki cepheden birden görüşme halindeydi. Bir albay Avrupa’ya, bir albay da PKK’nin cezaevi sorumlusu Sabri Ok’a gönderilmişti. Bu görüşmelere avukat Selim Okçuoğlu aracılık etmişti.
Genelkurmay, ‘yeni komuta kademesine fırsat verilmesini’ istemekte ve ‘kapsamlı bir dönüşümden’ söz etmektedir. ‘Devlet değişecek, her şey düzelecek ve işler yoluna girecek’ demektedir. PKK de bu tarihsel süreçte ‘devleti dönüştürmek için üzerine düşeni yerine getirmelidir.’
Buna göre ilk aşamada ateşkes ilan etmelidir. İkinci aşamada siyasi taleplerini gözden geçirmeli, bölünmeye yol açacak taleplerini geri çekmeli ve birlikte çözümü benimsemelidir. PKK; Türk-Kürt kardeşliğini esas alan 1920 ruhunun yenilenmesi için gayret göstermelidir. Genelkurmay’dan gelen mesaja göre üçüncü aşama ise geçmiş muhasebesidir. Karşılık olarak yapılan hatalarla yüzleşilecektir!
PKK, buna karşılık ; operasyonlar durmalı, koruculuk sistemi ve Jitem dağıtılmalı, medya üzerindeki ambargo kaldırılmalı, barışçıl çözümün koşulları sağlanmalı ve genel af için hazırlık yapılmalıdır’ demiştir. Genelkurmay bunlara ‘evet’ demiş ve süreç içinde yerine getireceğini söylemiştir. TSK-PKK görüşmeleri bu zeminde devam etmiştir.
MED TV’de her pazar akşamı hazırlayıp sunduğum ve Öcalan’ın telefonla katıldığı programda bu süreç yoğun olarak işlenmiştir. Öcalan bu görüşmelerden çok ciddi sonuçlar çıkacağından emin değildi. Aksine temkinliydi. Zira, 1993’ten bu yanan yaşananlar gözler önündeydi. Yine de kestirip atmak istemiyordu.
O günlerde MED TV’de programlara da katılan Yalçın Küçük, ‘Genelkurmay’dan bugünlerde PKK için önemli bir açıklama gelecek’ bilgisini verdi. Çok geçmeden de açıklama geldi. Dönemin Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanı Oramiral Güven Erkaya, 5 Şubat 1998 günü, ‘irticanın PKK’den daha tehlikeli olduğunu’ söyledi!
Belli ki Türkiye yeni bir döneme girmişti. Şimdi ‘irticayla mücadele’ öne çıkmıştı. Öcalan’a söylenen ordunun ‘yeni bir Türkiye kuracağı’ydı. Gelen mesajlar bu yöndeydi. Kaldı ki siyasal olaylar da buna işaret etmekteydi.
Öcalan o süreçte, Türk-Kürt kardeşliği temelinde Cumhuriyet’in kuruluş sürecini işledi. Kemalist devrimin önemine dikkat çekti ve her fırsatta, ‘yeni Türkiye’yi birlikte kurmaya hazırız’ dedi.
28 Şubat sürecinde yaşananlar
1998’le birlikte Kürt sorunu gündemden düşmüş, ‘irtica’ meselesi öne çıkmıştı. 28 Şubat’ta MGK toplanmış, ‘laiklik’ vurgusu yapmıştı. 21 Mayıs’ta Refah Partisi’nin kapatılması için dava açılmış, 17 Haziran’da Erbakan istifa ederek, başbakanlıktan ayrılmıştı.
Bütün bu gelişmeleri yakından izlemiş, tartışmıştık. Ordu bir adım atınca Öcalan da bir adım atıyordu. Ordu, ‘PKK asıl tehdit değil derken, Öcalan, Kemalist devrimin tamamlanması gerektiğini söylüyordu. Bu tür paslaşmalar oluyordu ancak pratikte bunun tersi yaşanıyordu.
Savaş devam ediyor, can kayıpları yaşanıyordu. Ayrıca Şemdin Sakık’ın yakalanmasından sonra (13 Nisan 98) Türkiye, Suriye üzerindeki baskılarını arttırmaya başlamıştı.
