MAXİME DEMİRALP-ANF
12:43 / 02 Aralık 2010
PARİS - Bundan 100 yıl önce, henüz Türkiye diye bir devlet yokken, Manchester’dan Basra’ya doğru giden bir gemi Scilly Adaları güneyinde battı. Geminin adı Kürdistan’dı.
Bugün kullanımı yasaklarla çevrili bir kelime olan Kürdistan, 100 yıl önce bir gemiye isim olarak verilmişti. Dramın yaşandığı Fransa’nın Brotonya bölgesindeki Plouguerneau’da herkesin unuttuğu bir trajedi, 100 yıl sonra yeniden gün yüzüne çıktı. Burada bir gemi battı ve bu gemiden geriye tek bir iz kaldı, o da haç işaretli bir mezar taşı.
Haçın üzerinde şu ifadeler yer alıyor: “Bu haç 21 Ekim 1910’da denizde kaybolan ‘Kürdistan’ gemisinin kaptanı, subayları, mürettebatı ve yolcuları anısına, aynı zamanda kıyıya vuran 17 cenazeyi toplayan sakinler ve ülke makamları ile bu haçı bu araziye dikmeye izin veren Nezou ailesine minnetin ifadesi olarak Londra İngiliz-Cezayir Şirketi tarafından dikildi.”
Haç işareti gözlerden uzak özel bir mülkiyet üzerinde bulunuyor. Ancak haçın üzerinde yazılanlar 100 yıl sonra Brotonya’nın bu küçük kentinde yerel tarihçiler ile Karreg-Hir Derneği üyelerinin dikkatini çekti. Geminin batışının yıldönümü dolayısıyla Karreg-Hirr, Le Telegramme gazetesinde olay hakkında bilgisi olan tüm kişi, tarihçi ya da denizcilere çağrıda bulundu.
Mezar taşı üzerindeki kaydın dışında yaşanan felakete ilişkin kesin bir bilgi bulunmuyor. Kazanın nedeni, yeri, boğulanların sayısı, hayatta kalanlar, sonuçları… hiçbir şey… ne yerel hafızada ne de yazılı olarak…
Gemi 16 Nisan 1906 tarihinde Galler Ülkesi kıyıları üzerindeki Swansea merkezli İngiliz-Cezayir Steamship Co. Ltd. şirketi için imal edildi. Dönemin gazetelerinde yer alan bilgilere göre Kaptan Mannings tarafından yönetilen Kürdistan gemisi Marsilya üzerinden Basra’ya gitmek üzere 14 Ekim’de Manchester’dan yola çıktı. Gemi’nin 28 Ekim dolaylarında Marsilya’ya ulaşarak buradan yolcuları alması gerekiyordu.
New York Times’in 6 Kasım 1910 tarihli sayısında gemiden kurtulan 2 kişinin 5 Kasım’da Kanarya Adaları’na ulaştığı belirtiliyor. Geminin Manş Denizi’nin girişine 60 mil uzakta küçük İngiliz takımadaları olan Scilly Adaları’nın güneyinde battığı anlatılıyor. Hayatta kalan iki kişi ise geminin battığı sırada suya bırakılan tek küçük gemiye binebilen 10 kişi arasında yer alıyordu. 26 saat sonra Vincent isimli İngiliz yelkenlisi tarafından alınan kazazedeler 2 Kasım’da Santa Ursula adlı Alman vapuruna bindirilerek Kanarya’ya bırakıldılar. Diğer 8 kişi de ya bir patlama sonucu ya da suda boğularak öldü. Brisbane Courier gazetesine göre ise 7 Kasım 1910’da batan gemide 46 kişi hayatını kaybetti, 2 kişi kurtuldu.
Geminin yolcuları arasında Kürtler de var mıydı ve neden gemiye Kürdistan adı verilmişti bilinmez ama bu geminin varlığı da bugün yok sayılan Kürdistan’ın Türk devletinin kuruluşundan önce de var olduğunu gösteriyor. Gemiye dair diğer bütün bilgiler bunca yıl unutulduktan sonra açığa çıkarılmayı bekliyor.
ANF NEWS AGENCY
'Kürdistan' 100 yıl önce battı!
Bundan 100 yıl önce, henüz Türkiye diye bir devlet yokken, Manchester’dan Basra’ya doğru giden bir gemi Scilly Adaları güneyinde battı. Geminin adı Kürdistan’dı.
Friday, December 3, 2010
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Wikileaks documents relating to Kurds
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to
have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that
there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs
heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party
face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace
core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,
and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with
core U.S. interests. End summary.
¶2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and
phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong
candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader
to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won
Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.
Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms through
parliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose
rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is
redolent with traditional and religious allusions that
resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous
exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of
the people, without a viable or discernible political
rival...outside his own ruling AKP.
¶3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And
is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership
and momentum they need from the Turkish side?
¶4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main
opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch
of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious,
broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's
rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social
questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in
Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the
stultifying effect of current party and election laws on
entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues
that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro
indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market
portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the
facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority
of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the
Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and
district level and with municipal functions to an extent not
seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors
seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
¶5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful
challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);
quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and
resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,
prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place
of religion; identity and history; rule of law).
EU
--
¶6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a
negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The
Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have
opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process
leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus
on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the
question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.
¶7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on
the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a
date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival
and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become
substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have
resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national
interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions
of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have
once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed
insinuations into the press in parallel with the
nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion,
neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal
steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin
tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --
legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must
occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The
road ahead will surely be hard.
¶8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP
chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and
political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.
But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is
that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence
at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that
the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread
skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in
ten years.
¶9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin
Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how
bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the
final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara
have given us the other side of the story). Gul was
noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the
lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit
negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.
There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in
Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray
Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed
to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone
calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran
says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do
so.
¶10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of
openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,
muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have
encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing
membership...or at least the process. Some see the process
as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what
remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have also
run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief
among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's
role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia
and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one
participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put
it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of
FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime
Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the
Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for
one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.
¶11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP
whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert
that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of
Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of
civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others
express concern that harmonization and membership will water
down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as
AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU
says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then
the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no,
it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long
run."
¶12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to
prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator
Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he
taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh
the political challenge his choice will face since it will be
the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU
position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because
the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU
demands and a prickly domestic environment that some
observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief
internal rival Gul.
¶13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire
a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU
languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing
with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization
starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of
"one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge
milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil
service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the
government hires on the base of competence, its new hires
will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous
hires at all levels.
Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
---------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's
and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to
take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to
the U.S.
¶15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.
¶16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected
that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material
benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots
popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst
Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us
late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1)
Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership
did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy
services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream
opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory
web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging
by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,
he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State
apparatus and to have a network of observers and data
collectors in all 81 provinces.
¶17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals
itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust
him." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
explains his failure to understand the context -- or real
facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With
regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."
Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
MPs and party intellectuals.
¶18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks
vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin
Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic
depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media
disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that
lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he
ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those
around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced
pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent
the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign
policies.
¶19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly
traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past
two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to
Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his
staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no
coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has
exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep
his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and
government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary
group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we
understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen
influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key
financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002
elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.
Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential
Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist
Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads
into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and
Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to
the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it
initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.
¶20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited
number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of
some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --
to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to
Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness
to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce
Erdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.
policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan
constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his
credentials by making statements inimical to good
U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a
partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be
unable to remove the influence of Gul.
¶21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising
to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers
AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,
are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption
in the party at the national, provincial and local level and
among close family members of ministers. We have heard from
two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;
his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding
presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman
is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan
children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.
¶22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently
involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,
Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial
chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in
the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a
continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket
and other activities has already produced evidence
incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we
have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to
look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the
trend is a time bomb.
¶23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's
appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party
headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range
of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,
former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former
Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has
expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,
prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,
an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of
the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state
bureaucracy. Dincer is despised by the TGS. Many
interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy
party chairmen. The result is that, unlike former leaders
such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom
appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for
their bosses as their party general secretary and as
Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left
himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of
day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive
channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the
Turkish state.
Two Big Questions
-----------------
¶24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of
pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's
Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly
Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam
in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a
strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see
in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with
the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent
(ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in
theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively
progressive.
¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is
that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of
"secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)
pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to
follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction-
and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs
Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in
Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and
intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable
to eject those who would politicize it in a radical,
anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly
educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,
anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.
Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to
challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,
verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so
long been used to justify violence against "infidels".
¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of
politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized
Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in
Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,
defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and
unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.
¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its
citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'
individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,
and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and
practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind
one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief
assembles his party cadres and, warning against various
ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's
only that damned past that keeps changing."
¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,
including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free
and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the
concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will
it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate
policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are
joining what is still only a handful of others to take
tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.
However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of
education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,
and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between
citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi)
Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate
road."
¶29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to
have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that
there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs
heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party
face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace
core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,
and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with
core U.S. interests. End summary.
¶2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power
Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and
phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong
candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader
to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won
Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.
Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms through
parliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose
rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is
redolent with traditional and religious allusions that
resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous
exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of
the people, without a viable or discernible political
rival...outside his own ruling AKP.
¶3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And
is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership
and momentum they need from the Turkish side?
¶4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main
opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch
of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious,
broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's
rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social
questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in
Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the
stultifying effect of current party and election laws on
entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues
that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro
indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market
portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the
facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority
of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the
Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and
district level and with municipal functions to an extent not
seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors
seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
¶5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful
challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);
quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and
resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,
prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place
of religion; identity and history; rule of law).
EU
--
¶6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a
negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The
Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have
opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process
leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus
on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the
question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.
¶7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on
the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a
date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival
and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become
substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have
resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national
interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions
of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have
once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed
insinuations into the press in parallel with the
nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion,
neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal
steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin
tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --
legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must
occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The
road ahead will surely be hard.
¶8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP
chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and
political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.
But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is
that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence
at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that
the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread
skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in
ten years.
¶9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin
Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how
bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the
final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara
have given us the other side of the story). Gul was
noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the
lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit
negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.
There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in
Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray
Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed
to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone
calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran
says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do
so.
¶10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of
openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,
muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have
encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing
membership...or at least the process. Some see the process
as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what
remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have also
run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief
among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's
role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia
and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one
participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put
it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of
FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime
Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the
Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for
one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.
¶11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP
whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert
that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of
Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of
civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others
express concern that harmonization and membership will water
down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as
AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU
says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then
the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no,
it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long
run."
¶12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to
prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator
Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he
taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh
the political challenge his choice will face since it will be
the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU
position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because
the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU
demands and a prickly domestic environment that some
observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief
internal rival Gul.
¶13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire
a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU
languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing
with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization
starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of
"one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge
milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil
service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the
government hires on the base of competence, its new hires
will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous
hires at all levels.
Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance
---------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's
and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to
take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to
the U.S.
¶15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.
¶16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected
that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material
benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots
popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst
Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us
late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1)
Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership
did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy
services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream
opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory
web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging
by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,
he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State
apparatus and to have a network of observers and data
collectors in all 81 provinces.
¶17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals
itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust
him." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
explains his failure to understand the context -- or real
facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With
regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."
Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
MPs and party intellectuals.
¶18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks
vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin
Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic
depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media
disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that
lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he
ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those
around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced
pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent
the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign
policies.
¶19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly
traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past
two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to
Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his
staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no
coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has
exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep
his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and
government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary
group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we
understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen
influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key
financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002
elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.
Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential
Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist
Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads
into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and
Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to
the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it
initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.
¶20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited
number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of
some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --
to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to
Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness
to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce
Erdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.
policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan
constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his
credentials by making statements inimical to good
U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a
partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be
unable to remove the influence of Gul.
¶21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising
to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers
AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,
are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption
in the party at the national, provincial and local level and
among close family members of ministers. We have heard from
two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;
his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding
presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman
is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan
children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.
¶22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently
involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,
Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial
chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in
the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a
continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket
and other activities has already produced evidence
incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we
have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to
look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the
trend is a time bomb.
¶23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's
appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party
headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range
of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,
former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former
Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has
expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,
prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,
an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of
the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state
bureaucracy. Dincer is despised by the TGS. Many
interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy
party chairmen. The result is that, unlike former leaders
such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom
appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for
their bosses as their party general secretary and as
Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left
himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of
day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive
channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the
Turkish state.
Two Big Questions
-----------------
¶24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of
pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's
Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly
Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam
in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a
strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see
in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with
the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent
(ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in
theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively
progressive.
¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is
that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of
"secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)
pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to
follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction-
and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs
Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in
Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and
intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable
to eject those who would politicize it in a radical,
anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly
educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,
anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.
Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to
challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,
verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so
long been used to justify violence against "infidels".
¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of
politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized
Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in
Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,
defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and
unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.
¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its
citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'
individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,
and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and
practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind
one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief
assembles his party cadres and, warning against various
ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's
only that damned past that keeps changing."
¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,
including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free
and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the
concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will
it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate
policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are
joining what is still only a handful of others to take
tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.
However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of
education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,
and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between
citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi)
Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate
road."
¶29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN
Wikileaks documents relating to Kurds
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
¶B. ANKARA 1231
¶C. ANKARA 1275
¶D. ANKARA 1511
¶E. ANKARA 1342
¶F. ANKARA 944
¶G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy drift stemming from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This period of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue until the next crisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
-----------------------
¶2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU harmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economic reform. Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax administration and social security legislation required by the IMF as a pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan has delayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations; both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officials and politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle.
¶3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift and we see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government will be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship – which remains strong in some areas – back to a more strategic level.
¶4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet and parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close to Erdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obliged to kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations, strong advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual advisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up, as we have heard directly from xxxxx.
¶5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others with broad and deep contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence Organization have cut him off from their reports. He never had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by “Hoca” Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet Davutoglu.
¶6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continues behind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced to cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With his relatively good English, Gul works to project an image of being “moderate”, or “modern”. In fact, Gul's peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some constructive statements on bilateral relations and on Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved by emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
¶7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from those who support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK. xxxxx that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policy or on rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamist sentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resign in disgust at the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's closest business and brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees no future for this government and thinks it is time for a more flexible and open leader. Leading member xxxxx has expressed to us the Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some to question the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to accelerate its transition. We are encouraged by the determination of some to open a long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey's relations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped ignite the debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26 press briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannot reduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan – albeit without conviction in his voice – expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of the importance of bilateral relations.
¶9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstream commentators. However, mainstream commentators are seen as too “pro-American” to be persuasive among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
¶10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness: resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey are “Metal Storm”, a conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S. invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike with the help of the Russians; and “Mein Kampf” (ref C). Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to “steal the beliefs of our young people and children.” We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum, including a statement from the General Staff that “the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their flag.” The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus, the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.