30 Haziran’da Mesut Yılmaz’ın başbakanlığında yeni bir hükümet kuruldu. Temmuz’un ilk haftası Yıldız Şimşir arkadaşımla birlikte MED TV’de ‘özel ‘bir program yaptık. Öcalan yine telefonla katıldı. Ancak bir telefon konuğumuz daha olacaktı. Ankara’dan katılacaktı. Ankara’dan katılacak olan görüşmeleri yönlendiren kişi olacaktı.
Programı açtık, PKK liderini aldık ve süreci tartıştık ancak Ankara’dan kimse bağlanmadı. Beklediğimiz kişi faks göndermişti. Faksı alıp, okudum. Faks adı sanı duyulmamış bir haber ajansının antetli kağıdıyla gönderilmişti.Yanılmıyorsam Ankara Ay Ajans’tı. Faks mesajında sorunun çözümü konusunda bilinen öneriler tekrarlandıktan sonra, ‘bu sorunun çözülmesi için Öcalan’ın bulunduğu yerden çıkması gerektiği’ söyleniyordu.
Faksı okuduktan sonra sözü Öcalan’a verdim. Öcalan, ‘eğer Ankara çözüm konusunda yeterli irade gösterirse biz burayı ikna ederiz. Bulunduğumuz alan diplomatik sorun edilmemeli, bu alana baskı yapılmamalı ‘ yanıtını verdi. Bir faks daha geldi. İkinci faksta, ‘Öcalan Suriye’de oldukça çözüm olmayacaktır’ yazıyordu.
Gidişatta bir terslik olduğu belliydi. O fakslar MED TV’nin arşivinde olmalı. Faks numaralarını araştırdık ancak sonuç alamadık. Öyle bir hat sanki hiç açılmamıştı! Ancak o ajansın adıyla birkaç hafta sonra bu kez Kıbrıs Türkleriyle ilgili bir haberde karşılaşmıştım.
1 Eylül 1998 ateşkesi
Öcalan karşı tarafın ikili oynadığından kuşkulanıyordu. Bu kuşkusunu yakın çevresiyle paylaşıyor ve tartışıyordu. Acele bir ateşkes kararı vermek istemiyordu. Bu arada mesajlar gelmeye devam ediyordu. Temmuz sonunda bu kez Yalçın Küçük Hoca’yla birlikte ‘özel’ bir program yaptık. Hoca, önceden bana , ‘bu programa iyi hazırlanalım Genelkurmay Karargâhı’ndan izleyecekler’ dedi. Aynı bilgi Öcalan’a da gitmişti.
Programı açtıktan sonra ilk sözü sözü stüdyodaki Yalçın Hoca’ya verdim. Yalçın Küçük,’biliyorum, bu gece paşalarımız bizi izliyor’ dedi ve uzun bir değerlendirme yaptı. Hoca’ya göre Ankara’da, özellikle ordu içinde ‘farklı düşünenler’ vardı. Bu programda söyledikleri onların kaygılarını gidermek amaçlıydı!
Tabii, Yalçın Hoca konusunda Öcalan’ın ve bizim düşüncelerimiz netti. Hoca’nın ordu içinde ilişkileri olabilirdi. Ayrıca, Kürt hareketini ‘siyaseten yönlendirmek’ niyetindeydi. Küçük, Kürt meselesinde kendi deyimiyle ‘devletin zihnini açıyordu’! Sık sık,’bizim devletimiz bana gelinceye kadar Kürt ve PKK cahiliydi’ diyordu.
Bunlar bilinen şeylerdi. Herkesin bir hesabı vardı ve olacaktı. Kürt tarafı bunun farkındaydı ve o da kendi hesabını yapmıştı.
21 Ağustos 1998 günü Genelkurmay’dan yeni bir mesaj geldi. Mesajda , ‘basın üzerindeki ambargonun kaldırıldığı belirtiliyor, ateşkesin ilan edilmesinin beklendiği ‘söyleniyordu.
28 Ağustos’ta programı yaptık. Programa NTV, ATV, Hüriyet, Milliyet gibi gazetelerin temsilcileri katıldı. Yeni Özgür Politika gazetesine bu programın ayrıntılarını yazdım. Yıldıray Oğur’un yazısında da var. Sonuçta Öcalan, Genelkurmay’ın talep ettiği ateşkesi ilan etti.