¶11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears to be a growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angry at limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul Ozkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper “Hurriyet” and one of the most authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement, closed with a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the public and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4 column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime as one reason for the current popularity of “Mein Kampf.”
¶12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in the press and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about the police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
¶13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals – a date to begin EU accession negotiations – Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay difficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as unreasonable U.S. “demands” that infringe upon Turkish “sovereignty.”
¶14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappiness inside AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risks to anyone who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a “nuclear” option in hand – early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and the settling out of the political system will be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will either energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives. Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be more nimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
¶B. ANKARA 1231
¶C. ANKARA 1275
¶D. ANKARA 1511
¶E. ANKARA 1342
¶F. ANKARA 944
¶G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy drift stemming from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This period of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well continue until the next crisis creates new political alternatives in a day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
-----------------------
¶2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU harmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economic reform. Implementation of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B). The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax administration and social security legislation required by the IMF as a pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan has delayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations; both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officials and politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle.
¶3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift and we see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government will be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship – which remains strong in some areas – back to a more strategic level.
¶4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet and parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close to Erdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obliged to kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations, strong advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual advisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up, as we have heard directly from xxxxx.
¶5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others with broad and deep contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence Organization have cut him off from their reports. He never had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by “Hoca” Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally Ahmet Davutoglu.
¶6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continues behind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced to cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power. With his relatively good English, Gul works to project an image of being “moderate”, or “modern”. In fact, Gul's peers say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some constructive statements on bilateral relations and on Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved by emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
¶7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from those who support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK. xxxxx that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policy or on rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamist sentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resign in disgust at the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's closest business and brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees no future for this government and thinks it is time for a more flexible and open leader. Leading member xxxxx has expressed to us the Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some to question the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to accelerate its transition. We are encouraged by the determination of some to open a long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey's relations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped ignite the debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26 press briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannot reduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan – albeit without conviction in his voice – expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of the importance of bilateral relations.
¶9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstream commentators. However, mainstream commentators are seen as too “pro-American” to be persuasive among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
¶10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness: resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey are “Metal Storm”, a conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S. invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike with the help of the Russians; and “Mein Kampf” (ref C). Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to “steal the beliefs of our young people and children.” We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum, including a statement from the General Staff that “the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their flag.” The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus, the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.
¶11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears to be a growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angry at limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul Ozkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper “Hurriyet” and one of the most authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement, closed with a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the public and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4 column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime as one reason for the current popularity of “Mein Kampf.”
¶12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in the press and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about the police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
¶13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals – a date to begin EU accession negotiations – Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU- and IMF-required reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay difficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as unreasonable U.S. “demands” that infringe upon Turkish “sovereignty.”
¶14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappiness inside AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risks to anyone who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a “nuclear” option in hand – early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and the settling out of the political system will be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will either energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives. Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be more nimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
Wikileaks documetnts relating to Kurds
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones (he rejects the term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national level, good record in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try to diminish him – whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives – cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His government's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters – land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform – has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
–Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that the party's choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and national level.
–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.
–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a “closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman
201247Z Jan 04
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in government, Turkey's democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones (he rejects the term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national level, good record in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to try to diminish him – whether by blocking legislation or attacking his motives – cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His government's inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters – land registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform – has not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world. Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
–Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that the party's choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and national level.
–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment (dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has become a public controversy.
–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a “closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman
Wikileaks documetnts relating to Kurds
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #1472/01 2860830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 130830Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0267
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0936
S E C R E T ANKARA 001472
NOFORN
SIPDIS
OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you'll be able to visit Turkey at this key
time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their
minds, missile defense. The Turks are keen to learn more
about U.S. plans, in particular what role the U.S.
wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play. The
Turkish General Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas
for HLDG reform, even if they may be slow to accept them.
¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey. As you
will have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a
few key issues.
Be sure to raise:
------------------
- Missile Defense, with emphasis on how the U.S. will look to
several Allies - not just Turkey - for help (para 3)
- Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support for
strikes against the PKK (para 5-6)
- Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan
(para 13)
- Float the idea of HLDG reform and ensure Guner knows we
expect him in Washington (para 4)
- Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey's view of the
threat assessment from Iran (para 10)
Watch Out For:
---------------
- Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras
11-12)
- Conflation of Turkey's exploration of air defense
capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)
Missile Defense
----------------
¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile
defense plans and in particular will expect you to have
specific ideas on how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.
While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will
understand the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to
explore ways Turkey can help, the political environment for a
request to base assets in Turkey is mixed, and Turkey's
perception of the Iranian threat to its territory differs
from ours. The GOT continues to tread a fine line in
managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
with both the Islamic world and Russia. The government must
be able to demonstrate that any missile defense program is
not specifically anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.
¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not
opposed to Turkey's role. Also important will be clarity on
the degree to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO
Command and Control (C2). The PAA would presumably
complement Turkey's effort to establish a domestic missile
defense capability that would protect Turkey's major
population centers. The PAC-3 has been offered in response
to Turkey's air defense tender and you should highlight the
system's ability to be interoperable with any future NATO
command and control architecture.
HLDG
-----
¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and
alter the current HLDG format to make it into a more
substantive discussion. The Turks are shy to stray from the
status quo; you should emphasize why we feel this change is
necessary while underscoring that it is vitally important the
DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December, when
decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon. (We
have learned that the new position of TGS number three, a
four-star slot held by General Balanli (with a focus on
hardware), might get the nod for the HLDG representative.
We've told Guner it should be his.) You should also be
prepared for the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared
Defense Vision document, as they await a response to their
latest proposed text.
PKK
----
¶6. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
military action alone. Although the government's Democratic
(i.e., Kurdish) Initiative is not yet fully developed, the
government has increased social and economic support to
ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey, has dramatically broadened
the rights of Kurds to use their own language, and increased
educational opportunities as well. It is our view that the
TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
intelligence--sharing operation, has given the civilians the
political space to explore this "opening." Turkish military
operations against the PKK continue, however, and on October
6 Parliament extended the government's mandate to conduct
cross-border operations against the PKK in Iraq for another
year.
¶7. (C) Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence
was a turning point for the bilateral relationship, and
President Obama's declaration before the Turkish Parliament
of our continuing commitment to support Turkey's fight
against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This cooperation has
helped to improve our bilateral relationship across the
board. Turkey's military leaders value this intelligence and
the advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made
it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a
safe haven. Turkish causalities are still occurring,
however, and an increasing proportion are from IEDs. Due to
pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and the Turkish
General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year, the
government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to
our own rules of engagement. The GOT has also requested the
sale of armed MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to
fulfill (see para 10).
Northern Iraq
--------------
¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the
political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's policy remains
focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the
continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
the KRG's healthy economy. It is also tied to turkey's new
opening to its own Kurds, by far the biggest and most
controversial domestic political issue here.
¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks
continue regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in
Erbil, established to share counter-PKK intelligence was
established over the summer. The Turks remain shy to share
data; they are not convinced that they can trust
Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information concerning
operations secret. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. Turkish military officials have become more
strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
against the PKK.
U.S. Drawdown through Turkey
-----------------------------
¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub -- vital to our
sustainment operations -- could be helpful in our drawdown if
other options prove too difficult. Minister of National
Defense Vedci Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that
Turkey was ready to agree to the increased use of Incirlik
for this purpose. Using the surface route from Habur Gate to
Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun, Mersin) is also worth
exploring, and we may be able to involve Turkish commercial
shippers in support of the Northern Distribution Network. We
caution that the rough terrain, security environment, and the
cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
will challenge any U.S. operation. Nevertheless, we are
evaluating these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and
EUCOM partners.
Iran
------
¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and
international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
trade route to Central Asian markets. PM Erdogan himself is
a particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position. Turkey
believes international pressure against Iran only helps to
strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. However, it
continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1
offer. The GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation
efforts, with several significant results. Politically,
Turkey will try to position itself on Iran between wherever
we are and where Russia is. In a pinch or if pressed, the
Turks will slant to us.
UAVs and Attack Helicopters
----------------------------
¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own
UAV capability. The administration has made clear at high
levels that we support this goal, and Turkey has pending
request to acquire armed Reaper UAVs. Ultimate approval for
armed Reapers is complicated due to MTCR obligations and Hill
concerns. However, even if those could be overcome, the
delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
intelligence support until they can replace it. We have not
made this commitment to date.
¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to
a severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed
for its fight against the PKK Turkey has looked to us to
help them bridge the capability gap, asking to purchase
additional AH-1W Super Cobra aircraft. These aircraft are in
short supply in our own inventory, but Secretary Gates and
VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to support with request
within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012, and 2013). The
Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception
and will take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey
leads PRT Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in
early 2010. Turkey has sponsored the "Ankara Process"
dialogue, one of several efforts to encourage constructive
communications between Kabul and Islamabad and is a leading
participant in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. Turkey
pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200 million
to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan. Because of
its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as
Foreign Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is
well disposed to act as an agent of the international
community's goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Constraining
Turkey's potential is a lack of resources. Our conversations
with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify several
areas in which Turkey can be of particular help: education
and health, military training and support, economics,
counter-narcotics, and trilateral engagement. (Note: Turkey
will not support any CT operations in Afghanistan. They do
not believe there is a NATO/ISAF mandate to engage in these
operations, and they additionally have national caveats
preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
operations. The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not
be engaged in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that
foreign fighters who engage in this fight just produces
antipathy against foreign forces in the local population. I
do, however, believe the GOT are willing to engage the
training of Afghan security forces.)
Caucasus
--------
¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power
and recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its
growth by frozen conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.
The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10
was a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting
point for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately,
the opening of its closed border. Nevertheless, future
relations will still be heavily linked to the 1915 "genocide"
issue and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey consistently warns
that any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
"genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship --
including political, military, and commercial aspects --
would be unavoidable.
Political Environment
----------------------
¶16. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
(AK) Party is squarely in the driver's seat, but fears an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief
of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
(represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
has seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military
involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
respective underlings.
Israel
-------
¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
shore up his domestic right political flank at the expense of
this relationship. His outburst at Davos was the first in a
series of events the results of which we and his staff have
sought to contain. The latest of these was Exercise
Anatolian Eagle. Erdogan canceled Israel's participation
hours before the exercise was to begin. With an Israeli
strike - across Turkish airspace - against targets in Iran a
possibility, Erdogan decided he could not afford the
political risk of being accused of training the forces which
would carry out such a raid. Through some remarkable work
with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
"postponement" of the international portion of the exercise,
but the relationship has begun to sour.
JEFFREY
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #1472/01 2860830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 130830Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0267
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0936
S E C R E T ANKARA 001472
NOFORN
SIPDIS
OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you'll be able to visit Turkey at this key
time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their
minds, missile defense. The Turks are keen to learn more
about U.S. plans, in particular what role the U.S.
wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play. The
Turkish General Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas
for HLDG reform, even if they may be slow to accept them.
¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey. As you
will have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a
few key issues.
Be sure to raise:
------------------
- Missile Defense, with emphasis on how the U.S. will look to
several Allies - not just Turkey - for help (para 3)
- Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support for
strikes against the PKK (para 5-6)
- Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan
(para 13)
- Float the idea of HLDG reform and ensure Guner knows we
expect him in Washington (para 4)
- Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey's view of the
threat assessment from Iran (para 10)
Watch Out For:
---------------
- Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras
11-12)
- Conflation of Turkey's exploration of air defense
capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)
Missile Defense
----------------
¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile
defense plans and in particular will expect you to have
specific ideas on how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.
While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will
understand the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to
explore ways Turkey can help, the political environment for a
request to base assets in Turkey is mixed, and Turkey's
perception of the Iranian threat to its territory differs
from ours. The GOT continues to tread a fine line in
managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
with both the Islamic world and Russia. The government must
be able to demonstrate that any missile defense program is
not specifically anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.
¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not
opposed to Turkey's role. Also important will be clarity on
the degree to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO
Command and Control (C2). The PAA would presumably
complement Turkey's effort to establish a domestic missile
defense capability that would protect Turkey's major
population centers. The PAC-3 has been offered in response
to Turkey's air defense tender and you should highlight the
system's ability to be interoperable with any future NATO
command and control architecture.
HLDG
-----
¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and
alter the current HLDG format to make it into a more
substantive discussion. The Turks are shy to stray from the
status quo; you should emphasize why we feel this change is
necessary while underscoring that it is vitally important the
DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December, when
decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon. (We
have learned that the new position of TGS number three, a
four-star slot held by General Balanli (with a focus on
hardware), might get the nod for the HLDG representative.
We've told Guner it should be his.) You should also be
prepared for the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared
Defense Vision document, as they await a response to their
latest proposed text.
PKK
----
¶6. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
military action alone. Although the government's Democratic
(i.e., Kurdish) Initiative is not yet fully developed, the
government has increased social and economic support to
ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey, has dramatically broadened
the rights of Kurds to use their own language, and increased
educational opportunities as well. It is our view that the
TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
intelligence--sharing operation, has given the civilians the
political space to explore this "opening." Turkish military
operations against the PKK continue, however, and on October
6 Parliament extended the government's mandate to conduct
cross-border operations against the PKK in Iraq for another
year.
¶7. (C) Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence
was a turning point for the bilateral relationship, and
President Obama's declaration before the Turkish Parliament
of our continuing commitment to support Turkey's fight
against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This cooperation has
helped to improve our bilateral relationship across the
board. Turkey's military leaders value this intelligence and
the advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made
it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a
safe haven. Turkish causalities are still occurring,
however, and an increasing proportion are from IEDs. Due to
pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and the Turkish
General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year, the
government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to
our own rules of engagement. The GOT has also requested the
sale of armed MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to
fulfill (see para 10).
Northern Iraq
--------------
¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the
political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's policy remains
focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the
continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
the KRG's healthy economy. It is also tied to turkey's new
opening to its own Kurds, by far the biggest and most
controversial domestic political issue here.
¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks
continue regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in
Erbil, established to share counter-PKK intelligence was
established over the summer. The Turks remain shy to share
data; they are not convinced that they can trust
Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information concerning
operations secret. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. Turkish military officials have become more
strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
against the PKK.
U.S. Drawdown through Turkey
-----------------------------
¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub -- vital to our
sustainment operations -- could be helpful in our drawdown if
other options prove too difficult. Minister of National
Defense Vedci Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that
Turkey was ready to agree to the increased use of Incirlik
for this purpose. Using the surface route from Habur Gate to
Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun, Mersin) is also worth
exploring, and we may be able to involve Turkish commercial
shippers in support of the Northern Distribution Network. We
caution that the rough terrain, security environment, and the
cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
will challenge any U.S. operation. Nevertheless, we are
evaluating these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and
EUCOM partners.
Iran
------
¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and
international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
trade route to Central Asian markets. PM Erdogan himself is
a particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position. Turkey
believes international pressure against Iran only helps to
strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. However, it
continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1
offer. The GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation
efforts, with several significant results. Politically,
Turkey will try to position itself on Iran between wherever
we are and where Russia is. In a pinch or if pressed, the
Turks will slant to us.