Ancak 6 Eylül’de yaşanan beklenenin tam tersi bir gelişmeydi. Başbakan Mesut Yılmaz İsrail’e gitmişti. Netanyahu ve Yılmaz görüşmesinden sonrası yapılan basın toplantısında Yılmaz, ‘bölücü teröre verdiği destek’ sebebiyle Suriye’nin ‘düşman ülke’ olduğunu söylemişti.
Bu açıklamanın ardından Öcalan, ‘bu bir oyundur’ dedi. Ancak ateşkes ilan edilmişti. 14 Eylül günü Genelkurmay’dan bir mesaj daha geldi. Genelkurmay görüşmelere , ‘ikinci bir gelişmeye kadar’ son verdiğini söylüyordu.
1999-2002 dönemi
Sonrası biliniyor. Amerika’nın baskısı sonucu Öcalan Suriye’den çıkarıldı. Uluslararası düzeyde aylar süren baskı ve takipten sonra da Kenya’da yakalandı ve Türk devletine verildi. Bu sürede Karadayı emekli olmuş, yerine Kıvrıkoğlu gelmişti.
TSK-PKK görüşmeleri için emri Karadayı-Kıvrıkoğlu ekibi vermişti. Görüşmeler onların bilgisi dahilinde gerçekleşmişti. Öcalan İmralı’da avukatlarıyla yaptığı görüşmelerde orada da birçok kez kendisiyle Kıvrıkoğlu adına görüşüldüğünü söyledi. Kıvrıkoğlu-Ecevit ikilisinin çözüm konusunda samimi davrandıklarını da belirtti. Öcalan’a göre ‘Rahşan affı’ da başta bu amaçla gündeme gelmişti. Ancak daha sonra değiştirilmişti. Ayrıca Ecevit Hükümeti’nin tasfiyesi de bu meseleyle yakından ilgiliydi.
Öyle miydi, değil miydi bilemeyiz. Bildiğimiz; Türkiye’nin PKK’yle görüşmeye başladığı her dönem ciddi sarsıntılar geçirdiğidir. Bazı gözlemciler bu görüşmelerin ‘oyun’ olduğunu söylüyor. Bu kadar ‘oyun’ bana fazla geliyor. Ne de olsa bugün de geçmişten farklı bir şey yaşanmıyor.
Gazeteci
gunayaslan@hotmail.de
Karayilan: We continue resisting, no matter if it takes a century
Wednesday, 07 July 2010 12:51
Qendil Mountains- The Defence Regions of Medya: Murat Karayilan the president of Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) stated that we are in a restricted self-defence position and have not exercised our full power yet.
Mr. Karayilan said that,” it is a warning position where we are standing now. If the state launches an incursion on the Defence Regions of Medya or any other part of Kurdistan then we break the chain and the situation will be completely different."
Karayilan further underlined that they are still supporting the line living with the people of Turkey on an equal and free basis and said “We will continue resisting, no matter if it takes a century. We cannot accept such dishonour; we cannot accept the assimilation policies on the Kurdish people. They will never be able to make us Turk.”
Since 1st June 2010 Kurdish problem entered a new phase. KCK Executive Committee had declared it by a public release. Following this declaration the clashes in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey) increased and spread all over to the Turkish regions such as Mediterranean, Black sea and the Marmara Regions. Turkish army has launched several air attacks on ‘The Defence Regions of Medya’, a region in northern Iraq controlled by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). With the raise in the number of clashes the number of casualties has also increased.
All these recent developments brought the Kurdish problem on the top of the agenda, as the most crucial problem of Turkey and the whole region. While some are suggesting a military-security solution to the problem some other suggestions are new approaches such as holding the problem with its all dimensions. What about the KCK? How does the KCK see the recent developments and discussions?
ANF interview Murat Karayilan, the head of Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) Executive Council. Karayilan explained what “Democratic Autonomy Solution” means.
Interviewer: How do you evaluate the developments after 1st June 2010? What are the characteristics of this new era?