UAVs and Attack Helicopters
----------------------------
¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own
UAV capability. The administration has made clear at high
levels that we support this goal, and Turkey has pending
request to acquire armed Reaper UAVs. Ultimate approval for
armed Reapers is complicated due to MTCR obligations and Hill
concerns. However, even if those could be overcome, the
delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
intelligence support until they can replace it. We have not
made this commitment to date.
¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to
a severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed
for its fight against the PKK Turkey has looked to us to
help them bridge the capability gap, asking to purchase
additional AH-1W Super Cobra aircraft. These aircraft are in
short supply in our own inventory, but Secretary Gates and
VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to support with request
within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012, and 2013). The
Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception
and will take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey
leads PRT Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in
early 2010. Turkey has sponsored the "Ankara Process"
dialogue, one of several efforts to encourage constructive
communications between Kabul and Islamabad and is a leading
participant in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. Turkey
pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200 million
to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan. Because of
its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as
Foreign Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is
well disposed to act as an agent of the international
community's goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Constraining
Turkey's potential is a lack of resources. Our conversations
with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify several
areas in which Turkey can be of particular help: education
and health, military training and support, economics,
counter-narcotics, and trilateral engagement. (Note: Turkey
will not support any CT operations in Afghanistan. They do
not believe there is a NATO/ISAF mandate to engage in these
operations, and they additionally have national caveats
preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
operations. The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not
be engaged in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that
foreign fighters who engage in this fight just produces
antipathy against foreign forces in the local population. I
do, however, believe the GOT are willing to engage the
training of Afghan security forces.)
Caucasus
--------
¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power
and recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its
growth by frozen conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.
The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10
was a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting
point for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately,
the opening of its closed border. Nevertheless, future
relations will still be heavily linked to the 1915 "genocide"
issue and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey consistently warns
that any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
"genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship --
including political, military, and commercial aspects --
would be unavoidable.
Political Environment
----------------------
¶16. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
(AK) Party is squarely in the driver's seat, but fears an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief
of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
(represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
has seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military
involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
respective underlings.
Israel
-------
¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
shore up his domestic right political flank at the expense of
this relationship. His outburst at Davos was the first in a
series of events the results of which we and his staff have
sought to contain. The latest of these was Exercise
Anatolian Eagle. Erdogan canceled Israel's participation
hours before the exercise was to begin. With an Israeli
strike - across Turkish airspace - against targets in Iran a
possibility, Erdogan decided he could not afford the
political risk of being accused of training the forces which
would carry out such a raid. Through some remarkable work
with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
"postponement" of the international portion of the exercise,
but the relationship has begun to sour.
JEFFREY
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
Thursday, November 18, 2010
Öcalan: Discussions are turning into negotiations
04 November 2010
"Nobody should be deceived by the AKP�s tricks. The approach of the state is much more positive than the AKP government" said imprisoned leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan.
"Nobody should be deceived by the AKP�s tricks. The approach of the state is much more positive than the AKP government" said imprisoned leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan.
He also stated that the meetings held with him are getting more serious. �We have not reached the negotiation phase yet but the current situation can be named as transition period. However, the government together with the opposition parties CHP and MHP are delivering speeches which are obstructing the solution. The oligarchic power, day-politics will destroy the state. AKP aims at creating its own Hamas.� added Öcalan.
KCK case is a plot
The lawyers of the Kurdish Leader Abdullah Öcalan visited him in Imrali prison.
Regarding the KCK cases Öcalan said �The case is a plot. Some groups within the state wanted to take politicians like Hatip Dicle and Fırat Anlı as hostage so that they could get rid of so called hardliners but it did not work. On one hand they were trying to string me along and on the other hand they were trying to purge KCK.
CHP must change
Öcalan also said that it is the time for CHP to change and update Kemalism according to our era otherwise they will lose. He also warned the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu to become aware of the situation and understand that it is his last chance to destroy the Ataturk myth which does not represent Kemalism. Öcalan also reminded the Kurdish Autonomy Law passed in the parliament in 1922 when Ataturk was still alive.
Green Turks replaced white Turks
Öcalan said: �After 2000s green Turks replaced white Turks. AKP is representing green Turkish nationalism. It is supported by the US and the UK and they receive enormous amount of financial support from abroad. They are criticized with being civil dictator and this critique is not unfair. Gulen Community have schools in South Kurdistan where Talabani�s grand children study. These are not coincidences. They are getting organized in the Kurdish region. They used to use weapons before but now other methods. What they do is creating disarmed Hizbullah. Zaman newspaper is also serving them, very obvious. They are using Islam for their political aims and it can be really dangerous� Öcalan also stated that AKP wants to create its own Hamas but even the PM himself cannot imagine how it will affect the region. �He himself will not be able to control them. We have seen what happened in Palestine, how they got the power from Al Fatih. The Kurds should not let this happen and develop their own understating of Islam and not let it be used for politics.� added Öcalan.
Meetings with state officials
Öcalan continued: �My meetings with state officials are continuing. We have not reached the negotiation phase yet but the current situation can be named as transition period. The officials with whom I am meeting are genuine and serious. However, the government together with the opposition parties CHP and MHP are delivering speeches which are obstructing the solution. The oligarchic power, day-politics will destroy the state. We are supporting an ideology-free state.� Öcalan also reiterated that they are not in favor of a federal state and they want to live together with Turkey as long as they the Kurdish rights are recognized.
Meanwhile Öcalan reiterated that a Truth Commission established within the parliament can help the solution. Both the state party and the PKK can cooperate with this commission.
Women should emancipate themselves
Focusing on the gender issue Öcalan said it was not a coincidence that the mayor of Rize suggested marrying Kurdish women as second wife in order to solve the Kurdish problem and this is a clear reflection of assimilation policy. Öcalan also said that the pressure faced by women drag them into suicide but the women should emancipate themselves and get organized.
"Nobody should be deceived by the AKP�s tricks. The approach of the state is much more positive than the AKP government" said imprisoned leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan.
"Nobody should be deceived by the AKP�s tricks. The approach of the state is much more positive than the AKP government" said imprisoned leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan.
He also stated that the meetings held with him are getting more serious. �We have not reached the negotiation phase yet but the current situation can be named as transition period. However, the government together with the opposition parties CHP and MHP are delivering speeches which are obstructing the solution. The oligarchic power, day-politics will destroy the state. AKP aims at creating its own Hamas.� added Öcalan.
KCK case is a plot
The lawyers of the Kurdish Leader Abdullah Öcalan visited him in Imrali prison.
Regarding the KCK cases Öcalan said �The case is a plot. Some groups within the state wanted to take politicians like Hatip Dicle and Fırat Anlı as hostage so that they could get rid of so called hardliners but it did not work. On one hand they were trying to string me along and on the other hand they were trying to purge KCK.
CHP must change
Öcalan also said that it is the time for CHP to change and update Kemalism according to our era otherwise they will lose. He also warned the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu to become aware of the situation and understand that it is his last chance to destroy the Ataturk myth which does not represent Kemalism. Öcalan also reminded the Kurdish Autonomy Law passed in the parliament in 1922 when Ataturk was still alive.
Green Turks replaced white Turks
Öcalan said: �After 2000s green Turks replaced white Turks. AKP is representing green Turkish nationalism. It is supported by the US and the UK and they receive enormous amount of financial support from abroad. They are criticized with being civil dictator and this critique is not unfair. Gulen Community have schools in South Kurdistan where Talabani�s grand children study. These are not coincidences. They are getting organized in the Kurdish region. They used to use weapons before but now other methods. What they do is creating disarmed Hizbullah. Zaman newspaper is also serving them, very obvious. They are using Islam for their political aims and it can be really dangerous� Öcalan also stated that AKP wants to create its own Hamas but even the PM himself cannot imagine how it will affect the region. �He himself will not be able to control them. We have seen what happened in Palestine, how they got the power from Al Fatih. The Kurds should not let this happen and develop their own understating of Islam and not let it be used for politics.� added Öcalan.
Meetings with state officials
Öcalan continued: �My meetings with state officials are continuing. We have not reached the negotiation phase yet but the current situation can be named as transition period. The officials with whom I am meeting are genuine and serious. However, the government together with the opposition parties CHP and MHP are delivering speeches which are obstructing the solution. The oligarchic power, day-politics will destroy the state. We are supporting an ideology-free state.� Öcalan also reiterated that they are not in favor of a federal state and they want to live together with Turkey as long as they the Kurdish rights are recognized.
Meanwhile Öcalan reiterated that a Truth Commission established within the parliament can help the solution. Both the state party and the PKK can cooperate with this commission.
Women should emancipate themselves
Focusing on the gender issue Öcalan said it was not a coincidence that the mayor of Rize suggested marrying Kurdish women as second wife in order to solve the Kurdish problem and this is a clear reflection of assimilation policy. Öcalan also said that the pressure faced by women drag them into suicide but the women should emancipate themselves and get organized.
TBMM, Kürt Özerkliğini 10 Şubat 1922 Kabul etti
TBMM, Kürt Özerkliğini Kabul Etti [10 Şubat 1922]
Fotoğrafta, Mustafa Kemal ve Dersim'in Mebusu Diyap Ağa (22 Mart 1921). Diyap Ağa, Dersim'in ileri gelenlerinden etkili bir Kürt aşiret lideriydi. Mustafa Kemal ile Sivas Kongresi'nde tanışmışlardı. Kürt liderleri yanına çekmek isteyen Mustafa Kemal ile sıkı bir dostluk kurdular. İlk TBMM'de mebus olarak Mustafa Kemal tarafından seçtirildi (Bu dönemde Koçgiri İsyanı patlak vermişti). Soyadı Kanunu'yla birlikte Yıldırım soyadını aldı. Meclisteki ateşli konuşmaların hatibiydi, Kürtler ve Türklerin ortak vatan kurduklarının fotoğraflardaki çok az yansımasından biri olarak hafızalarda yer etti. 4 Kasım 1922 tarihli meclis tutanaklarından anlaşıldığı kadarıyla Bitlis Mebusu Yusuf Ziya Bey ile Lozan ile ilgili istişare toplantılarında Türk-Kürt ortaklığının savunucularındandı ve Kürtlerin Türklerle ortak vatanda kalmaları gerektiğini savunuyorlardı lakin Yusuf Bey, 1925'te Bitlis'te idam edilecekti. 1926'da ölen Diyap Ağa'nın damadı Seyid Rıza ise 11 yıl sonra baş kaldıracaktı.Fransız arşivlerindeki bir belgede* 1921 Haziran ayında Kürt liderler ile Ankara hükümeti arasında küçük çaplı çatışmalar sonunda karşılıklı delegelerin anlaştığından ve imzalanan bir protokoldan söz ediliyor. Mardindeki aşiret liderlerinden Pirizade Bekir, Derwînden Musa Beg ve Millî Aşiret Reisi Mirliva İbrahim Paşa, Kürt tarafının önde gelenleri olarak bu belgede ismi geçiyor. Mustafa Kemal liderliğindeki hükümet tarafından otonom bir Kürt devletinin resmen tanınmasından bahseden bu tutanağın Haziranın son günlerinde karşılıklı olarak imzalandığı belirtilmektedir.Fransız arşivlerindeki belgeye göre antlaşma şu noktalardan oluşuyordu:
1-Ankara hükümeti tarafından Kürtlerin yaşadığı bölgede otonom bir Kürt devleti tanınacaktır.
2-Sınırlar Kürtler tarfından çizilecektir.
3-Türk jandarmaları ve Türk devlet görevlileri Kürdistanın sınırları dışına çağrılacaktır.
4-Otonom Kürdistan örgütlenme işlerinden Türk devlet yetkilileri elini çekecektir.
5-Ankara hükümeti tarafından toplanan tüm askeri vergiler ve askeri bağışlar Kürtlere tahsis edilecektir
6-Türkiye toprakları içinde kalan Kürtler dış mihraklara karşı korunacak ve orduda bulunan Kürtler özgür bırakılacaktır. (Haziran 1921)*
İngilterenin o tarihlerde güneyde Kürt sorununu gündeme getirdiği biliniyor. M.Kemal de İngilterenin elindeki Kürt kozunu geçersiz kılmak için Kürt otonomisini dar bir çevrede konuştu. 10 Şubat 1922 tarihinde Kürt otonomisi yasalaştı. Fakat her ne hikmetse bu yasa ve yasaya ait meclis müzakereleri ne açık ne de gizli meclis zabıtlarında yok. 9 ve 11 Şubat tarihli zabıtlar var fakat 10 Şubat 1922′ye ait zabıtlar ortada yok.
O günlere dönecek olursak, 14 Ocak 1922 günü yurt gezisine çıkan Mustafa Kemal Paşa, 17 Ocak 1922 günü İzmitteki durağında İzmit Kasrında gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtlamıştı. Akşam Gazetesi yazarı Falih Rıfkının (Atay soyadını alacaktı daha sonra) bir sorusu üzerine Musul ve Kürtler konusuna değiniyordu ve şöyle konuşuyordu:
Musulu da kendi topraklarımız içine alan sınıra ulusal sınır demiştim. Gerçekten o zaman Musulun güneyinde bir ordumuz vardı. Fakat biraz sonra bir İngiliz kumandanı gelmiş ve İhsan Paşayı aldatarak orada oturmuş. Musul bizim için çok önemlidir. Birincisi, Musulda sınırsız servet oluşturan petrol kaynakları vardır. (.) İkincisi onur kadar önemli olan Kürtlük sorunudur. İngilizler orada kendilerine bağımlı bir Kürt hükümeti kurmak istiyorlar. Bunu yaparlarsa, bu düşünce bizim sınırlarımız içindeki Kürtlere de yayılır. Buna engel olmak için sınırı güneyden geçirmek gerekir
Fotoğrafta, Mustafa Kemal ve Dersim'in Mebusu Diyap Ağa (22 Mart 1921). Diyap Ağa, Dersim'in ileri gelenlerinden etkili bir Kürt aşiret lideriydi. Mustafa Kemal ile Sivas Kongresi'nde tanışmışlardı. Kürt liderleri yanına çekmek isteyen Mustafa Kemal ile sıkı bir dostluk kurdular. İlk TBMM'de mebus olarak Mustafa Kemal tarafından seçtirildi (Bu dönemde Koçgiri İsyanı patlak vermişti). Soyadı Kanunu'yla birlikte Yıldırım soyadını aldı. Meclisteki ateşli konuşmaların hatibiydi, Kürtler ve Türklerin ortak vatan kurduklarının fotoğraflardaki çok az yansımasından biri olarak hafızalarda yer etti. 4 Kasım 1922 tarihli meclis tutanaklarından anlaşıldığı kadarıyla Bitlis Mebusu Yusuf Ziya Bey ile Lozan ile ilgili istişare toplantılarında Türk-Kürt ortaklığının savunucularındandı ve Kürtlerin Türklerle ortak vatanda kalmaları gerektiğini savunuyorlardı lakin Yusuf Bey, 1925'te Bitlis'te idam edilecekti. 1926'da ölen Diyap Ağa'nın damadı Seyid Rıza ise 11 yıl sonra baş kaldıracaktı.Fransız arşivlerindeki bir belgede* 1921 Haziran ayında Kürt liderler ile Ankara hükümeti arasında küçük çaplı çatışmalar sonunda karşılıklı delegelerin anlaştığından ve imzalanan bir protokoldan söz ediliyor. Mardindeki aşiret liderlerinden Pirizade Bekir, Derwînden Musa Beg ve Millî Aşiret Reisi Mirliva İbrahim Paşa, Kürt tarafının önde gelenleri olarak bu belgede ismi geçiyor. Mustafa Kemal liderliğindeki hükümet tarafından otonom bir Kürt devletinin resmen tanınmasından bahseden bu tutanağın Haziranın son günlerinde karşılıklı olarak imzalandığı belirtilmektedir.Fransız arşivlerindeki belgeye göre antlaşma şu noktalardan oluşuyordu:
1-Ankara hükümeti tarafından Kürtlerin yaşadığı bölgede otonom bir Kürt devleti tanınacaktır.