Karayilan: Our leadership and the movement have put great efforts for 18 years to develop a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. Most recently on 13 April 2009 we declared a unilateral ceasefire which was ended on 1st June 2010. However, what we have seen is that the AKP government and the Turkish state have no intention to make peace with the Kurdish people. They insist on their assimilation policies on our people and they want the Kurds unconditionally surrender. Our leader Abdullah Ocalan has declared that he is still supporting a democratic solution and he passed the initiative to us. The responsibility of this new phase belongs to us. Nobody can blame our leadership for this.
Interviewer: Mr. Ocalan has said that he can be part of a solution if there are negotiations. For your movement what is the role of your leadership Ocalan? How do you see the discussions about this issue?
Karayilan: The role of our leadership is clear not only for our movement but also for the Kurdish people. As we have already underlined numberless times he is the leader of a people, he is the leader of the Kurdish people. His role is decisive for us. He said the 3rd phase is over and he will withdraw until he is recognised as an interlocutor and negotiations start. He did it in the face of denial and destruction policies of the AKP and the Turkish state.
We are a movement. We have a council, executive board and administration. We have been discussing for the last 6- 7 months how we can develop our own solution. Therefore, we decided to start a new phase. It was a necessity for us. If the state does not want to find a solution by negotiating with you then you have to find your own solution with your own dynamics. That is what we are doing now. Because the state does not want to solve the Kurdish problem but destroy the Kurdish people. This is a danger for our people. The AKP has rejected all our reasonable proposals. This means I do not want to make peace with you but to destroy you. This is the danger. We consider the phase as “protecting our existence as a nation and building a free life”. We are developing a solution and are ready to welcome the state if they want to be a part of the solution. If not, we will make it with our own dynamics.
Interviewer: There are some calls from NGO’s and some business unions for a ceasefire and stopping the military operations. How do you see these calls? Is a ceasefire possible in this phase? If yes, depending on what?
Karayilan: First of all I should say that following the call from the NGO’s in Diyarbakir in which they asked for a ceasefire from us and stopping the military operations from the state the Turkish media disseminated false, fabricated news. This is a big lie. We respect all the calls from the NGO’s both based in and out of Diyarbakir. They are coherent and balanced. However, making calls, itself does not suffice. A greater effort is needed. The framework proposed by the NGO’s is acceptable. If the state agrees on it too then we can start negotiations. On the one hand, the Turkish PM is calling NATO and waiting the US and despite all the tension with Israel, he is still sending delegations to Israel to buy Herons; this is the same with Syria and Iran. In order to destroy us they are holding security meetings one after another. One the other hand they are calling for a unilateral ceasefire. It does not make any sense. It is not acceptable. We have the power to resist the Turkish state, to stand on our own feet. All should be aware of this fact.
We are at a restricted self defence position. That means we have not exercised our full power yet. Because we are still of view of living together with Turkey and we are struggling for it. However, if the state as a result of these security meetings launches an incursion to the Defence Regions of Medya or any other part of Kurdistan then we break the chain and the situation will be completely different. We are following a well planned and organised self defence strategy. We gained experience during these years fighting in the mountains. We are limiting ourselves. It should not be thought that we are using all of our power. No, this is not our full power. Nobody should miscalculate. We are at a warning position. But if they insist on the deadlock, if they insist on the denial and destruction then the Kurdish people have the right to head other options. We have the power to resist. The palavers from the politicians saying that they had liquidated the PKK in 1999; this is their false theory. That time, upon the request from our leadership we withdrew out of the borders. It was a way of showing good faith. The Turkish state should not be deceived and think that it was something that they managed themselves.
Qendil Mountains- The Defence Regions of Medya: Murat Karayilan the president of Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) stated that we are in a restricted self-defence position and have not exercised our full power yet.
Mr. Karayilan said that,” it is a warning position where we are standing now. If the state launches an incursion on the Defence Regions of Medya or any other part of Kurdistan then we break the chain and the situation will be completely different."
Karayilan further underlined that they are still supporting the line living with the people of Turkey on an equal and free basis and said “We will continue resisting, no matter if it takes a century. We cannot accept such dishonour; we cannot accept the assimilation policies on the Kurdish people. They will never be able to make us Turk.”