2-Sınırlar Kürtler tarfından çizilecektir.
3-Türk jandarmaları ve Türk devlet görevlileri Kürdistanın sınırları dışına çağrılacaktır.
4-Otonom Kürdistan örgütlenme işlerinden Türk devlet yetkilileri elini çekecektir.
5-Ankara hükümeti tarafından toplanan tüm askeri vergiler ve askeri bağışlar Kürtlere tahsis edilecektir
6-Türkiye toprakları içinde kalan Kürtler dış mihraklara karşı korunacak ve orduda bulunan Kürtler özgür bırakılacaktır. (Haziran 1921)*
İngilterenin o tarihlerde güneyde Kürt sorununu gündeme getirdiği biliniyor. M.Kemal de İngilterenin elindeki Kürt kozunu geçersiz kılmak için Kürt otonomisini dar bir çevrede konuştu. 10 Şubat 1922 tarihinde Kürt otonomisi yasalaştı. Fakat her ne hikmetse bu yasa ve yasaya ait meclis müzakereleri ne açık ne de gizli meclis zabıtlarında yok. 9 ve 11 Şubat tarihli zabıtlar var fakat 10 Şubat 1922′ye ait zabıtlar ortada yok.
O günlere dönecek olursak, 14 Ocak 1922 günü yurt gezisine çıkan Mustafa Kemal Paşa, 17 Ocak 1922 günü İzmitteki durağında İzmit Kasrında gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtlamıştı. Akşam Gazetesi yazarı Falih Rıfkının (Atay soyadını alacaktı daha sonra) bir sorusu üzerine Musul ve Kürtler konusuna değiniyordu ve şöyle konuşuyordu:
Musulu da kendi topraklarımız içine alan sınıra ulusal sınır demiştim. Gerçekten o zaman Musulun güneyinde bir ordumuz vardı. Fakat biraz sonra bir İngiliz kumandanı gelmiş ve İhsan Paşayı aldatarak orada oturmuş. Musul bizim için çok önemlidir. Birincisi, Musulda sınırsız servet oluşturan petrol kaynakları vardır. (.) İkincisi onur kadar önemli olan Kürtlük sorunudur. İngilizler orada kendilerine bağımlı bir Kürt hükümeti kurmak istiyorlar. Bunu yaparlarsa, bu düşünce bizim sınırlarımız içindeki Kürtlere de yayılır. Buna engel olmak için sınırı güneyden geçirmek gerekir
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Mustafa Pasha Yamolki: his life and role in the Kurdish nationalist movement
* KurdishMedia.com - By Dr Rebwar Fatah, 25/05/2005
A king is just like a chess king today in the world.
From a poem by Shukri Fazli, Kurdish intellect, journalist and poet
There are countless Kurdish figures that have been denied due credit for contributing to the cause of their people. Mustafa Pasha Yamolki is but one. Attempting to name the others would risk missing some and history already excels at this.
Therefore, this article seeks to reveal some unknown details of Yamolki’s life and to reintroduce him after an absence that is unjustified for a human of such stature. It was a significant, but worthwhile, challenge to discover information about Yamolki. I depended heavily upon his immediate family, whose acquaintance I treasure a great deal.
Contents
- Family background
- Education
- Profession and military life
- Sense of humour
- Role in the Kingdom of Kurdistan - Sulemani
Prior to his death on May 25, 1936 in the Alwazyrya area of Baghdad, Mustafa Pasha Yamolki asked to have this verse of poetry etched into his grave:
Etirsm ey weten bimrim, nebînim bextiyarî to
Binwsin ba leser qebrim, weten xemgîn u min xemgîn.
Which can be translated to:
My homeland, I am scared that I may die without seeing your happiness
Etch into my grave that my homeland and I are both sad.
He was buried in the Gurdi Saywan [Saywan Heights] graveyard in Sulemani, along with many other well-known Kurds. Until his death, Yamolki remained proud of his Kurdish nationality.
Family background
Yamolki was born in Sulemani, South Kurdistan, on 25 January 1866, to an intellectual family. They lived in one of the traditional areas of Sulemani, Sabonkaran, opposite to the well-known public bath, Hamami Mufti. At 170 cm tall, Yamolki was renowned for his patriotism, bravery and brightness.
Yamolki belongs to the powerful Bilbaz, one of the Kurdish tribes.
On 3 May 1888, Yamolki married Safya Khanim Khandan Zada, the daughter of Hussain Pasha and the sister of Saeed Pash, in Istanbul. Hers was a well-known Kurdish family and lived in Uskidar area in Istanbul.
Yamolki and his wife had one son and three daughters:
- Colonel Aziz Yamolky deceased on August 1982 in Baghdad
- Zahra Yamolky (married to Ezzet Bagy Jaff) deceased 1972 in Baghdad
- Dr. Anjom Yamolky deceased 1968 in Paris, France
- Ms Maliha Yamolky
Education
In Yamolki’s era, the majority of Middle Easterners were illiterate. Yet Yamolki was a highly educated person with high qualifications and experiences as a military personnel. He spoke Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish and Persian fluently.
He attended primary school in Sulemani and studied in mosques, which was customary during his time. Two religious teachers, Mala Fatah and Mala Erfan, taught him in Said Hussan Mosque, at an early age. Yamolki entered a military school called Rusdia Alaskarya [Al-Rushdia Military School] in Baghdad. He then transferred to a military school, known as Harb Medrasasi (literally means War School) in Istanbul. In the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Yamolki had access to higher education institutions and intellectual communities.
Professional and military life
- 1888 graduated with distinction from the General Staff Academy in Istanbul as an officer (Naqib). After one year, he transferred to Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) to lead the Hijaz Division of the Ottoman Empire as a high-ranking officer.
- 1893 appointed as a councillor in Slimas and Khuey, Urmiah Province East [Iranian] Kurdistan and also a commercial councillor in Sanandaje Province East Kurdistan.
- 1899 appointed as the deputy chief of military staff of the entire Ottoman sixth army in Baghdad.
- 1904 appointed as a commissioner to define the border between Iraq and Iran.
- 1908 appointed as the head of the military division in Ankara.
- 1909 promoted as a brigadier and appointed head of the 21st army in Baghdad and transferred to a similar rank in Azerbaijan a year later.
- 1911 appointed as the commander of the fifth army during the Turkish-Italian War.
- 1917 appointed to lead the Ottoman Empire army in Baghdad.
- December 3, 1918, appointed to lead the Ottoman Army in Syvas region (North East of Turkey).
- Yamolki also wrote poetry. His book of poetry was published in Baghdad in 1956 after his death.
Sense of humour
Yamolki was well-known for his sense of humour as the following story illustrates.
The time is 1912, the place is Istanbul. One day when Mustafa Pasha was in his Saray (official office in the Turkish language), he sent a soldier to find him a shoe polisher for his military boots. A young person came in and began to polish Yamolki’s boots. The young shoe polisher, a Kurd, didn’t know that the man whose boots he was polishing was also a Kurd. So the story began.
As the young shoe polisher worked on the boots, he was swearing in Kurdish at the boots’ owner. Yamolki kept quiet until the shoe polisher finished his job. Then Yamolki approached him kindly, paid ten Ghroosh (a local currency of the time) and told the shoe polisher in very clear Kurdish, "This 10 Ghroosha is for the boots and this 10 Lira is for the swearing.
Yamolki’s Role in the Kingdom of Kurdistan – Sulemani
The Ottoman Empire had asked for an Armistice on Oct. 30th 1918. The Arabian provinces were lost, which was partitioned between Britain and France by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1917; France proceeded not only to occupy Syria and Lebanon, but also Cilicia. The Italians claimed the coast opposite the already Italian Dodekanese islands; the Greeks desired the Smyrna region and Eastern Thrace.
Entente troops occupied the Straits area including Istanbul, which they demanded be demilitarized. The powers contemplated the establishment of an Armenian State in north-eastern Anatolia (under British protection) and a Kurdish State in south-eastern Anatolia (under French protection); there was little room left for a Turkish state.
Sultan Mehmed VI Vahiheddin, who had ascended to the throne only in July 1918, soon found himself unable to lead the affairs of his Empire, his own capital being occupied by Entente forces.
An officer, the hero of Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Ataturk) organized Turkish troops in the Ankara region, establishing a provisorical administration and reorganising the Ottoman forces into a Turkish army. Ataturk also gained the Kurdish support by promising the establishment of a Turkish-Kurdish republic.
In 1920 the Entente offered harsh conditions in the Treaty of Sevres, a treaty Turkey’s parliament never ratified.
In 1921, France withdrew from Cilicia; the united front of the Entente disintegrated. Ataturk’s forces defeated the Greeks in the Battle of Sakalya in 1922; in 1923 the Greeks were expelled from Smyrna. The Italians withdrew. The war had been decided militarily. The hitherto provisorical Turkish Republic gained international recognition in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
After the end of the First World War, Yamolki was appointed to the Iraqi legal court. Then Vali of Prussia, Farid Pasha commissioned Yamolki to head a military court as a military judge to try the Kemel Ataturk’s group.
The group was charged with declaring a mutiny against the Istanbul Caliphdom which had been established after the dethroning of Sultan Abdul-Hamid. The group comprised of Mustafa Kemel (later known as Ataturk 1881-1938– i.e. the father of Turks), Foud Pasha, Dury Pasha Ciqmaq and Husyain Rauf Bag.
The group was to be sentenced in absentia and, on April 20, 1920, Yamolki ordered their death by hanging.
In 1922 in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal finally defeated the Turkish Government of Constantinople which, as heir to the Ottomans, had signed the Treaty of Sevres. Born in Erzurum province and helped to victory by the Kurdish people, the Kemalist Movement originally proclaimed its intention to create a modern Republic of Turkey in which the Kurdish and Turkish people would live as equals with full ’ethnic rights’. Kemalism rejected the Treaty of Sevres, which may have been a just treaty in that it guaranteed rights of independence and self-determination to the Kurds.
The genocide of every aspect of Kurds and Kurdistan by the Turks under the pretext of national unity continued, i.e. Turkification of the Kurdistan. The bloodshed has not stopped since.
On June 17, 1921, after Ataturk’s victory, Yamolki returned to his homeland where he took part in the newly established Kurdish State of Sulemani, headed by Shekh Mahmud Barzinji.
When Yamulki arrived back in Kurdistan, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji was leading the Kurdish people to establish a Kurdish state in South Kurdistan.
On October 10, 1921, a statement was issued in Sulemani, the capital of Kurdistan, to establish a Kurdish government. Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji declared himself as the King of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The cabinet members included
- Abdulkarim Alaka - Finance Minister
- Ahmed Bagy Fatah Bag - Customs Minister
- Hajy Mala Saeed Karkukli - Justice Minister
- Hema Abdullah Agha - Labour Minister
- Mustafa Pasha Yamolki- Education Minister
- Sheikh Qadir Hafeed, a brother of Sheikh Mahmud - Prime Minister
- Sheikh Mohammed Gharib - Interior Minister
- Zaky Sahibqran - Defence Minister (The Kurdish army at that time was called The Kurdish National Army)
Sheikh Mufeed Sheikh Qadir appointed as the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, and the Brigadier General, Saddik Qadiry (Yamolki’s brother) as the Army’s General Inspector. Despite his strong religious affiliation, Sheikh Barzinji appointed a Christian to the post of finance minister, which shows the diversity of the Kurdish society and his own open-mindedness.
Jemiyeti Kurdistan (Kurdistan Association)
On July 21, 1922, a group of Kurdish intellectuals and social figures, led by Yamoki, established Jemiyeti Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Association). The founding members were:
- Ahmad Behjat Afendi
- Ali Afendi Bapir Agha
- Faiq Arif Beg
- Haji Agha Fethulla
- Idham Yuzybashi
- Rafiq Hilmi Ahmed Beg
- Salih Qeftan
- Sheikh Muhemed Gulan
- Sukry Aleke (Christian Kurd)
- Tofiq Beg
Jemiyeti Kurdistan had, amongst other objectives, the goal of establishing and supporting a Kurdish state headed by Sheikh Mehmud Barzinji in Sulemani Province. On August 2, 1922, the group published the first issue of its paper, ‘Bangi Kurdistan’ (The Call of Kurdistan), in Kurdish, Turkish and Persian.
As the Kurdistan Kingdom of Sheikh Barzinji was not destroyed by the British, the Kurdish King of Kurdistan was replaced by an imposed Arab King, Faysial I, Yamolki left for Baghdad where he began publishing the paper on January 28, 1926.
On October 1, 1924, Jemiyeti Kurdistan sent a letter to the League of Nations protesting Turkish demand of Wilayet Musel and Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish people in North [Turkey’s] Kurdistan.
The historical footprint of this organisation is important as it demanded an independent Kurdistan and legitimised its demands at the Treaty of Sevres.
British role in the destruction of the Kurdistan Kingdom
The Kingdom of Kurdistan did not last long, thanks to the British Royal Air Force acting on behalf of a puppet government in Baghdad. The British were not much kinder to the Kurds. It is wrongly preserved that the first regime that used poison gases against Kurds was Saddam Hussein’s government. This is wrong. British were the first regime to gas Kurds in South Kurdistan.
In this book, ’Deterring Democracy’, Noam Chomsky describes British rule in South Kurdistan as follows: [1]
As Secretary of State at the War Office in 1919, Churchill was approached by the RAF Middle East Command for permission to use chemical weapons ’against recalcitrant Arabs as experiment.’ Churchill authorized the experiment, dismissing objections:
I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gases; gases can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.
Churchill added: ’we cannot in any circumstances acquiesce in the non utilization of any weapons which are available to procure a speedy termination of the disorder which prevails on the frontier.’ Chemical weapons were merely ’the application of Western science to modern warfare.’
Churchill was in favour of using air power and poison gas against ’uncivilized tribes’ and ’recalcitrant Arabs’ i.e. Kurds and Afghans [2]. Not surprisingly, in the 1990s, William Waldegrave, who was in charge of Prime Minister John Major’s ’open government’ initiative, ordered the removal from the Public Record Office of ’files detailing how British troops had used poison gas against Iraqi dissidents including Kurds in 1919 [2].
In this way, a people who wished to run their own affairs were oppressed to the limit of genocide. Their King was undermined by the mighty British forces and an ’imported’ King from totally different culture was forced upon them.
The history has been written with the blood of the oppressed by the oppressing people. When the writings are still wet, the concept of ‘civilised and uncivilised’ people emerges. The more oppressed people bleed, the larger the history books get. The history fails to report commensurately the suffering of the oppressed. In this way, we build, what we term, ’civilisation’.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the information and pictures provided by the family of the late Mustafa Pasha Yamolki, in particular Mr. Kamal Yamolki.
Further reading on Yamolki
- Dr. Abdul-Sattar Sherif (Arabic), "History of Kurdish Societies and Political Parties"
- Rafiq Hilmi, Yadashtekani Refiq Hilmi (Kurdish)
- Dr. Kamal Mazhar, Safahatun min tarikh al-Iraq (Arabic)
- Dr. Fadhil Hussein, Mushkilat Musil (Arabic)
Further sources on the role of British Empire in oppressing Kurds
- Winston Churchill, Iraq: From Sumer to Sudan, by Geoff Simons:
http://www.informationwar.org/state%20terrorism/Britain_using_chemical_weapons.htm
- A Wall to Wall Production for Channel 4 - MLMXCII
- War is Business, Business is War, Dave Whyte, University of Leeds: http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/newsletter/issue11/isue11_part4.htm
- Britain’s role in shaping Iraq, BBC NEWS, 3 February, 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2719939.stm
- Stink Of Hypocrisy, Sunday Herald - 09 February 2003: http://www.sundayherald.com/print31247
- Prospects for Peace in the Middle East, Noam Chomsky, The University of Toledo, 4 March 2001: http://www.countercurrents.org/chomsky1.htm. Here Noam Chomsky states:
"The importance of control over oil-that was understood by about the time of the First World War. At that time, Britain was the major world power and controlled a lot of that region. Britain however did not have the military strength after the First World War to control the region by direct military occupation. It had declined to the point where it couldn’t do that. So it turned to other means. One was the use of air power and also poison gas; this was considered the ultimate atrocity at that time. The most enthusiastic supporter was Winston Churchill, who called for the use of poison gas against Kurds and Afghans.
The British use of poison gas had been suppressed for many years. Records were released, including Churchill’s enthusiasm, around 1980. Every time I went to England and gave a talk on any topic I made sure to bring that up, and discovered that everybody’s ears were closed. By the time of the Gulf War, information was beginning to seep through, but the details on how the military followed Churchill’s directives were still sealed. In 1992 the British government under popular pressure instituted an "open government" policy - meaning that in a free and democratic society people should have access to information about their own government. The first act taken under the open information policy was to remove from the Public Records office all documents having to do with England’s use of poison gas against the Kurds and Afghans and Churchill’s role in it. So that’s one that we’re not going to know a lot about thanks to the dedication to freedom and democracy for which we praise ourselves effusively."
- Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (1874-1965), http://quote.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill, about using gas said:
"I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."
"I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effects should be good, and it would spread a lively terror."
References
1. Chomsky, Noam, (1992), Deterring Democracy. New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 19 Union Square West, NY 10003, pages 181-2.
2. Chomsky, Noam, (1999), The New Military Humanism - Lessons from Kosova. London: Pluto Press. ISBN: 0 7453 1634 4. 345 Archway Road, N6 5AA, page 62
A king is just like a chess king today in the world.
From a poem by Shukri Fazli, Kurdish intellect, journalist and poet
There are countless Kurdish figures that have been denied due credit for contributing to the cause of their people. Mustafa Pasha Yamolki is but one. Attempting to name the others would risk missing some and history already excels at this.
Therefore, this article seeks to reveal some unknown details of Yamolki’s life and to reintroduce him after an absence that is unjustified for a human of such stature. It was a significant, but worthwhile, challenge to discover information about Yamolki. I depended heavily upon his immediate family, whose acquaintance I treasure a great deal.
Contents
- Family background
- Education
- Profession and military life
- Sense of humour
- Role in the Kingdom of Kurdistan - Sulemani
Prior to his death on May 25, 1936 in the Alwazyrya area of Baghdad, Mustafa Pasha Yamolki asked to have this verse of poetry etched into his grave:
Etirsm ey weten bimrim, nebînim bextiyarî to
Binwsin ba leser qebrim, weten xemgîn u min xemgîn.
Which can be translated to:
My homeland, I am scared that I may die without seeing your happiness
Etch into my grave that my homeland and I are both sad.
He was buried in the Gurdi Saywan [Saywan Heights] graveyard in Sulemani, along with many other well-known Kurds. Until his death, Yamolki remained proud of his Kurdish nationality.
Family background
Yamolki was born in Sulemani, South Kurdistan, on 25 January 1866, to an intellectual family. They lived in one of the traditional areas of Sulemani, Sabonkaran, opposite to the well-known public bath, Hamami Mufti. At 170 cm tall, Yamolki was renowned for his patriotism, bravery and brightness.
Yamolki belongs to the powerful Bilbaz, one of the Kurdish tribes.
On 3 May 1888, Yamolki married Safya Khanim Khandan Zada, the daughter of Hussain Pasha and the sister of Saeed Pash, in Istanbul. Hers was a well-known Kurdish family and lived in Uskidar area in Istanbul.
Yamolki and his wife had one son and three daughters:
- Colonel Aziz Yamolky deceased on August 1982 in Baghdad
- Zahra Yamolky (married to Ezzet Bagy Jaff) deceased 1972 in Baghdad
- Dr. Anjom Yamolky deceased 1968 in Paris, France
- Ms Maliha Yamolky
Education
In Yamolki’s era, the majority of Middle Easterners were illiterate. Yet Yamolki was a highly educated person with high qualifications and experiences as a military personnel. He spoke Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish and Persian fluently.
He attended primary school in Sulemani and studied in mosques, which was customary during his time. Two religious teachers, Mala Fatah and Mala Erfan, taught him in Said Hussan Mosque, at an early age. Yamolki entered a military school called Rusdia Alaskarya [Al-Rushdia Military School] in Baghdad. He then transferred to a military school, known as Harb Medrasasi (literally means War School) in Istanbul. In the capital of the Ottoman Empire, Yamolki had access to higher education institutions and intellectual communities.
Professional and military life
- 1888 graduated with distinction from the General Staff Academy in Istanbul as an officer (Naqib). After one year, he transferred to Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) to lead the Hijaz Division of the Ottoman Empire as a high-ranking officer.
- 1893 appointed as a councillor in Slimas and Khuey, Urmiah Province East [Iranian] Kurdistan and also a commercial councillor in Sanandaje Province East Kurdistan.
- 1899 appointed as the deputy chief of military staff of the entire Ottoman sixth army in Baghdad.
- 1904 appointed as a commissioner to define the border between Iraq and Iran.
- 1908 appointed as the head of the military division in Ankara.
- 1909 promoted as a brigadier and appointed head of the 21st army in Baghdad and transferred to a similar rank in Azerbaijan a year later.
- 1911 appointed as the commander of the fifth army during the Turkish-Italian War.
- 1917 appointed to lead the Ottoman Empire army in Baghdad.
- December 3, 1918, appointed to lead the Ottoman Army in Syvas region (North East of Turkey).
- Yamolki also wrote poetry. His book of poetry was published in Baghdad in 1956 after his death.
Sense of humour
Yamolki was well-known for his sense of humour as the following story illustrates.
The time is 1912, the place is Istanbul. One day when Mustafa Pasha was in his Saray (official office in the Turkish language), he sent a soldier to find him a shoe polisher for his military boots. A young person came in and began to polish Yamolki’s boots. The young shoe polisher, a Kurd, didn’t know that the man whose boots he was polishing was also a Kurd. So the story began.
As the young shoe polisher worked on the boots, he was swearing in Kurdish at the boots’ owner. Yamolki kept quiet until the shoe polisher finished his job. Then Yamolki approached him kindly, paid ten Ghroosh (a local currency of the time) and told the shoe polisher in very clear Kurdish, "This 10 Ghroosha is for the boots and this 10 Lira is for the swearing.
Yamolki’s Role in the Kingdom of Kurdistan – Sulemani
The Ottoman Empire had asked for an Armistice on Oct. 30th 1918. The Arabian provinces were lost, which was partitioned between Britain and France by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1917; France proceeded not only to occupy Syria and Lebanon, but also Cilicia. The Italians claimed the coast opposite the already Italian Dodekanese islands; the Greeks desired the Smyrna region and Eastern Thrace.
Entente troops occupied the Straits area including Istanbul, which they demanded be demilitarized. The powers contemplated the establishment of an Armenian State in north-eastern Anatolia (under British protection) and a Kurdish State in south-eastern Anatolia (under French protection); there was little room left for a Turkish state.
Sultan Mehmed VI Vahiheddin, who had ascended to the throne only in July 1918, soon found himself unable to lead the affairs of his Empire, his own capital being occupied by Entente forces.
An officer, the hero of Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Ataturk) organized Turkish troops in the Ankara region, establishing a provisorical administration and reorganising the Ottoman forces into a Turkish army. Ataturk also gained the Kurdish support by promising the establishment of a Turkish-Kurdish republic.
In 1920 the Entente offered harsh conditions in the Treaty of Sevres, a treaty Turkey’s parliament never ratified.
In 1921, France withdrew from Cilicia; the united front of the Entente disintegrated. Ataturk’s forces defeated the Greeks in the Battle of Sakalya in 1922; in 1923 the Greeks were expelled from Smyrna. The Italians withdrew. The war had been decided militarily. The hitherto provisorical Turkish Republic gained international recognition in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
After the end of the First World War, Yamolki was appointed to the Iraqi legal court. Then Vali of Prussia, Farid Pasha commissioned Yamolki to head a military court as a military judge to try the Kemel Ataturk’s group.
The group was charged with declaring a mutiny against the Istanbul Caliphdom which had been established after the dethroning of Sultan Abdul-Hamid. The group comprised of Mustafa Kemel (later known as Ataturk 1881-1938– i.e. the father of Turks), Foud Pasha, Dury Pasha Ciqmaq and Husyain Rauf Bag.
The group was to be sentenced in absentia and, on April 20, 1920, Yamolki ordered their death by hanging.
In 1922 in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal finally defeated the Turkish Government of Constantinople which, as heir to the Ottomans, had signed the Treaty of Sevres. Born in Erzurum province and helped to victory by the Kurdish people, the Kemalist Movement originally proclaimed its intention to create a modern Republic of Turkey in which the Kurdish and Turkish people would live as equals with full ’ethnic rights’. Kemalism rejected the Treaty of Sevres, which may have been a just treaty in that it guaranteed rights of independence and self-determination to the Kurds.
The genocide of every aspect of Kurds and Kurdistan by the Turks under the pretext of national unity continued, i.e. Turkification of the Kurdistan. The bloodshed has not stopped since.
On June 17, 1921, after Ataturk’s victory, Yamolki returned to his homeland where he took part in the newly established Kurdish State of Sulemani, headed by Shekh Mahmud Barzinji.
When Yamulki arrived back in Kurdistan, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji was leading the Kurdish people to establish a Kurdish state in South Kurdistan.
On October 10, 1921, a statement was issued in Sulemani, the capital of Kurdistan, to establish a Kurdish government. Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji declared himself as the King of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The cabinet members included
- Abdulkarim Alaka - Finance Minister
- Ahmed Bagy Fatah Bag - Customs Minister
- Hajy Mala Saeed Karkukli - Justice Minister
- Hema Abdullah Agha - Labour Minister
- Mustafa Pasha Yamolki- Education Minister
- Sheikh Qadir Hafeed, a brother of Sheikh Mahmud - Prime Minister
- Sheikh Mohammed Gharib - Interior Minister
- Zaky Sahibqran - Defence Minister (The Kurdish army at that time was called The Kurdish National Army)
Sheikh Mufeed Sheikh Qadir appointed as the Army’s Commander-in-Chief, and the Brigadier General, Saddik Qadiry (Yamolki’s brother) as the Army’s General Inspector. Despite his strong religious affiliation, Sheikh Barzinji appointed a Christian to the post of finance minister, which shows the diversity of the Kurdish society and his own open-mindedness.
Jemiyeti Kurdistan (Kurdistan Association)
On July 21, 1922, a group of Kurdish intellectuals and social figures, led by Yamoki, established Jemiyeti Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Association). The founding members were:
- Ahmad Behjat Afendi
- Ali Afendi Bapir Agha
- Faiq Arif Beg
- Haji Agha Fethulla
- Idham Yuzybashi
- Rafiq Hilmi Ahmed Beg
- Salih Qeftan
- Sheikh Muhemed Gulan
- Sukry Aleke (Christian Kurd)
- Tofiq Beg
Jemiyeti Kurdistan had, amongst other objectives, the goal of establishing and supporting a Kurdish state headed by Sheikh Mehmud Barzinji in Sulemani Province. On August 2, 1922, the group published the first issue of its paper, ‘Bangi Kurdistan’ (The Call of Kurdistan), in Kurdish, Turkish and Persian.
As the Kurdistan Kingdom of Sheikh Barzinji was not destroyed by the British, the Kurdish King of Kurdistan was replaced by an imposed Arab King, Faysial I, Yamolki left for Baghdad where he began publishing the paper on January 28, 1926.
On October 1, 1924, Jemiyeti Kurdistan sent a letter to the League of Nations protesting Turkish demand of Wilayet Musel and Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish people in North [Turkey’s] Kurdistan.
The historical footprint of this organisation is important as it demanded an independent Kurdistan and legitimised its demands at the Treaty of Sevres.
British role in the destruction of the Kurdistan Kingdom
The Kingdom of Kurdistan did not last long, thanks to the British Royal Air Force acting on behalf of a puppet government in Baghdad. The British were not much kinder to the Kurds. It is wrongly preserved that the first regime that used poison gases against Kurds was Saddam Hussein’s government. This is wrong. British were the first regime to gas Kurds in South Kurdistan.
In this book, ’Deterring Democracy’, Noam Chomsky describes British rule in South Kurdistan as follows: [1]
As Secretary of State at the War Office in 1919, Churchill was approached by the RAF Middle East Command for permission to use chemical weapons ’against recalcitrant Arabs as experiment.’ Churchill authorized the experiment, dismissing objections:
I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gases; gases can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.
Churchill added: ’we cannot in any circumstances acquiesce in the non utilization of any weapons which are available to procure a speedy termination of the disorder which prevails on the frontier.’ Chemical weapons were merely ’the application of Western science to modern warfare.’
Churchill was in favour of using air power and poison gas against ’uncivilized tribes’ and ’recalcitrant Arabs’ i.e. Kurds and Afghans [2]. Not surprisingly, in the 1990s, William Waldegrave, who was in charge of Prime Minister John Major’s ’open government’ initiative, ordered the removal from the Public Record Office of ’files detailing how British troops had used poison gas against Iraqi dissidents including Kurds in 1919 [2].
In this way, a people who wished to run their own affairs were oppressed to the limit of genocide. Their King was undermined by the mighty British forces and an ’imported’ King from totally different culture was forced upon them.
The history has been written with the blood of the oppressed by the oppressing people. When the writings are still wet, the concept of ‘civilised and uncivilised’ people emerges. The more oppressed people bleed, the larger the history books get. The history fails to report commensurately the suffering of the oppressed. In this way, we build, what we term, ’civilisation’.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the information and pictures provided by the family of the late Mustafa Pasha Yamolki, in particular Mr. Kamal Yamolki.