Since 1st June 2010 Kurdish problem entered a new phase. KCK Executive Committee had declared it by a public release. Following this declaration the clashes in Northern Kurdistan (Turkey) increased and spread all over to the Turkish regions such as Mediterranean, Black sea and the Marmara Regions. Turkish army has launched several air attacks on ‘The Defence Regions of Medya’, a region in northern Iraq controlled by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). With the raise in the number of clashes the number of casualties has also increased.
All these recent developments brought the Kurdish problem on the top of the agenda, as the most crucial problem of Turkey and the whole region. While some are suggesting a military-security solution to the problem some other suggestions are new approaches such as holding the problem with its all dimensions. What about the KCK? How does the KCK see the recent developments and discussions?
ANF interview Murat Karayilan, the head of Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan (KCK) Executive Council. Karayilan explained what “Democratic Autonomy Solution” means.
Interviewer: How do you evaluate the developments after 1st June 2010? What are the characteristics of this new era?
Karayilan: Our leadership and the movement have put great efforts for 18 years to develop a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. Most recently on 13 April 2009 we declared a unilateral ceasefire which was ended on 1st June 2010. However, what we have seen is that the AKP government and the Turkish state have no intention to make peace with the Kurdish people. They insist on their assimilation policies on our people and they want the Kurds unconditionally surrender. Our leader Abdullah Ocalan has declared that he is still supporting a democratic solution and he passed the initiative to us. The responsibility of this new phase belongs to us. Nobody can blame our leadership for this.
Interviewer: Mr. Ocalan has said that he can be part of a solution if there are negotiations. For your movement what is the role of your leadership Ocalan? How do you see the discussions about this issue?
Karayilan: The role of our leadership is clear not only for our movement but also for the Kurdish people. As we have already underlined numberless times he is the leader of a people, he is the leader of the Kurdish people. His role is decisive for us. He said the 3rd phase is over and he will withdraw until he is recognised as an interlocutor and negotiations start. He did it in the face of denial and destruction policies of the AKP and the Turkish state.
We are a movement. We have a council, executive board and administration. We have been discussing for the last 6- 7 months how we can develop our own solution. Therefore, we decided to start a new phase. It was a necessity for us. If the state does not want to find a solution by negotiating with you then you have to find your own solution with your own dynamics. That is what we are doing now. Because the state does not want to solve the Kurdish problem but destroy the Kurdish people. This is a danger for our people. The AKP has rejected all our reasonable proposals. This means I do not want to make peace with you but to destroy you. This is the danger. We consider the phase as “protecting our existence as a nation and building a free life”. We are developing a solution and are ready to welcome the state if they want to be a part of the solution. If not, we will make it with our own dynamics.
Interviewer: There are some calls from NGO’s and some business unions for a ceasefire and stopping the military operations. How do you see these calls? Is a ceasefire possible in this phase? If yes, depending on what?
Karayilan: First of all I should say that following the call from the NGO’s in Diyarbakir in which they asked for a ceasefire from us and stopping the military operations from the state the Turkish media disseminated false, fabricated news. This is a big lie. We respect all the calls from the NGO’s both based in and out of Diyarbakir. They are coherent and balanced. However, making calls, itself does not suffice. A greater effort is needed. The framework proposed by the NGO’s is acceptable. If the state agrees on it too then we can start negotiations. On the one hand, the Turkish PM is calling NATO and waiting the US and despite all the tension with Israel, he is still sending delegations to Israel to buy Herons; this is the same with Syria and Iran. In order to destroy us they are holding security meetings one after another. One the other hand they are calling for a unilateral ceasefire. It does not make any sense. It is not acceptable. We have the power to resist the Turkish state, to stand on our own feet. All should be aware of this fact.
We are at a restricted self defence position. That means we have not exercised our full power yet. Because we are still of view of living together with Turkey and we are struggling for it. However, if the state as a result of these security meetings launches an incursion to the Defence Regions of Medya or any other part of Kurdistan then we break the chain and the situation will be completely different. We are following a well planned and organised self defence strategy. We gained experience during these years fighting in the mountains. We are limiting ourselves. It should not be thought that we are using all of our power. No, this is not our full power. Nobody should miscalculate. We are at a warning position. But if they insist on the deadlock, if they insist on the denial and destruction then the Kurdish people have the right to head other options. We have the power to resist. The palavers from the politicians saying that they had liquidated the PKK in 1999; this is their false theory. That time, upon the request from our leadership we withdrew out of the borders. It was a way of showing good faith. The Turkish state should not be deceived and think that it was something that they managed themselves.