Further reading on Yamolki
- Dr. Abdul-Sattar Sherif (Arabic), "History of Kurdish Societies and Political Parties"
- Rafiq Hilmi, Yadashtekani Refiq Hilmi (Kurdish)
- Dr. Kamal Mazhar, Safahatun min tarikh al-Iraq (Arabic)
- Dr. Fadhil Hussein, Mushkilat Musil (Arabic)
Further sources on the role of British Empire in oppressing Kurds
- Winston Churchill, Iraq: From Sumer to Sudan, by Geoff Simons:
http://www.informationwar.org/state%20terrorism/Britain_using_chemical_weapons.htm
- A Wall to Wall Production for Channel 4 - MLMXCII
- War is Business, Business is War, Dave Whyte, University of Leeds: http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/newsletter/issue11/isue11_part4.htm
- Britain’s role in shaping Iraq, BBC NEWS, 3 February, 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2719939.stm
- Stink Of Hypocrisy, Sunday Herald - 09 February 2003: http://www.sundayherald.com/print31247
- Prospects for Peace in the Middle East, Noam Chomsky, The University of Toledo, 4 March 2001: http://www.countercurrents.org/chomsky1.htm. Here Noam Chomsky states:
"The importance of control over oil-that was understood by about the time of the First World War. At that time, Britain was the major world power and controlled a lot of that region. Britain however did not have the military strength after the First World War to control the region by direct military occupation. It had declined to the point where it couldn’t do that. So it turned to other means. One was the use of air power and also poison gas; this was considered the ultimate atrocity at that time. The most enthusiastic supporter was Winston Churchill, who called for the use of poison gas against Kurds and Afghans.
The British use of poison gas had been suppressed for many years. Records were released, including Churchill’s enthusiasm, around 1980. Every time I went to England and gave a talk on any topic I made sure to bring that up, and discovered that everybody’s ears were closed. By the time of the Gulf War, information was beginning to seep through, but the details on how the military followed Churchill’s directives were still sealed. In 1992 the British government under popular pressure instituted an "open government" policy - meaning that in a free and democratic society people should have access to information about their own government. The first act taken under the open information policy was to remove from the Public Records office all documents having to do with England’s use of poison gas against the Kurds and Afghans and Churchill’s role in it. So that’s one that we’re not going to know a lot about thanks to the dedication to freedom and democracy for which we praise ourselves effusively."
- Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (1874-1965), http://quote.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill, about using gas said:
"I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."
"I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poison gas against uncivilized tribes. The moral effects should be good, and it would spread a lively terror."
References
1. Chomsky, Noam, (1992), Deterring Democracy. New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 19 Union Square West, NY 10003, pages 181-2.
2. Chomsky, Noam, (1999), The New Military Humanism - Lessons from Kosova. London: Pluto Press. ISBN: 0 7453 1634 4. 345 Archway Road, N6 5AA, page 62
Thursday, September 9, 2010
What is Russia’s Place in the Middle East?
by Thierry Meyssan*
http://www.voltairenet.org/article166818.html
Caught up in a smoldering feud between its President and Prime Minister, Russia is not making the most of the historic opportunity to deploy in the Middle East. Russian elites were unable to draw up a strategy for that region when they had the chance and, now, they are no longer capable of it. In Thierry Meyssan’s view, Moscow is paralyzed, having failed both to take full advantage of the botched US “remodeling” of the Middle East and to fulfill the hopes raised by Vladimir Putin.
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President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. The understanding between the “30-year” friends has abruptly turned into an open war. Under these conditions, how could Moscow nurture any major ambition in the Middle East?
The Israeli defeat in the Summer of 2006 against the Lebanese resistance spelled the end of US supremacy in the Middle East. In only four years, the military, economic and diplomatic situation in that region underwent a complete change.
At present, the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle has emerged as the leading pole while Russia and China expand their influence as that of the United States is fading. However, Moscow is reluctant to seize the opportunities it has at hand. First of all, its priority is not the Middle East; secondly because no project related to this region has the consensus of the Russian elites, finally because Middle East conflicts have sensitive implications for Russia’s own domestic problems. Let’s take stock of the situation.
2001-2006 and the myth of the remodeling of the “Great Middle East”
The Bush administration was able to rally the oil lobby, the military industrial complex and the Zionist movement around a huge project: securing control of the oil fields running from the Caspian Sea to the Horn of Africa by redesigning the political map based on small ethnic states. The zone, demarcated not according to its population but to the riches under its soil, was first called “Crescent Crisis” by University professor Bernard Lewis and later “Greater Middle East” by George W. Bush.
Washington did not skimp on its Middle East “remodeling” project. Huge sums of money were invested in buying local elites so that their personal interests would come before national interests in the context of a globalized economy. Most important was the deployment of a strong military force to Afghanistan and Iraq to hem in Iran, the main actor in the region that stands up to the empire. Maps of the new region were drawn up and circulated by the Chiefs of Staff. All countries in the region, including Washington’s allies, would be broken up into various emirates incapable of defending themselves, while vanquished Iraq would be divided into three federate states (a Kurdish, a Sunni and a Shiite).
When it seemed that nothing could prevent that domination process from going ahead, the Pentagon handed Israel the task of destroying all secondary fronts before attacking Iran. The aim was to wipe out the Lebanese Hezbollah and to overthrow the Syrian government. However, after submitting one third of the Lebanese territory to a bombing campaign the likes of which hadn’t seen since the Vietnam War, Israel was forced to retreat without having attained any of its goals. That defeat marked a strategic shift in the balance of forces.
Over the next months, US generals rebelled against the White House. They had lost control of the situation in Iraq and anticipated with apprehension the difficulties of a war against a well-armed and organized state—Iran—potentially setting the entire region ablaze. The generals, gathered around Admiral William Fallon and senior general Brent Scowcroft, forged an alliance with several realistic politicians who opposed the danger inherent in the excessive military deployment.
They used the Baker-Hamilton Commission to influence American voters until obtaining the dismissal of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his replacement with one of their allies: Robert Gates. Subsequently, these same individuals hoisted Obama to the White House, on condition that Robert Gates would remain the Pentagon.
In fact, the US General Staff has lacked an alternative strategy ever since the “remodeling” failed. Its only concern is to stabilize its positions. US soldiers withdrew from large Iraqi cities and retreated to their bases. They left the management of Iraq’s Kurdish areas in the hands of the Israelis while the Arab zones were left to the Iranians. The US State Department has stopped handing out sumptuous gifts to regional leaders and has become increasingly avaricious in these times of economic crisis. Yesterday’s beholden are looking for new masters to feed them.
Tel Aviv is the only one to still believe that the US withdrawal is but an eclipse and that the “remodelling” will resume once the economic crisis is over.
Formation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran Triangle
Washington thought that the dismantlement of Iraq would be contagious. The Sunni-Shiite civil war (the Fitna, in Arabic) was supposed to pit Iran against Saudi Arabia and split the whole Arab-Muslim world. The virtual independence of Iraqi Kurdistan was expected to cause a Kurdish secession in Turkey, Syria and Iran.
But the opposite happened. The easing of US pressure on Iraq sealed the alliance among the enemy brothers of Turkey, Syria and Iran. All three realized that in order to survive they had to unite and that once united they could exert regional leadership. In fact, Turkey, Syria and Iran, together, cover all crucial aspects of the regional political spectrum. As the heir to the Ottoman empire, Turkey incarnates political Sunni Islam. As the only remaining Baathist state after the destruction of Iraq, Syria embodies secularism. And, finally, since the Khomeiny Revolution, Iran represents political Shi’ism.
In just a few months, Ankara, Damascus and Teheran opened their common borders, lowered customs tariffs and paved the way for a common market. This opening provided them with a breath of fresh air and a sudden economic growth which, despite the memories of prior disputes, has also garnered genuine grassroots support.
However, each of these three states has its own Achilles’ heel which the United States and Israel, as well as some of their neighbors, will attempt to exploit.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
For years, Tel Aviv and Washington have accused Iran of violating its obligations as signatory of the [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty and of developing a secret military nuclear program. In the times of Shah Reza Pahlevi, both capitals - plus Paris - had set up a large program designed to provide Iran with the atomic bomb. In view of its history, it was generally accepted that Iran had no expansionit ambitions and that the great powers could safely provide it with such technology. A propaganda campaign based on deliberately fabricated information was later organized, painting current Iranian leaders as fanatic and capable of using the atomic bomb - if they had it - in an irrational manner, therefore posing a great threat to world peace.
Nevertheless, Iranian leaders affirm they have renounced to building, storing or using the atomic bomb, precisely due to ideological reasons. And their assertion to totally reliable. Let us simply recall what happened during the war led by the Iraq of Sadam Husein against the Iran of Imam Khomeiny.
When Baghdad unleashed a stream of missiles against Iranian cities, Teheran retaliated in the same way. But they were unguided missiles that were launched in any given direction and fell indicriminately. Imam Khomeiny intervened to denounce the use of such weapons by his own armed forces. Khomeiny stressed that good Muslims should refrain from shooting at the military if it entailed the risk of killing a large number of civilians. Khomeiny then prohibited the use of missiles against cities, which had an impact on the balance of forces, prolonged the war and brought new suffering to the Iranian people. At present, the successor of Khomeiny, Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Revolution, defends the same ethics in respect of nuclear weapons and it is unthinkable that any faction of the Iranian state would dare to violate the authority of the Supreme Leader and secretly build the atomic bomb.
The fact is that after the Iraqi offensive, Iran anticipated the eventual depletion of its hydrocarbon reserves and wanted to have a civil nuclear industry to guarantee its own long-term development and that of the rest of Third World nations. To this end, the Revolutionary Guards set up a special team of officials dedicated to scientific and technical research, which was organized in secret cities, according to the soviet model. These researchers are also working on other programs, such as those linked to conventional weapons. Iran has opened all its nuclear facilities for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it refuses to give them access to research facilities dedicated to conventional weapons. We therefore find ourselves in a déjà vu situation : IAEA inspectors assure there is nothing to accuse Iran of, while the CIA and the Mossad insist—without any evidence—that Iran hides its illegal activities within its vast scientific research sector.This situation is reminiscent of the intoxication campaign previously carried out by the Bush administration, accusing the UN inspectors of not doing their job properly and of overlooking the WMD programs supposedly developed by Sadam Husein.
No country in the world has been the object of so many IAEA inspections and it is not serious to keep accusing Iran, but it hasn’t made a dent in the bad faith displayed by Washington and Tel Aviv. The fallacy about the alleged threat is crucial for the military industrial complex, which has for years implemented the Israeli program known as “antimissile shield” with US taxperyers’ money. Without the Iranian threat, there is no budget!
Teheran has undertaken two operations to get out of the trap which was set against it. First, it organized an international conference for a nuclear-free world, during which Iran finally expounded its position to its principal partners (on April 17). Iran also accepted the mediation by Brazil, a country whose president Lula da Silva aspires to become the Secretary General of the United Nations. President Lula had asked his US counterpart Barack Obama what kind of measures would be likely to reestablish confidence. Obama replied in writing that the compromise concluded in November 2009, but never ratified, would suffice. President Lula travelled to Moscow to make sure Russian President Dimitri Medvedev had the same opinion. President Medvedev publicly confirmed his view that the November 2009 compromise would be enough to solve the crisis. The next day, May 18, President Lula co-signed with Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a document that, from all perspectives, met the demands made by the United States and Russia. But the White House and the Kremlin did an about-face, going back on their position, and denounced the guarantees offered by the new document as insufficient.
However, there is no significant difference between the document negotiated in November 2009 and the one ratified [by Iran, Brazil and Turkey] in May 2010.
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Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) is striving to restore his country’s independence in the face of US tutelage. By opening his country to Russian trade, the Turkish PM intends to balance international relations. His foreing minister Ahmet Davutoglu (right) is trying to solve, one by one, the conflicts inherited from the past, which hinder Ankara’s scope of action.
Turkey’s liabilities
Turkey inherited from its past a large number of problems with its minorities and neighbors; the United States has been fueling these problems for decades to keep Turkey under its thumb. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, a theorist of neo-ottomanism and new Turkish foreign minister, has drawn up a foreign policy aimed, in the first place, at freeing Turkey from the endless conflicts bogging it down, as well as at multiplying its alliances with various intergovernmental institutions.
The dispute with Syria was the first to be solved. Damascus stopped using the Kurds and abandoned its claim over the Hatay province. In return, Ankara yielded on the division of river waters and helped Damascus to come out of its diplomatic isolation; it even organized direct negotiations with Tel Aviv, which occupies the Syrian Golan. Syrian President Bachar el-Assad was received in Turkey (in 2004) and the Turkish President Abdullah Gull was welcomed in Syria (in 2009). A Strategic Cooperation Council was set up by the two countries.
As for Iraq, Ankara had opposed an invasion of this country by the Anglo-Americans (in 2003). It banned the United States from using the NATO bases on Turkish territory to attack Bagdad, thus upsetting Washington and delaying the start of the war. When the Anglo-Americans formally transferred power to the Iraqis, Ankara favored the electoral process and encouraged the Turkmen minority to take part in the vote. Later, Turkey relaxed border controls and boosted bilateral trade. There is only one aspect marring this panorama: relations between Ankara and the Bagdad national government are excellent, but they are chaotic with the Kurdish regional government of Erbil. The Turkish army even took the liberty of persecuting the PKK separatists inside Iraqi territory—needless to say, with the support of the Pentagon and under its control. Be that as it may, an accord was signed to guarantee the export of Iraqi oil through the Turkish harbor of Ceyhan.
Ankara took a series of initiatives to put an end to the secular conflict with the Armenians. Resorting to “football diplomacy”, Ankara acknowledged the 1915 massacre (but refused the term ‘genocide’), and managed to establish diplomatic relations with Erevan, while it seeks a solution to the High Karabaj conflict. Nevertheless, Armenia suspended the ratification of the Zurich bi-party accord.
Turkey’s liability in relation to Greece and Cyprus is also very significant. The division of the Aegean Sea has not yet been clarified and the Turkish army is still occupying Northern Cyprus. Ankara has proposed different measures to reestablish confidence, particularly the mutual reopening of harbors and airports. But relations are far from being normalized and, for the time being, Ankara does not appear willing to abandon the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Syria’s diplomatic isolation
Washington has accused Syria of continuing its war against Israel through various intermediaries: Iran’s secret services, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas. The United States thus falsely blamed Syrian President Bachar el Assad of having ordered the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and had a Special Penal Court set up to judge the Syrian President.
With astonishing ability, Bachar el-Assad, who had been depicted as a conceited and totally incompetent "daddy’s boy”, managed to wiggle out of that corner without making concessions or firing a single shot. The testimonies of his accusers wilted one after the other, and Saad Hariri, the son of the late Hariri, stopped demanding his arrest and even paid him a friendly visit in Damascus. Nobody wants to finance the Special Court any more and it is possible that the UN might decide to dismantle it even before it convenes, unless it will be used as a forum to accuse Hezbollah.
Finally, in response to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s injunctions to break relations with Iran and with Hezbollah, Bachar el-Assad organized a surprise Summit meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and with the top Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
What about Russia?
The consolidation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle is a consequence of US and Israeli military power decline. The vacuum created is being filled by others.
China has become Iran’s first commercial partner and draws on the expertise of the Revolutionary Guards to overcome the hurdles set up by the CIA in Africa. It also gives military back-up, as discreet as it is effective, to Hezbollah (which it probably equipped with land-to-air missiles and guiding systems to counter interference) and to Hamas (which opened a representation office in Pekin). However, China is advancing very slowly and cautiously on the Middle East stage where it has no intention of playing a decisive role.
All expectations point in Moscow’s direction, which has been absent from the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia wants to recover its former position of world power, but is reluctant to make a move before having solved the problems it currently faces in the former Warsaw Pact zone. The main drawback is that the Russian elites have no alternative policy to replace the US “remodeling” project and are stuck on precisely the same problem as the United Sates: in view of the shift in the regional power correlation, it is no longer possible to implement a balanced policy between Israel and the Arab countries. Any involvement in the region implies, sooner or later, a rupture with the Zionist regime.
Moscow’s clock stopped in 1991, at the moment when the Madrid Conference took place. Moscow has not yet registered the failure of the Oslo (signed in 1993) and the Wabi Araba (1994) accords in terms of implementing the so-called “Two-State Solution”, which is no longer viable. The only peaceful option is the one implemented by South Africa: the abandonment of Apartheid and the recognition of a single nationality for all citizens, Jews and non-Jews alike; and the reinstatement of a real democracy based on the principle of “one man, one vote.” That is already the official position adopted by Syria and Iran, which will soon be embraced also by Turkey.
The great diplomatic conference on the Middle East that the Kremlin wanted to organize in Moscow in 2009, and which was both announced at the Annapolis Summit and confirmed by several UN resolutions, never took place. Russia passed up its opportunity to act.
Those Russian elites which still enjoy great prestige in the Middle East, no longer frequent the region; they fantasize about it more than they understand it. In the 1990s, they were enthusiastic over the romantic theories of anthropologist Lev Gumilev and were in tune with Turkey, the only nation which, similar to Russia, is both European and Asian. Then, they fell for the geo-political charisma of Alexander Dugin, who detested western materialism, thought that Turkey was contaminated by western values, and was mesmerized by the asceticism of the Iranian Revolution.
However, that momentum evaporated in Chechnya before it began to materialize. Russia was brutally confronted with a form of religious extremism that received undercover support from the United States and was fueled by the Turkish and Saudi secret services. As a consequence, any alliance with a Muslim state seemed risky and dangerous. And when peace was reestablished in Grozny, Russia was unable, or did not want, to play on its colonial heritage. According to the President of the Islamic Committee of Russia, Gaidar Zhemal, Russia cannot aspire to become an euro-Asian nation and at the same time pretend that nothing happened nor can it continue to view itself as an orthodox state which is protecting its turbulent Muslim brothers. Russia had—and still has—to define itself by considering orthodox and Muslims as equals.
Rather than leaving for tomorrow the solution to the problems concerning minorities, and postponing for the day after tomorrow its involvement in the Middle East, Russia could consider interacting with Muslim partners abroad, as reliable third-party players, with a view to establishing an internal dialogue. The Syria of Bachar el-Assad constitutes a model of a post-socialist state on its way to democratization that has been able to preserve its lay institutions, has allowed the flourishing of major religions and their various ramifications, including hardcore Wahhabism, while also managing to preserve social peace.
The economic attraction
For the time being, the Russian elites are ignoring the warning issued by former Chief of Staff of the Russian armed forces, General Leonid Ivashov, about the need to establish alliances in Asia and in the Middle East, in the face of US imperialism. As noted by political analyst Gleb Pavlovski, they prefer to think that geo-political antagonism will dissipate thanks to economic globalization. They also regard the Middle East primarily as a market.
President Dimitri Medvedev has recently concluded a tour that took him to Damascus and Ankara. He lifted visa requirements and opened the doors of the burgeoning common market (Turkey, Syria, Iran + Lebanon) for Russian companies. He also favored the sale of a large arsenal to all these countries. In particular, he negotiated the ten-year construction of nuclear power plants. Finally, he took advantage of Turkey’s strategic evolution to obtain support for the transit of Russia’s hydrocarbons. A Russian land oil pipeline would connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Ankara might be attracted to the transnational South Stream gas pipeline project.
The limits of Russia’s involvement
Outside of the economic sphere, it is hard for Moscow to consolidate its position. Former Soviet naval bases in Syria have been reactivated and opened to the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, all the more since naval deployment in the Black Sea is expected to be reduced. It is all happening as if Moscow were trying to gain time and postpone the Israeli issue.
The fact is that any condemnation [by Russia] of Jewish colonialism may revive internal problems. In the first place because, to express it in a caricatural and unflattering manner, Israeli apartheid is reminiscent of Russia’s treatment of the Chechnyans; and also because Russia is acting under the burden of a historical complex: that of anti-Semitism. Vladimir Putin has tried on several occasions to turn the page through symbolic gestures such as appointing a rabbi to the army, but Russia keeps feeling uncomfortable with this issue.
However, Russia ought to stop playing the waiting game; the dice have been tossed and Russia must face the consequences once and for all. Israel played a crucial role in arming and training the Georgian troops that attacked and killed Russian citizens in Southern Ossetia. In response, Georgia’s Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, a double Israeli-Georgian national, rented two military air bases to the Israeli Tsahal enabling it to attack Iran from a closer distance. Moscow stood stoically by without lifting a finger against Israel.
The Middle East looked upon this lack of reaction with surprise. It is true that Tel Aviv has numerous relations with the Russian elites, networking with them by offering to some of the most influential people material privileges in Israel. But, Moscow has comparatively many more contacts in Israel, considering the presence of some one million Soviets immigrants. Conceivably, Moscow could bring to the fore some personality capable of playing in occupied Palestine the role played by Frederik de Klerk in South Africa: to abolish Apartheid and establish democracy in the heart of one single state. With this scenario in mind, Dimitri Medvedev anticipates a possible exodus of Israeli Jews who would not tolerate the new situation. Therefore, he blocked the formerly announced merger between the Krai of Jabarovsk with the autonomous Jewish Oblast of Birobidyan. The Russian president, who comes from a Jewish family and converted to the Russian Orthodox religion, plans to reactivate that administrative entity founded by Stalin in 1934 as an alternative to the creation of the State of Israel. What used to be a Jewish republic within the former Soviet Union could become the future home to refugees, who would certainly be welcomed since Russia is experiencing a plummeting demographic decline.
Ultimately, it is Russia’s procrastinations with respect to Iran’s nuclear program that surprise the most. It is a fact that Iranian businessmen have constantly questioned the bills submitted for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. It is also true that the Persians have become sensitive after years of Anglo-American interference. But the Kremlim hasn’t stopped blowing hot and cold. President Medvedev speaks with the West and pledges Russia’s support in favor of the UN sanctions voted by the Security Council. Meanwhile, Putin assures the Iranians that Russia will not leave them unshielded if they accept to play the game of transparency. On the ground, officials are wondering whether the two leaders have split their roles according to the interlocutors in order to jack up the bids. Or, whether Russia has been paralysed by a conflict brewing at the apex of power? In reality, this is what appears to be happening: the Medvedev-Putin duo has gradually deteriorated and their relationship has abruptly turned into a fratricidal war.
Russian diplomacy had led the Non-Aligned countries to believe that a fourth resolution adopted by the UN Security Council condemning Iran would be preferable to the adoption of unilateral measures by the United States or the European Union. It was wrong since Washington and Brussels would automatically use the UN resolution to justify their own unilateral and additional sanctions.
During a joint press Conference, held on May 14, with his Brazilian counterpart, President Medvedev indicated that he had reached a common position with President Obama during a phone conversation: If Iran accepted the proposal made [in November 2009] to enrich uranium abroad, there would be no reason to adopt sanctions at the Security Council. But when Iran unexpectedly signed the Teheran Protocol with Brazil and Turkey, Washington withdrew and Moscow hurriedly followed suit, breaching its commitment.
On 14 May 2010, Russian president Medvedev publicly vowed his support for the initiative by his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva to solve the Iranian crisis. Some days later, Medvedev aligned with the United States and ordered his ambassador at the UN to vote in favor of Resolution 1929, thus reneging on his previous promise.
© Kremlin Press Service
It is a fact that Russia’s permanent representative at the Security Council, Vitaly Churkin, drained resolution 1929 of much of its substance by preventing a total energy embargo … but he nevertheless voted in favor. Short of being effective, the resolution is altogether an outrage for Iran, for Brazil, for Turkey as well as for all the Non-Aligned states that support Teheran’s position. The resolution is all the more shocking since it violates the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which guarantee to all signatory countries the right to enrich uranium. Resolution 1929 of the UN Security Council denies Iran that right. Up to now Russia seemed to be the defender of international law. But it is not any longer. The Non-Aligned countries in general, and Iran in particular, have interpreted the Russian vote as the will on the part of a great power to prevent emerging powers from attaining the energy independence they need for their economic development. And it will be difficult to make them forget this Russian faux pas.
http://www.voltairenet.org/article166818.html
Caught up in a smoldering feud between its President and Prime Minister, Russia is not making the most of the historic opportunity to deploy in the Middle East. Russian elites were unable to draw up a strategy for that region when they had the chance and, now, they are no longer capable of it. In Thierry Meyssan’s view, Moscow is paralyzed, having failed both to take full advantage of the botched US “remodeling” of the Middle East and to fulfill the hopes raised by Vladimir Putin.
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President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. The understanding between the “30-year” friends has abruptly turned into an open war. Under these conditions, how could Moscow nurture any major ambition in the Middle East?
The Israeli defeat in the Summer of 2006 against the Lebanese resistance spelled the end of US supremacy in the Middle East. In only four years, the military, economic and diplomatic situation in that region underwent a complete change.
At present, the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle has emerged as the leading pole while Russia and China expand their influence as that of the United States is fading. However, Moscow is reluctant to seize the opportunities it has at hand. First of all, its priority is not the Middle East; secondly because no project related to this region has the consensus of the Russian elites, finally because Middle East conflicts have sensitive implications for Russia’s own domestic problems. Let’s take stock of the situation.
2001-2006 and the myth of the remodeling of the “Great Middle East”
The Bush administration was able to rally the oil lobby, the military industrial complex and the Zionist movement around a huge project: securing control of the oil fields running from the Caspian Sea to the Horn of Africa by redesigning the political map based on small ethnic states. The zone, demarcated not according to its population but to the riches under its soil, was first called “Crescent Crisis” by University professor Bernard Lewis and later “Greater Middle East” by George W. Bush.
Washington did not skimp on its Middle East “remodeling” project. Huge sums of money were invested in buying local elites so that their personal interests would come before national interests in the context of a globalized economy. Most important was the deployment of a strong military force to Afghanistan and Iraq to hem in Iran, the main actor in the region that stands up to the empire. Maps of the new region were drawn up and circulated by the Chiefs of Staff. All countries in the region, including Washington’s allies, would be broken up into various emirates incapable of defending themselves, while vanquished Iraq would be divided into three federate states (a Kurdish, a Sunni and a Shiite).
When it seemed that nothing could prevent that domination process from going ahead, the Pentagon handed Israel the task of destroying all secondary fronts before attacking Iran. The aim was to wipe out the Lebanese Hezbollah and to overthrow the Syrian government. However, after submitting one third of the Lebanese territory to a bombing campaign the likes of which hadn’t seen since the Vietnam War, Israel was forced to retreat without having attained any of its goals. That defeat marked a strategic shift in the balance of forces.
Over the next months, US generals rebelled against the White House. They had lost control of the situation in Iraq and anticipated with apprehension the difficulties of a war against a well-armed and organized state—Iran—potentially setting the entire region ablaze. The generals, gathered around Admiral William Fallon and senior general Brent Scowcroft, forged an alliance with several realistic politicians who opposed the danger inherent in the excessive military deployment.
They used the Baker-Hamilton Commission to influence American voters until obtaining the dismissal of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his replacement with one of their allies: Robert Gates. Subsequently, these same individuals hoisted Obama to the White House, on condition that Robert Gates would remain the Pentagon.
In fact, the US General Staff has lacked an alternative strategy ever since the “remodeling” failed. Its only concern is to stabilize its positions. US soldiers withdrew from large Iraqi cities and retreated to their bases. They left the management of Iraq’s Kurdish areas in the hands of the Israelis while the Arab zones were left to the Iranians. The US State Department has stopped handing out sumptuous gifts to regional leaders and has become increasingly avaricious in these times of economic crisis. Yesterday’s beholden are looking for new masters to feed them.
Tel Aviv is the only one to still believe that the US withdrawal is but an eclipse and that the “remodelling” will resume once the economic crisis is over.
Formation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran Triangle
Washington thought that the dismantlement of Iraq would be contagious. The Sunni-Shiite civil war (the Fitna, in Arabic) was supposed to pit Iran against Saudi Arabia and split the whole Arab-Muslim world. The virtual independence of Iraqi Kurdistan was expected to cause a Kurdish secession in Turkey, Syria and Iran.
But the opposite happened. The easing of US pressure on Iraq sealed the alliance among the enemy brothers of Turkey, Syria and Iran. All three realized that in order to survive they had to unite and that once united they could exert regional leadership. In fact, Turkey, Syria and Iran, together, cover all crucial aspects of the regional political spectrum. As the heir to the Ottoman empire, Turkey incarnates political Sunni Islam. As the only remaining Baathist state after the destruction of Iraq, Syria embodies secularism. And, finally, since the Khomeiny Revolution, Iran represents political Shi’ism.
In just a few months, Ankara, Damascus and Teheran opened their common borders, lowered customs tariffs and paved the way for a common market. This opening provided them with a breath of fresh air and a sudden economic growth which, despite the memories of prior disputes, has also garnered genuine grassroots support.
However, each of these three states has its own Achilles’ heel which the United States and Israel, as well as some of their neighbors, will attempt to exploit.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
For years, Tel Aviv and Washington have accused Iran of violating its obligations as signatory of the [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty and of developing a secret military nuclear program. In the times of Shah Reza Pahlevi, both capitals - plus Paris - had set up a large program designed to provide Iran with the atomic bomb. In view of its history, it was generally accepted that Iran had no expansionit ambitions and that the great powers could safely provide it with such technology. A propaganda campaign based on deliberately fabricated information was later organized, painting current Iranian leaders as fanatic and capable of using the atomic bomb - if they had it - in an irrational manner, therefore posing a great threat to world peace.
Nevertheless, Iranian leaders affirm they have renounced to building, storing or using the atomic bomb, precisely due to ideological reasons. And their assertion to totally reliable. Let us simply recall what happened during the war led by the Iraq of Sadam Husein against the Iran of Imam Khomeiny.
When Baghdad unleashed a stream of missiles against Iranian cities, Teheran retaliated in the same way. But they were unguided missiles that were launched in any given direction and fell indicriminately. Imam Khomeiny intervened to denounce the use of such weapons by his own armed forces. Khomeiny stressed that good Muslims should refrain from shooting at the military if it entailed the risk of killing a large number of civilians. Khomeiny then prohibited the use of missiles against cities, which had an impact on the balance of forces, prolonged the war and brought new suffering to the Iranian people. At present, the successor of Khomeiny, Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Revolution, defends the same ethics in respect of nuclear weapons and it is unthinkable that any faction of the Iranian state would dare to violate the authority of the Supreme Leader and secretly build the atomic bomb.