Ocalan: Either A Solution or Revolution
Friday, 09 July 2010 14:10
IMRALI PRISON, Turkey – In his weekly visit of the lawyers which took place on Wednesday 7th July, the Kurdish national leader Mr. Abdullah Ocalan stated that if negotiations do not start then Kurdistan Revolution will extend. He also claimed that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) cannot be destroyed with the professional army or any advanced technological weapons. Moreover, there is a risk that the clashes might escalate in cities. In that case everybody will lose but the state at most.
In the course of his lawyer visit in Imrali High Security Prison, Ocalan also reminded the basic conditions for a solution. A bilateral ceasefire, establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and legal framework and constitutional guarantees. In regard to the statements of Ilker Bashbug, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, who told MP’s of the pro-Kurdish BDP to leave the parliament and go to mountains while criticising them for attending the funerals of Kurdish slain guerrillas, Ocalan said: “Bashbug is repeating himself. It is the reiteration of a tried but failed approach.”
The Kurdish national leader further stated that he finds it important that BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) is opening a representative office in Hewler (Arbil) the capital of Kurdistan Region in Iraq. “It is important to have representatives in Brussels or in Washington but most importantly in Hewler because the people there are our own people. It is even too late while more than 500 Turkish companies are already there.” added Ocalan.
Ocalan pointed out the autonomy for the Kurdish people as promised by Mustafa Kemal the foundering father of the Turkish republic and stated that: “The Kurds had played a vital role in the “Independence War” and this role found its place in 1921 Constitution. Mustafa Kemal promised autonomy for the Kurds. These promises can be found in the parliament reports. However, he neutralised by Ismet InonU and Fevzi Chakmak as well as British. The British had sacrificed the Kurds.”
The Kurdish national leader commended three suggestions which are as followed:
“I have three practical suggestions for the government, KCK (Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan) and BDP so that the Kurdish problem can be solved: First, there should be a bilateral ceasefire complied with by the both sides. Second, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission like it was established in South Africa after the abolition of apartheid. This commission should be composed of experts. A parliamentary commission can also be formed in which experts, intellectuals and NGO’s can take part. The commission can hear all the sides of the conflict including myself. Then they can find the truth out, share them with public opinion and then reconciliation can be reached. It is not as difficult as it looks. It worked in South Africa and there is no reason why it should not work here too. In a parallel way, the PKK forces can be gathered in a certain area under observation of an international organisation such as UN. They can wait there until a solution is found and then the thirds step comes.
The third, bringing the PKK guerrillas back home. Not like the one in Habur [Peace delegation sent by the PKK upon the request from Ocalan on 19 October 2009], but en masse. All the guerrillas can arrive together. The security aspect can be discussed with KCK. BDP can work on a democratic constitution and the other political parties can contribute it. It means if the problem solved with in a legal framework and under constitutional guarantee then the weapon can be laid down.
In regard to the assertion of groups who claim that Ocalan is trying to save himself, he said “Some are manipulating my position and suggesting that I am trying to save myself. These are thoughtless approaches. A process which I am not a part of cannot be successful. This is clear. I do not have an aim of saving myself. If there is a salvation then it will be for all of us.”
Ocalan criticized the government along with the Turkish main political parties and said; “A peace process negotiations should be held. And if it does not happen then revolution starts which I explained in my previous meeting. And once they start they are uncontrollable. Turkey is confronted by such a risk. It should not be seen that I am giving tactics to the PKK in order to increase the conflict. What I am doing is evaluating the facts because the PKK has its own methods. I am sorry for soldier deaths as much as I am sorry for the guerrilla deaths. I endeavor to prevent these deaths. Neither CHP nor MHP not the fake Islamists can solve this issue. They are still talking about operations, bombardments, killings. The PKK cannot be destroyed with professional army or technological weapons. There are still Kurds all over joining the PKK. Moreover, there is a risk that the clashes might escalate in cities. And if the war escalates then there will be radical groups from both sides which can make the problem more complicated and unsolvable. In that case, everybody loses but the sate at most.”