The fact is that after the Iraqi offensive, Iran anticipated the eventual depletion of its hydrocarbon reserves and wanted to have a civil nuclear industry to guarantee its own long-term development and that of the rest of Third World nations. To this end, the Revolutionary Guards set up a special team of officials dedicated to scientific and technical research, which was organized in secret cities, according to the soviet model. These researchers are also working on other programs, such as those linked to conventional weapons. Iran has opened all its nuclear facilities for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it refuses to give them access to research facilities dedicated to conventional weapons. We therefore find ourselves in a déjà vu situation : IAEA inspectors assure there is nothing to accuse Iran of, while the CIA and the Mossad insist—without any evidence—that Iran hides its illegal activities within its vast scientific research sector.This situation is reminiscent of the intoxication campaign previously carried out by the Bush administration, accusing the UN inspectors of not doing their job properly and of overlooking the WMD programs supposedly developed by Sadam Husein.
No country in the world has been the object of so many IAEA inspections and it is not serious to keep accusing Iran, but it hasn’t made a dent in the bad faith displayed by Washington and Tel Aviv. The fallacy about the alleged threat is crucial for the military industrial complex, which has for years implemented the Israeli program known as “antimissile shield” with US taxperyers’ money. Without the Iranian threat, there is no budget!
Teheran has undertaken two operations to get out of the trap which was set against it. First, it organized an international conference for a nuclear-free world, during which Iran finally expounded its position to its principal partners (on April 17). Iran also accepted the mediation by Brazil, a country whose president Lula da Silva aspires to become the Secretary General of the United Nations. President Lula had asked his US counterpart Barack Obama what kind of measures would be likely to reestablish confidence. Obama replied in writing that the compromise concluded in November 2009, but never ratified, would suffice. President Lula travelled to Moscow to make sure Russian President Dimitri Medvedev had the same opinion. President Medvedev publicly confirmed his view that the November 2009 compromise would be enough to solve the crisis. The next day, May 18, President Lula co-signed with Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a document that, from all perspectives, met the demands made by the United States and Russia. But the White House and the Kremlin did an about-face, going back on their position, and denounced the guarantees offered by the new document as insufficient.
However, there is no significant difference between the document negotiated in November 2009 and the one ratified [by Iran, Brazil and Turkey] in May 2010.
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Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) is striving to restore his country’s independence in the face of US tutelage. By opening his country to Russian trade, the Turkish PM intends to balance international relations. His foreing minister Ahmet Davutoglu (right) is trying to solve, one by one, the conflicts inherited from the past, which hinder Ankara’s scope of action.
Turkey’s liabilities
Turkey inherited from its past a large number of problems with its minorities and neighbors; the United States has been fueling these problems for decades to keep Turkey under its thumb. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, a theorist of neo-ottomanism and new Turkish foreign minister, has drawn up a foreign policy aimed, in the first place, at freeing Turkey from the endless conflicts bogging it down, as well as at multiplying its alliances with various intergovernmental institutions.
The dispute with Syria was the first to be solved. Damascus stopped using the Kurds and abandoned its claim over the Hatay province. In return, Ankara yielded on the division of river waters and helped Damascus to come out of its diplomatic isolation; it even organized direct negotiations with Tel Aviv, which occupies the Syrian Golan. Syrian President Bachar el-Assad was received in Turkey (in 2004) and the Turkish President Abdullah Gull was welcomed in Syria (in 2009). A Strategic Cooperation Council was set up by the two countries.
As for Iraq, Ankara had opposed an invasion of this country by the Anglo-Americans (in 2003). It banned the United States from using the NATO bases on Turkish territory to attack Bagdad, thus upsetting Washington and delaying the start of the war. When the Anglo-Americans formally transferred power to the Iraqis, Ankara favored the electoral process and encouraged the Turkmen minority to take part in the vote. Later, Turkey relaxed border controls and boosted bilateral trade. There is only one aspect marring this panorama: relations between Ankara and the Bagdad national government are excellent, but they are chaotic with the Kurdish regional government of Erbil. The Turkish army even took the liberty of persecuting the PKK separatists inside Iraqi territory—needless to say, with the support of the Pentagon and under its control. Be that as it may, an accord was signed to guarantee the export of Iraqi oil through the Turkish harbor of Ceyhan.
Ankara took a series of initiatives to put an end to the secular conflict with the Armenians. Resorting to “football diplomacy”, Ankara acknowledged the 1915 massacre (but refused the term ‘genocide’), and managed to establish diplomatic relations with Erevan, while it seeks a solution to the High Karabaj conflict. Nevertheless, Armenia suspended the ratification of the Zurich bi-party accord.
Turkey’s liability in relation to Greece and Cyprus is also very significant. The division of the Aegean Sea has not yet been clarified and the Turkish army is still occupying Northern Cyprus. Ankara has proposed different measures to reestablish confidence, particularly the mutual reopening of harbors and airports. But relations are far from being normalized and, for the time being, Ankara does not appear willing to abandon the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Syria’s diplomatic isolation
Washington has accused Syria of continuing its war against Israel through various intermediaries: Iran’s secret services, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas. The United States thus falsely blamed Syrian President Bachar el Assad of having ordered the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and had a Special Penal Court set up to judge the Syrian President.
With astonishing ability, Bachar el-Assad, who had been depicted as a conceited and totally incompetent "daddy’s boy”, managed to wiggle out of that corner without making concessions or firing a single shot. The testimonies of his accusers wilted one after the other, and Saad Hariri, the son of the late Hariri, stopped demanding his arrest and even paid him a friendly visit in Damascus. Nobody wants to finance the Special Court any more and it is possible that the UN might decide to dismantle it even before it convenes, unless it will be used as a forum to accuse Hezbollah.
Finally, in response to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s injunctions to break relations with Iran and with Hezbollah, Bachar el-Assad organized a surprise Summit meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and with the top Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
What about Russia?
The consolidation of the Turkey-Syria-Iran triangle is a consequence of US and Israeli military power decline. The vacuum created is being filled by others.
China has become Iran’s first commercial partner and draws on the expertise of the Revolutionary Guards to overcome the hurdles set up by the CIA in Africa. It also gives military back-up, as discreet as it is effective, to Hezbollah (which it probably equipped with land-to-air missiles and guiding systems to counter interference) and to Hamas (which opened a representation office in Pekin). However, China is advancing very slowly and cautiously on the Middle East stage where it has no intention of playing a decisive role.
All expectations point in Moscow’s direction, which has been absent from the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia wants to recover its former position of world power, but is reluctant to make a move before having solved the problems it currently faces in the former Warsaw Pact zone. The main drawback is that the Russian elites have no alternative policy to replace the US “remodeling” project and are stuck on precisely the same problem as the United Sates: in view of the shift in the regional power correlation, it is no longer possible to implement a balanced policy between Israel and the Arab countries. Any involvement in the region implies, sooner or later, a rupture with the Zionist regime.
Moscow’s clock stopped in 1991, at the moment when the Madrid Conference took place. Moscow has not yet registered the failure of the Oslo (signed in 1993) and the Wabi Araba (1994) accords in terms of implementing the so-called “Two-State Solution”, which is no longer viable. The only peaceful option is the one implemented by South Africa: the abandonment of Apartheid and the recognition of a single nationality for all citizens, Jews and non-Jews alike; and the reinstatement of a real democracy based on the principle of “one man, one vote.” That is already the official position adopted by Syria and Iran, which will soon be embraced also by Turkey.
The great diplomatic conference on the Middle East that the Kremlin wanted to organize in Moscow in 2009, and which was both announced at the Annapolis Summit and confirmed by several UN resolutions, never took place. Russia passed up its opportunity to act.
Those Russian elites which still enjoy great prestige in the Middle East, no longer frequent the region; they fantasize about it more than they understand it. In the 1990s, they were enthusiastic over the romantic theories of anthropologist Lev Gumilev and were in tune with Turkey, the only nation which, similar to Russia, is both European and Asian. Then, they fell for the geo-political charisma of Alexander Dugin, who detested western materialism, thought that Turkey was contaminated by western values, and was mesmerized by the asceticism of the Iranian Revolution.
However, that momentum evaporated in Chechnya before it began to materialize. Russia was brutally confronted with a form of religious extremism that received undercover support from the United States and was fueled by the Turkish and Saudi secret services. As a consequence, any alliance with a Muslim state seemed risky and dangerous. And when peace was reestablished in Grozny, Russia was unable, or did not want, to play on its colonial heritage. According to the President of the Islamic Committee of Russia, Gaidar Zhemal, Russia cannot aspire to become an euro-Asian nation and at the same time pretend that nothing happened nor can it continue to view itself as an orthodox state which is protecting its turbulent Muslim brothers. Russia had—and still has—to define itself by considering orthodox and Muslims as equals.
Rather than leaving for tomorrow the solution to the problems concerning minorities, and postponing for the day after tomorrow its involvement in the Middle East, Russia could consider interacting with Muslim partners abroad, as reliable third-party players, with a view to establishing an internal dialogue. The Syria of Bachar el-Assad constitutes a model of a post-socialist state on its way to democratization that has been able to preserve its lay institutions, has allowed the flourishing of major religions and their various ramifications, including hardcore Wahhabism, while also managing to preserve social peace.
The economic attraction
For the time being, the Russian elites are ignoring the warning issued by former Chief of Staff of the Russian armed forces, General Leonid Ivashov, about the need to establish alliances in Asia and in the Middle East, in the face of US imperialism. As noted by political analyst Gleb Pavlovski, they prefer to think that geo-political antagonism will dissipate thanks to economic globalization. They also regard the Middle East primarily as a market.
President Dimitri Medvedev has recently concluded a tour that took him to Damascus and Ankara. He lifted visa requirements and opened the doors of the burgeoning common market (Turkey, Syria, Iran + Lebanon) for Russian companies. He also favored the sale of a large arsenal to all these countries. In particular, he negotiated the ten-year construction of nuclear power plants. Finally, he took advantage of Turkey’s strategic evolution to obtain support for the transit of Russia’s hydrocarbons. A Russian land oil pipeline would connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Ankara might be attracted to the transnational South Stream gas pipeline project.
The limits of Russia’s involvement
Outside of the economic sphere, it is hard for Moscow to consolidate its position. Former Soviet naval bases in Syria have been reactivated and opened to the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, all the more since naval deployment in the Black Sea is expected to be reduced. It is all happening as if Moscow were trying to gain time and postpone the Israeli issue.
The fact is that any condemnation [by Russia] of Jewish colonialism may revive internal problems. In the first place because, to express it in a caricatural and unflattering manner, Israeli apartheid is reminiscent of Russia’s treatment of the Chechnyans; and also because Russia is acting under the burden of a historical complex: that of anti-Semitism. Vladimir Putin has tried on several occasions to turn the page through symbolic gestures such as appointing a rabbi to the army, but Russia keeps feeling uncomfortable with this issue.
However, Russia ought to stop playing the waiting game; the dice have been tossed and Russia must face the consequences once and for all. Israel played a crucial role in arming and training the Georgian troops that attacked and killed Russian citizens in Southern Ossetia. In response, Georgia’s Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, a double Israeli-Georgian national, rented two military air bases to the Israeli Tsahal enabling it to attack Iran from a closer distance. Moscow stood stoically by without lifting a finger against Israel.
The Middle East looked upon this lack of reaction with surprise. It is true that Tel Aviv has numerous relations with the Russian elites, networking with them by offering to some of the most influential people material privileges in Israel. But, Moscow has comparatively many more contacts in Israel, considering the presence of some one million Soviets immigrants. Conceivably, Moscow could bring to the fore some personality capable of playing in occupied Palestine the role played by Frederik de Klerk in South Africa: to abolish Apartheid and establish democracy in the heart of one single state. With this scenario in mind, Dimitri Medvedev anticipates a possible exodus of Israeli Jews who would not tolerate the new situation. Therefore, he blocked the formerly announced merger between the Krai of Jabarovsk with the autonomous Jewish Oblast of Birobidyan. The Russian president, who comes from a Jewish family and converted to the Russian Orthodox religion, plans to reactivate that administrative entity founded by Stalin in 1934 as an alternative to the creation of the State of Israel. What used to be a Jewish republic within the former Soviet Union could become the future home to refugees, who would certainly be welcomed since Russia is experiencing a plummeting demographic decline.
Ultimately, it is Russia’s procrastinations with respect to Iran’s nuclear program that surprise the most. It is a fact that Iranian businessmen have constantly questioned the bills submitted for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. It is also true that the Persians have become sensitive after years of Anglo-American interference. But the Kremlim hasn’t stopped blowing hot and cold. President Medvedev speaks with the West and pledges Russia’s support in favor of the UN sanctions voted by the Security Council. Meanwhile, Putin assures the Iranians that Russia will not leave them unshielded if they accept to play the game of transparency. On the ground, officials are wondering whether the two leaders have split their roles according to the interlocutors in order to jack up the bids. Or, whether Russia has been paralysed by a conflict brewing at the apex of power? In reality, this is what appears to be happening: the Medvedev-Putin duo has gradually deteriorated and their relationship has abruptly turned into a fratricidal war.
Russian diplomacy had led the Non-Aligned countries to believe that a fourth resolution adopted by the UN Security Council condemning Iran would be preferable to the adoption of unilateral measures by the United States or the European Union. It was wrong since Washington and Brussels would automatically use the UN resolution to justify their own unilateral and additional sanctions.
During a joint press Conference, held on May 14, with his Brazilian counterpart, President Medvedev indicated that he had reached a common position with President Obama during a phone conversation: If Iran accepted the proposal made [in November 2009] to enrich uranium abroad, there would be no reason to adopt sanctions at the Security Council. But when Iran unexpectedly signed the Teheran Protocol with Brazil and Turkey, Washington withdrew and Moscow hurriedly followed suit, breaching its commitment.
On 14 May 2010, Russian president Medvedev publicly vowed his support for the initiative by his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva to solve the Iranian crisis. Some days later, Medvedev aligned with the United States and ordered his ambassador at the UN to vote in favor of Resolution 1929, thus reneging on his previous promise.
© Kremlin Press Service
It is a fact that Russia’s permanent representative at the Security Council, Vitaly Churkin, drained resolution 1929 of much of its substance by preventing a total energy embargo … but he nevertheless voted in favor. Short of being effective, the resolution is altogether an outrage for Iran, for Brazil, for Turkey as well as for all the Non-Aligned states that support Teheran’s position. The resolution is all the more shocking since it violates the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which guarantee to all signatory countries the right to enrich uranium. Resolution 1929 of the UN Security Council denies Iran that right. Up to now Russia seemed to be the defender of international law. But it is not any longer. The Non-Aligned countries in general, and Iran in particular, have interpreted the Russian vote as the will on the part of a great power to prevent emerging powers from attaining the energy independence they need for their economic development. And it will be difficult to make them forget this Russian faux pas.
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