IMRALI PRISON, Turkey – In his weekly visit of the lawyers which took place on Wednesday 7th July, the Kurdish national leader Mr. Abdullah Ocalan stated that if negotiations do not start then Kurdistan Revolution will extend. He also claimed that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) cannot be destroyed with the professional army or any advanced technological weapons. Moreover, there is a risk that the clashes might escalate in cities. In that case everybody will lose but the state at most.
In the course of his lawyer visit in Imrali High Security Prison, Ocalan also reminded the basic conditions for a solution. A bilateral ceasefire, establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and legal framework and constitutional guarantees. In regard to the statements of Ilker Bashbug, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, who told MP’s of the pro-Kurdish BDP to leave the parliament and go to mountains while criticising them for attending the funerals of Kurdish slain guerrillas, Ocalan said: “Bashbug is repeating himself. It is the reiteration of a tried but failed approach.”
The Kurdish national leader further stated that he finds it important that BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) is opening a representative office in Hewler (Arbil) the capital of Kurdistan Region in Iraq. “It is important to have representatives in Brussels or in Washington but most importantly in Hewler because the people there are our own people. It is even too late while more than 500 Turkish companies are already there.” added Ocalan.
Ocalan pointed out the autonomy for the Kurdish people as promised by Mustafa Kemal the foundering father of the Turkish republic and stated that: “The Kurds had played a vital role in the “Independence War” and this role found its place in 1921 Constitution. Mustafa Kemal promised autonomy for the Kurds. These promises can be found in the parliament reports. However, he neutralised by Ismet InonU and Fevzi Chakmak as well as British. The British had sacrificed the Kurds.”
The Kurdish national leader commended three suggestions which are as followed:
“I have three practical suggestions for the government, KCK (Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan) and BDP so that the Kurdish problem can be solved: First, there should be a bilateral ceasefire complied with by the both sides. Second, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission like it was established in South Africa after the abolition of apartheid. This commission should be composed of experts. A parliamentary commission can also be formed in which experts, intellectuals and NGO’s can take part. The commission can hear all the sides of the conflict including myself. Then they can find the truth out, share them with public opinion and then reconciliation can be reached. It is not as difficult as it looks. It worked in South Africa and there is no reason why it should not work here too. In a parallel way, the PKK forces can be gathered in a certain area under observation of an international organisation such as UN. They can wait there until a solution is found and then the thirds step comes.
The third, bringing the PKK guerrillas back home. Not like the one in Habur [Peace delegation sent by the PKK upon the request from Ocalan on 19 October 2009], but en masse. All the guerrillas can arrive together. The security aspect can be discussed with KCK. BDP can work on a democratic constitution and the other political parties can contribute it. It means if the problem solved with in a legal framework and under constitutional guarantee then the weapon can be laid down.
In regard to the assertion of groups who claim that Ocalan is trying to save himself, he said “Some are manipulating my position and suggesting that I am trying to save myself. These are thoughtless approaches. A process which I am not a part of cannot be successful. This is clear. I do not have an aim of saving myself. If there is a salvation then it will be for all of us.”
Ocalan criticized the government along with the Turkish main political parties and said; “A peace process negotiations should be held. And if it does not happen then revolution starts which I explained in my previous meeting. And once they start they are uncontrollable. Turkey is confronted by such a risk. It should not be seen that I am giving tactics to the PKK in order to increase the conflict. What I am doing is evaluating the facts because the PKK has its own methods. I am sorry for soldier deaths as much as I am sorry for the guerrilla deaths. I endeavor to prevent these deaths. Neither CHP nor MHP not the fake Islamists can solve this issue. They are still talking about operations, bombardments, killings. The PKK cannot be destroyed with professional army or technological weapons. There are still Kurds all over joining the PKK. Moreover, there is a risk that the clashes might escalate in cities. And if the war escalates then there will be radical groups from both sides which can make the problem more complicated and unsolvable. In that case, everybody loses but the sate at most.”
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